Did state antiquity matter for the size of the informal economy?

Economics of Governance - This study investigates how state history influences the size of the informal sector. The study employs a two-stage least squares estimation technique with data from 91...     

Orderbook demand for corporate bonds

We examine the determinants of investor demand for corporate bond offerings using novel data on the primary market orderbook size. We find that credit risk and bond market presence are significant in explaining investor demand. These effects are more pronounced during the crisis periods including the global financial crisis and eurozone crisis as well as during the postcrisis periods. Our results also highlight the size of the bond investor order depends on information asymmetry costs and the benefit of diversifications, as investor demand is lower for new issuers as well as very frequent issuers. The levels of investor demand have important economic consequences for bond issuers as high investor demand shortens the time to subsequent bond issues and potentially reduces the firm's cost of capital at issuance.     

Reversibly greater downside risk aversion

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review - It is shown that, for the Arrow–Pratt measure $$r_u=-u''/u'$$ and the third-order measure $$D_u=u'''/u'-3r_u^2,$$ an...     

Subjective Inheritance Expectations and Economic Outcomes

In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent inheritance expectations act as a driver of economic choices. We use survey data that are representative of the Dutch adult population with a specific module on subjective probabilities on receiving an inheritance and its amount in the next 10 years. We analyze whether the expected inheritance acts as a deterrent to saving. Results suggest that individuals perceive the expected inheritances as a potential increase of personal wealth, which leads to a reduction in savings. Expectations also appear to matter for the intentions to bequeath and for intended choices on work versus leisure in the future.     

The political reception of innovations

Why do some societies embrace innovative technologies, policies, and ideas, while others are slow to adopt, and some even resist, them? Incumbent producers are most likely to be affected by certain kinds of innovations; they also wield a disproportionate influence in the design of institutions and policies that encourage or limit their adoption. We show formally that the elite has four cardinal policy options: to appropriate the innovation for itself; to encourage its adoption; to tax, regulate, or limit the innovation; or to block it. We show that six features of an innovation determine how it is received: (i) whether it is easy to replicate; (ii) whether it complements or competes with the elite's sources of income; (iii) whether its impact is broad or narrow; (iv) whether it is location-dependent, and (v) concealable; (vi) whether it requires large fixed costs. While other works have occasionally considered one of these factors, we show where each feature comes from, and we assess them systematically and together. We provide illustrative evidence of the relevance and generality of the model to understand the fate of a variety of innovations.     

Moral leadership and investor attention: An empirical assessment of the potus’s tweets on firms’ market returns

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Drawing upon investor attention and moral leadership theories, we examine the impact of President Trump’s tweets on firms’ market...