Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Endogenous Alleviation of Overreaction Problem by Aggregate Information Announcement

It is well‐known that agents overreact to public information in markets characterized by strategic complementarities. We propose a simple and implementable method of alleviating the overreaction problem. Extending the beauty‐contest game of Morris and Shin to a multi‐region economy, we show that, under an aggregate information announcement, each agent converts purely public information into imperfect public information endogenously. This makes the agents’ beliefs dispersed and alleviates the overreaction problem. Moreover, we compare the welfare effect of the aggregate information announcement with that of a separate announcement. We find that there exist plausible situations where the aggregate information announcement is better than the separate information announcement despite reduced quality.     

A Non-homothetic Globally Concave Flexible Cost Function and its Application to Panel Data

A new non-homothetic globally concave flexible cost function is introduced and applied to a panel of firms in the Japanese paper and pulp industry. This cost function is a mixture of the generalized McFadden form and the generalized Ozaki form due to Nakamura (1990). A generalized index of technical change is used in place of the standard quadratic form of time-trend. The estimated cost function satisfied global concavity, and the symmetry condition of the Slutsky matrix was not rejected. Homotheticity was strongly rejected.
JEL Classification Numbers: C33, D24.     

Valuation of Mortgage-Backed Securities Based upon a Structural Approach

This paper studies the valuation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) based upon a structural approach of several risks involving the prepayment and/or default behavior of mortgagors. For the Kariya and Kobayashi (1999) model using a time-consuming Monte-Carlosimulation, we provide an alternative semi-analytic valuation methodology closely related to solving the (Volterra type) integral equation with respectto the first hitting time density for a curved/flat boundary; consequently that enables us to calculate the MBS price faster and more precisely. Next, to capture the path-dependent prepayment behavior of the interest ratemovements we give some prepayment models based upon a two-dimensional Markov process of the interest rate and its long-run average rate. Third, we study the simultaneous assessment issue of prepayment and defaultrisks, encountered in practice.Finally we discuss the calculation of the joint probability density ofmultiple first hitting times.     

The Industrial Organization of Financial Markets in Thailand

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the industrial organizational features of the financial markets in Thailand which may play an important role in promoting the recent high economic growth. Specifically, we examine whether or not the market-structure-performance hypothesis is valid by estimating profit and cost functions. The main results are as follows:
1) market concentration in Thailand is higher than in Japan;
2) expense rate of Thai commercial banks is considerably higher than Japanese banks;
3) economies of scale are not found;
4) the more concentrated the market is, the larger are the profits and costs of the commercial banks.     

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case

The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.