Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd preannounce quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information.     

Theory of the dominant firm: A capital market test

This study provides a test of dominant firm theory by examining earnings-induced information transfers within industries that have a dominant firm. Based on the economic asymmetries between dominant and fringe firms, it is posited that the earnings announcements of dominant firms will act as an industry bell, resulting in a positive association between the unexpected earnings of the dominant firm and the security price changes of the fringe firms. Due to their position as industry followers, the earnings announcements of the fringe firms are not expected to affect the security prices of the dominant firm. The results of empirical tests are generally consistent with dominant firm theory.     

Patriotic Stock Repurchases: The Two Weeks Following the 9–11 Attack

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks created a unique situation where patriotism became a significant motive for companies to make stock buyback announcements. Officials from the stock markets and the SEC encouraged stock repurchase announcements to help stabilize the markets. However, some analysts questioned the wisdom of repurchase announcements at this time of economic uncertainty, given that buybacks reduce the firm's cash and equity. This study finds that announcements made during the two weeks following the attacks had a positive effect on a firm's stock price. It was also found that the earlier the announcement following the attacks, generally the more positive the market response. This suggests the possibility of a patriotism effect where the firms most eager to show their patriotism were rewarded by patriotic investors.     

Analyst Following and Equity Offerings Subsequent to Initial Public Offerings

Analyst forecast information is collected for firms following their IPOs and is used in an examination of subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Consistent with information asymmetry arguments, the analysis indicates that a larger percentage of firms conducting SEOs within three years of the IPO are covered by financial analysts than those without SEOs, and that analyst coverage is a significant predictor of subsequent SEOs. In addition, the results indicate that long-term earnings growth forecasts are larger for firms with subsequent SEOs, but growth forecasts decline significantly following the SEOs. Further, SEO abnormal returns exhibit a significant negative relationship with earnings growth forecasts. These results are consistent with windows of opportunity arguments since they suggest that SEOs are timed to coincide with the peak of earnings growth expectations, but that market participants compensate by reacting more negatively to offerings by firms with high growth forecasts.     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

On the Rationality of the Post-Announcement Drift

This paper demonstrates that a post-announcement earnings drift, which is often advanced as an example of market irrationality, can arise even if traders act rationally on their information. Specifically, we show that in the presence of share supply variations which are unrelated to information, there is a positive correlation between the unexpected component of current public signals and future price changes. Such a correlation arises from the fact that while prices reveal private information that cannot be found in public signals, non-information based trading distorts the information content of prices relative to the implications of both private and public information. Under these circumstances, markets may appear semi-strong inefficient and slow to respond to earnings announcements even though information is processed in a timely and efficient manner. Our findings correspond well with previously documented empirical evidence and suggest that the robustness of earnings-based anomalies may be rational outcomes of varying uncertain share supply.     

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.     

Microstructure of Firms' Disclosure

Because of imperfections in auditing technology, firms can successfully misrepresent financial reports. We offer a new mechanism, a sunshine rule, by which firms are required to publicize a management draft prior to the audited reports. If the final reports are materially different from the management's draft, the market penalizes both the firm and the manager. The proposal's effectiveness in eliminating earnings management, increasing the quality of the financial reports, and reducing the cost of the manager's incentives is illustrated in signaling games with perfect and imperfect information and a principal-agent model with perfect information.     

A New Approach to Group Structure, Burden Sharing, and the Equilibrium Provision of Public Goods

In the received model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good, the usual practice is to proceed from assumptions about the group characteristics to inferences about an implied outcome. The approach advocated in this paper reverses the traditional direction. Assuming a Nash equilibrium, we ask how to characterize the diverse set of group characteristics which will support it. Approaching the problem from this angle we define three crucial characteristics of a group-equilibrium: consumer's free rider inducing supply, zero contribution-inducing wealth and voluntary surplus tribute which is the amount by which a person's actual income exceeds his/her zero-contribution inducing wealth. Defining these indicators we show how they form the foundation of a complete mapping between the distribution of individual characteristics of a group, and equilibrium public good supply. Certain questions such as the interaction between size of the group and heterogeneity of incomes and tastes not yet adequately addressed are shown to yield easily to this approach.     

