Employment and Prices in a Simple Macroeconomy

This exercise sets up interlinked labor and goods markets in a classroom macroeconomy. Students with worker roles are endowed with labor that can be consumed or sold to firms that post wages, purchase labor, and produce goods that can be either consumed or sold to workers. The money from sales is used by firms to purchase labor in the next period. Complicated record keeping is avoided by using ordinary playing cards to represent money and goods. The exercise can stimulate a discussion of potential output, unemployment, and the role of money in determining wages and prices. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory macroeconomics classes to teach concepts of the circular flow, real and money wages, unemployment, and labor market equilibrium and in intermediate classes to consider Keynesian and quantity theories. Time required: Fifteen minutes for reading instructions, 30 to 45 minutes for trading (depending on the number of periods), and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one copy of the instructions for each person and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each replicated group of two workers and one firm. No money or other incentives are required.     

Trust and development

In this paper we examine linkages between social trust and economic development using, for the first time, a panel of data. We confirm earlier cross-sectional studies finding that trust is a significant factor in development and also show for the first time that trust significantly interacts with both investment in physical and human capital. We provide a robustness analysis of our results via a set of jackknife experiments on our main equations, and the trust coefficients and interactions are very tightly distributed, indicating that the results are not highly sample dependent. We also consider whether trust directly influences investment and find that in a panel framework it does not unless we allow for a trust–education interaction in the investment equation.     

Purchasing power parity: Doctrinal perspective and evidence from the 1920s

The first part of the paper traces the doctrinal origins of the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine and reviews the central issues of controversy. The second part is an empirical study covering the flexible exchange rates period of the 1920s. The empirical work examines the efficiency of foreign exchange markets, the absolute and the relative versions of PPP for alternative price indices, the homogeneity postulate, the relation between the short run and the long run, and the patterns of ‘causality’ between prices and exchange rates. The paper concludes with estimations of price equations and a discussion of the proper specification of PPP.     

Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Integrated Pest Management Extension Methods: An Example from Bangladesh

This study examines the cost-effectiveness of alternative methods for diffusing integrated pest management practices in Bangladesh. Methods compared include farmer field schools, field days, and extension agent visits. Farmer field school participants were more likely to adopt integrated pest management practices than recipients of messages from field days and agent visits. However, due to lower costs per participant, field days were the most cost-effective means for stimulating adoption of simpler practices and extension agent visits were the most cost-effective for extending more complex practices.     

Job Satisfaction as a Function of Top Management Support for Ethical Behavior: A Study of Indian Managers

Based on organizational justice theories and cognitive dissonance theories, the authors hypothesized that: (a) perceived top management support for ethical behaviors will be positively correlated with all facets of job satisfaction (supervision, pay, promotion, work, co-workers, and overall); and (b) the correlation will be highest with the facet of supervision. Empirical results (n = 77 middle level managers from two organizations in South India) supported only the second hypothesis. Implications for managing a global workforce are discussed.     

Effects of organizational process change on responsibility accounting and managers’ revelations of private knowledge

We report the results of a nine-year field study that examines how responsibility accounting (RA) is used to manage horizontal relationships among several responsibility center (RC) managers including those who work on committees or cross-functional teams. We find theory-consistent evidence that the goal-congruent design or redesign of accounting and participation practices in general, and of RA in particular, depends on the magnitude, scope, and speed of organizational process change. When there is a change in the magnitude, scope, and speed of organizational process change, we find that the measurability of RC managers’ financial performance can change, and we also find that using RA to manage RC boundaries is an important mechanism for achieving goal-congruent behavior and avoiding dysfunctional behavior. Moreover, we show that several accounting and participation practices (e.g., activity-based costing, open book accounting, project budgeting, cross-functional teams) support RC boundary management that involves framing or reframing RC boundaries so as to influence competitive or cooperative behavior among RC managers. Finally, this study contributes by introducing a new research method to the accounting literature that is effective in structuring and interpreting longitudinal field data in relation to theoretical expectations.     

Within‐Subject Intra‐ and Inter‐Method Consistency of Two Experimental Risk Attitude Elicitation Methods

We compare the consistency of choices in two methods used to elicit risk preferences on an aggregate as well as on an individual level. We ask subjects to choose twice from a list of nine decisions between two lotteries, as introduced by Holt and Laury 2002, 2005 ) alternating with nine decisions using the budget approach introduced by Andreoni and Harbaugh ( 2009 ). We find that, while on an aggregate (subject pool) level the results are consistent, on an individual (within‐subject) level, behaviour is far from consistent. Within each method as well as across methods we observe low (simple and rank) correlations.     

Management Roles and Sustainability Information. Exploring Corporate Practice

Little empirical research has been conducted on perceptions of the types of sustainability information dealt with by different managers in internal company processes. In this study the roles of different managers are distinguished based on contingency theory and using the categorisation in the sustainability balanced scorecard concept. Expected sustainability information types are identified for these roles and hypotheses are derived and tested about perceptions of the types of sustainability information in different management roles. Interviews identified 116 roles involved with sustainability information in a set of leading German and UK sustainability reporting companies. Results from analysing sustainability information types contingent upon different management roles contribute to the understanding of sustainability accounting systems and practices and how companies can best support different management roles with appropriate sustainability information.     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.