Pricing Bonds and Bond Options with Default Risk

The pricing of bonds and bond options with default risk is analysed in the general equilibrium model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). This model is extended by means of an additional parameter in order to deal with financial and credit risk simultaneously. The estimation of such a parameter, which can be considered as the market equivalent of an agencies' bond rating, allows to extract from current quotes the market perceptions of firm's credit risk. The general pricing model for defaultable zero-coupon bond is first derived in a simple discrete-time setting and then in continuous-time. The availability of an integrated model allows for the pricing of default-free options written on defaultable bonds and of vulnerable options written either on default-free bonds or defaultable bonds. A comparison between our results and those given by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is also presented.     

Strategic Interactions and Contagion Effects under Monetary Unions

This paper applies game theory and a cost‐benefit analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion effects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looks at two non‐core or periphery countries of a large union and examines the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions as determinants of equilibrium outcomes, following both country‐specific and common shocks. The paper finds that under almost symmetry between countries, country‐specific shocks are never associated with multiple equilibria and, if large enough, can spread to other countries leading to contagion. By contrast, common shocks are seen to sustain multiple equilibria if almost‐symmetric countries are considered and to have implications similar to those found in the country‐specific case if large structural asymmetries are admitted.     

Non-market valuation of forest goods and services: Good practice guidelines

The European COST Action E45 on European Forest Externalities (EUROFOREX) participants developed a set of good practice guidelines for the non-market valuation of forests, elaborating on stated and revealed preference methodologies, as well as benefit transfer and meta-analytical procedures. This article presents a summary of the guidelines.     

Numerical evaluation of the critical price and American options

An approximate solution to the American put value is proposed and implemented numerically. Relaxation techniques enable the critical price to be determined with high accuracy. The method uses a modification of the quadratic approximation of MacMillan and Barone-Adesi and Whaley which gives an expression for the critical price. Numerical experimentation and iterative methods quickly provide highly accurate solutions.     

Micro versus macro cointegration in heterogeneous panels

We consider the issue of cross-sectional aggregation in nonstationary and heterogeneous panels where each unit cointegrates. We derive asymptotic properties of the aggregate estimate, and necessary and sufficient conditions for cointegration to hold in the aggregate relationship. We then analyze the case when cointegration does not carry through the aggregation process, and we investigate whether the violation of the formal conditions for perfect aggregation can still lead to an aggregate equation that is observationally equivalent to a cointegrated relationship. We derive a measure of the degree of noncointegration of the aggregate relationship and we explore its asymptotic properties. We propose a valid bootstrap approximation of the test. A Monte Carlo exercise evaluates size and power properties of the bootstrap test.     

Farm size,land yields and the agricultural production function: An analysis for fifteen developing countries

The paper analyzes the relationship between factor inputs, land yields and labor productivity for farms of different size on the basis of FAO farm management data for 15 developing countries. For all but three countries a strong negative correlation is found between farm size on the one side, and factor inputs and yields per hectare on the other. The fitting of unconstrained production functions to the above data suggests that in only few cases the decline in yields for increasing farm size can be attributed to decreasing returns to scale. The higher yields observed in small farms are mainly to be ascribed to higher factor inputs and to a more intensive use of land. Therefore, where conspicuous labor surpluses exist, the superiority of small farming provides solid arguments in favor of land redistribution. Such an agrarian reform would determine higher output, higher labor absorption and a more equitable income distribution, thus contributing in a decisive manner to the alleviation of rural poverty. The paper also provides estimates of cross-sectional production functions for the 15 countries analyzed. Empirical relations are found between the output elasticities of land, labor and intermediate inputs and physical indicators of their scarcity. The paper concludes by proposing a simple method for deriving a long-term production function for agriculture.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Reversal

For standard irreversibility theory the prospect of acquiring better information in the future should induce more flexible decisions: the “irreversibility effect”. This result relies on the definition of an irreversible position as one that would be technically or economically impossible to reverse. In practice, many positions can be reversed at an affordable cost. In this case an increase in informativeness alone is not enough to bias decisions in favour of more flexibility. We look for restrictions on decision sets, information structures and preferences that make possible to study the effect of information on flexibility. JEL Classification No: D81, D9