The Impact of Option Introduction on Stock Return Variances: The Role of Bid-Ask Spreads, Return Autocorrelations, and Intrinsic Variances

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in stock return variances following option introduction. The sample consists of National Market System stocks and employs both transaction returns and returns based on bid and ask quotes. Variances are decomposed into portions attributable to bid-ask spreads, return autocorrelations, and intrinsic variances. Spreads play a negligible role in explaining variance changes. A generally positive component to short-term autocorrelations falls following option introduction, increasing variances over short holding periods. Intrinsic variances fall prior to the October 1987 crash, but do not change after the crash with option introduction.     

Economic analysis of the impact of adopting herd health control programs on smallholder dairy farms in Central Thailand

The economic impact of adopting herd health programs for mastitis and reproduction by small-scale dairy producers of Central Thailand was assessed using a policy analysis matrix (PAM). Following a reduction in the incidence of bovine disease on adopter farms, an increase in private net profits is observed. More importantly the social costs of supporting dairy farmers is reduced; the PAM effective protection coefficient was reduced by 35% for mastitis program adopters and by 44% for reproductive program adopters, indicating improved social efficiency of dairy policy. Other indicators of efficiency and policy implications are discussed.     

Is Index Performance Achievable? An Analysis of Australian Equity Index Funds

This article examines the performance of index equity funds in Australia. Despite the significant growth in index funds since 1976, when the first index mutual fund was launched in the U.S., research on their performance is sparse in the U.S. and non-existent in Australia. This study documents the existence of significant tracking error for Australian index funds. For example, the magnitude of the difference between index fund returns and index returns averages between 7.4 and 22.3 basis points per month across index funds operating for more than five years. However, there is little evidence of bias in tracking error implying that these funds neither systematically outperform nor underperform their benchmark on a before cost basis. Further analysis provides evidence that the magnitude of tracking error is related to fund cash flows, market volatility, transaction costs and index replication strategies used by the manager.     

Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs

We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spin-offs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spin-off announcement. Our findings suggest that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.     

A Spatial Cross–Sectional Analysis of Elasticity of Demand for Soccer

Several studies estimate the demand for watching English professional football (soccer) as highly inelastic, a puzzling result given that clubs appear to possess a degree of monopoly power. We discuss weaknesses in earlier studies and offer an alternative method of assessing elasticity based on travel costs of spectators living different distances from the grounds. We find that elasticity varies across the 20 senior clubs for which data were available but in almost every case demand is more elastic than reported in the existing literature and pricing policy appears therefore to be more orientated towards profit maximisation than previously thought.     

Focusing the fuzzy front–end in new product development

Effectively managing the 'upfront or fuzzy front–end' (FFE) of the product development process is one of the most important, difficult challenges facing innovation managers. In this paper, we define the FFE as the period between when an opportunity is first considered and when an idea is judged ready for development. We classify the outcomes of the FFE into product definition, time, and people dimensions. We suggest several strategies to manage the FFE by assigning a FFE manager or team; by providing organizational support for FFE activities; by understanding the sources of FFE ambiguity; by building an information system; and by developing relationships with supporters, partners, and alliances.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.