Market Power and the Power Market: Multi-Unit Bidding and (In)Efficiency in Electricity Auctions

In this paper we apply auction theory to the modelling of competition in a multi-unit wholesale electricity market. Bidding strategies of multi-plant producers are derived and examined assuming various degrees of market concentration. Unlike previous literature, which mainly focuses on demand uncertainty, we assume both demand and cost uncertainty as well as cost differentials among the two types of generating units considered in the model, namely baseload units and peak units. Results indicate that the System Marginal Price (competitive pricing) rule provides incentives for bid shading on the part of all those generators-units who have a non-null probability of setting the market price. We also show that the extent of the bid shading is positively affected by the differential in the endowments of the baseload generation capacity of multi-plant firms. The inefficiency of the resulting allocation is also examined and some policy implications are briefly discussed.     

Learning to Build a Car: An Empirical Investigation of Organizational Learning

abstract    This study provides a longitudinal empirical examination of the basic elements of Nonaka's (1994 ) dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. First, the data illustrate the notion that knowledge creation in organizations proceeds through an intertwined four-phase process: (1) socialization (tacit knowledge amplification); (2) externalization (tacit knowledge is transformed into explicit knowledge); (3) combination (explicit knowledge amplification); and (4) internalization (explicit knowledge is transformed into tacit knowledge). Second, the study extends Nonaka's theory by comparing the relative amount of intra-organizational knowledge transfer occurring during periods of product redesign with the amount of knowledge transfer occurring during steady-state periods. The questionnaire data suggest that the overall level of knowledge transfer is higher during periods of product redesign than it is during the steady state, whereas the interview data indicate that there were more mentions of knowledge transfer during the steady state. Third, the data suggest that there may be benefit in adding tacit error correction as a fifth phase in the learning cycle. This phase is characterized by a dual emphasis on externalization and internalization. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

WTO Disciplines on Domestic Support and Market Access in Agri‐Food Supply Chains

Multilateral negotiations on agriculture in the WTO are making very little progress as developed economies are reluctant to bind trade‐distorting domestic support and import tariffs at levels acceptable to developing countries. This paper presents the basic Bagwell–Staiger framework as it relates to agricultural trade negotiations. In its basic version, market access commitments are sufficient to achieve efficient trade agreements. We show that vertical linkages between agricultural goods and processed food commodities may prevent countries to reach an efficient trade agreement. We argue that the features of agricultural supply chains hinder the argument that total discretion over domestic policies is appropriate. Les négociations multilatérales de l'OMC sur l'agriculture progressent très lentement étant donné que les pays développés hésitent à maintenir un soutien interne qui fausse les échanges et des barrières tarifaires à des niveaux acceptables pour les pays en développement. Le présent article traite du modèle Bagwell–Staiger dans le contexte des négociations sur le commerce des produits agricoles. Dans sa version de base, les engagements quant à l'accès au marché sont suffisants pour permettre des échanges commerciaux efficaces. Nous montrons que les liens verticaux entre les produits agricoles et les produits alimentaires transformés peuvent empêcher les pays d'atteindre un accord commercial efficace. Nous soutenons que les caractéristiques des chaînes d'approvisionnement agricole entravent l'argument voulant que l'entière discrétion quant aux politiques intérieures soit appropriée.