The Impact of Risk-Based Premiums on FDIC-Insured Institutions

This paper examines the effect of a series of announcements leading to the approval of risk-based deposit insurance premiums on returns to stockholders of commercial banks. Utilizing risk-weighted capital ratios and measures of overall risk, we group banks according to one of the nine-tier insurance categories subsequently defined by the FDIC. During the period in which the new insurance system was considered and approved, we found that stockholders of well-capitalized, healthy banks experienced wealth changes significantly different from those experienced by less than well-capitalized, less than healthy banks. Although many argued the premium range in the initial insurance schedule was insufficient, the results show that this initial risk-basing marked an important change in the relative burdens imposed by FDIC insurance.     

Dwelling Age,Redevelopment, and Housing Prices: The Case of Apartment Complexes in Seoul

The aging of a housing structure not only leads to depreciation but also increases the possibility of redevelopment. If redevelopment accompanies an increase in structural density in order to accommodate the increased demand for housing, it provides large capital gains to the existing owners. In this case, expectations of redevelopment in the near future and the eventual announcement of redevelopment plans can have a strong positive impact on the current price of housing. We test this hypothesis using a hedonic pricing model designed to decompose the age effects into depreciation effect and redevelopment effect. Based on 3,474 observations on apartments in Seoul in 2001, estimation results confirm our hypothesis. While the depreciation effect dominates the redevelopment effect until 15 to 19 years of age, depending on the specification, the redevelopment effect eventually dominates the depreciation effect thereafter, causing the apartment price to increase. At 27 years of age, the apartment price decreases by as much as 4553 percent of the initial value, due to depreciation. However, the redevelopment effect increases the price by as much as 2832 percent, driving the price up to 7687 percent of the original value.     

Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Valuation

A simulation method is employed to value Adustable Rate Mortgages, (ARMS). It is used to price two typical instruments: an ARM linked to a Treasury interest rate and an ARM linked to a Cost of Funds Index. Contractual provisions such as the margin over the index, caps and floors on the ARM's rate or on the monthly prepayment, reset frequency, and the teaser rate are examined for their influence on value. The effects of interest rate trend and volatility are also analysed.This paper was written when both authors were employees of Goldman, Sachs & Co. in New York.The material in this paper is for private information, and Goldman, Sachs & co. is not soliciting any action based on it. Opinions expressed are the authors present opinions only. The material is based upon information which Goldman, Sachs & Co. considers reliable; but it does not represent that the material is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldman, Sachs & Co. may from time to time have a long or short position in, and buy or sell, securities mentioned.     

The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability

Prior research provides evidence that a higher proportion of accrued relative to cash earnings is associated with lower earnings performance in the subsequent fiscal year. The result has been widely interpreted as indicative of higher levels of operating accruals relative to cash flows foreshadowing a subsequent earnings reversal, and thus signaling earnings management. We note, however, that earnings performance in prior studies is typically defined as one-year-ahead operating income divided by one-year-ahead invested capital, or a measure of profitability. We find that accruals are more highly associated than cash flows with invested capital in the denominator of the profitability measure. In contrast, accruals and cash flows have no differential relation to one-year-ahead operating income. The evidence is not consistent with accruals having a reversal effect on earnings. This suggests that the lower persistence of accruals versus cash flows may not be due to earnings management but may rather be due to the effect of growth on future profitability.     

