As earthquakes can result in multi-dimensional negative consequences such as human loss and building damage, the ability to make accurate economic loss estimations immediately after the occurrence is crucial. Unfortunately, in many earthquake-stricken countries such as Iran, governments are often unable to quickly or accurately assess post-earthquake losses. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to extend the model developed by Chan et al. (Nat Hazards 17:269–283, 1998) to two independent variables to develop an earthquake economic loss estimation method based on the economic and socio-economic indices gross domestic product (GDP) and disposable personal income (DPI) and a seismic hazard probability function. A global cell map is also considered to assess the GDP and DPI based on the population in each cell affected by the earthquake. In the final stage, using the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, 18 earthquake damaged areas in Iran are taken as case study to estimate the economic losses using the new model presented in this paper.
Arbitration is increasingly employed to resolve disputes. Two arbitration mechanisms, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer
arbitration (FOA) are commonly utilized, but previous theoretical and empirical research has found that they are unsatisfactory.
Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed, but ultimately laboratory research has found that they do not offer an
improvement. An exception is amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA), which not only has desirable theoretical properties but
also has been demonstrated to outperform FOA in the laboratory. This study provides a direct laboratory comparison of AFOA
with CA. Also, by utilizing an environment with an uncertain payoff to one of the parties, this study tests the robustness
of AFOA’s performance relative to FOA. The results indicate that AFOA does outperform FOA, but that AFOA is only weakly better
than CA.
JEL Classification C7, C9, J5, K4 相似文献