Information Monopoly and Commitment in Intermediary-Firm Relationships

A bank may use the private information that it acquires through monitoring to hold up borrowers. This information monopoly of the bank may inefficiently distort the borrowers investment decisions in environments where moral hazard is prevalent. The paper analyses how this problem is resolved within bank-firm relationships. In the benchmark case when the bank can contractually commit to future actions, the optimal contract turns out to be ambiguous in nature. When commitment contracts cannot be written, firms have an incentive to develop multiple banking relationships in order to decrease the inside banks bargaining power. However, with costly monitoring, this may defeat the initial purpose for contracting with a financial intermediary, namely information production. The paper argues that when contractual commitment is not feasible, bank size may serve as an alternative commitment device that prevents the bank from holding up borrowers in the future.     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REACTION TO DIVIDEND CUTS AND OMISSIONS

In this paper the proposition is tested that stock market reaction to a dividend change is a function of its information content. A multiple regression model is formulated to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut/omit dividends. Results indicate that, in conformity with the information content hypothesis, the announcement period capital loss induced by a dividend deduction significantly depends on the percentage change in dividends, the size and risk of the firm, and the price performance of the firm's stock in the immediately preceding period. The results further reveal that (1) simultaneous announcements of poor earnings cause larger capital losses; (2) prior announcements of loss/lower earnings, strikes, etc. attenuate the negative impact of dividend cuts; (3) managerial reassurances that the dividend reduction is growth-motivated produces a weakly favorable effect, and (4) institution of stock dividends concurrently with the dividend cut significantly reduces the negative valuation effect. It is concluded from the evidence that stock market reaction to managerial signals is a function of the perceived costs associated with these signals.     

Do Market Makers Suffer from Splitting Headaches?

Studies of transactions surrounding stock split ex-dates often conclude that splitting firms either experience a decline or an improvement in their stock's liquidity, based on independent measures of trading costs and trading activity. In contrast, our evidence suggests that splits from outside into what often is deemed to be the optimal stock price range of $10.00 to $39.99 are nonevents for market makers: The spread-setting behavior of the market does not change after a split. Our analysis accounts for the interdependencies between bid-ask spreads and market microstructure effects and distinguishes between optimal and all other splitting firms.     

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.     

Discussion of “The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings”

Doyle et al. (2003, this issue) provide evidence that IBES exclusions have incremental explanatory power (over GAAP earnings) for future cash flows, for market-adjusted returns at the earnings announcement date, and for future market-adjusted returns. They argue that this evidence supports the viewpoint that the current regulatory concern about the use of pro forma earnings may be warranted. My contention in this discussion is that one can readily posit alternative explanations for each of the empirical results, in turn suggesting that the results do not provide a basis for regulatory concern. Further, since there is considerable evidence that IBES earnings differ from pro forma earnings, it is not clear that the empirical analyzes in this paper may be used to draw any conclusions about pro forma earnings.     

The Impact of Taxing Unemployment Insurance Benefits on Unemployment Duration and Post-unemployment Earnings

In 1979, unemployment insurance benefits became taxableincome for recipients with income above a specified threshold.Further legislation in 1982 lowered the income threshold. Thispaper uses the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) database to evaluate the effects of the 1982 change on the compensatedduration of unemployment and post-unemployment earnings. The1982 episode is a particularly useful natural experimentbecause the treatment group (those newly subject to benefittaxation) is the middle income category and the two controlgroups (those whose benefits were already taxed and those whosebenefits still were not taxed) are the high and low income categories.If the two control groups show similar trends in unemploymentduration (or post-unemployment earnings) and the treatment groupshows a strikingly different pattern, this is compelling evidenceof a tax effect. The empirical results suggest that taxing unemploymentbenefits reduced the affected workers' mean compensated durationby more than a week, but did not have a statistically significanteffect on their post-unemployment earnings.     

FIRM SIZE AND DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENTS

This study documents an association between firm size and abnormal returns from the announcement of large dividend increases. Dividend announcements are examined only where there are no contemporaneous earnings announcements. The methodology controls for both the payout ratio of firms and the size of the dividend increase. Using means tests and analysis of variance, the findings indicate that the abnormal stock price reaction to a dividend increase is greater for small firms.