Interaktivität, Interaktion, Internet

In recent years, numerous suggestions have been made to clarify the concept of interactivity in communication science. Most often, an inclusion strategy is used, in which diverse definitions are summarized into a multi-dimensional notion of interactivity. Aside from this, there is also an exclusion strategy: On the one hand, certain technical media (computer-mediated communication, »interactive television«) or communicative situations (face-to-face communication) are marked as »interactive«. In doing this, no differentiation is made between potential and process, and betwen »interactivity« and »interaction«. On the other hand, the notion of interaction as it is rooted in sociology offers itself for a theoretically grounded definition. Seven ways of using the term in relationsship to the notion of communication can be found. It is suggested to conceptualize interaction as a type of communication in the sense of Rafaeli: Interactive communication is reciprocal and relates to earlier messages. The concept of interactive communication chosen here can be linked with systems theory and the deliberative theory of the public sphere.     

Attitudes Toward Catastrophe

In light of climate change and other global threats, policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes. This paper reflects on what society’s attitude toward low-probability, high-impact events is, or should be. We first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses. Based on this conception, we review studies from decision sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics that explore people’s attitudes toward various social risks. Contray to popular belief, we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion—the preference for a mean-preserving contraction of the loss distribution—and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations. Next, we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk. We explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other-regarding preferences. Finally, we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk.     

Dictator games: a meta study

Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. This meta study summarises the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix parameters they did not intend to test, in multiple regression the meta study is able to assess the effect of single manipulations, controlling for a host of alternative explanatory factors. The resulting rich dataset also provides a testbed for comparing alternative specifications of the statistical model for analysing dictator game data. It shows how Tobit models (assuming that dictators would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a positive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) provide additional insights.     

Measuring the immeasurable — A survey of sustainability indices

Sustainability indices for countries provide a one-dimensional metric to valuate country-specific information on the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, environmental, and social conditions. At the policy level, they suggest an unambiguous yardstick against which a country's development can be measured and even a cross-country comparison can be performed. This article reviews the explanatory power of various sustainability indices applied in policy practice. We show that these indices fail to fulfill fundamental scientific requirements making them rather useless if not misleading with respect to policy advice.     

Collaboration,motivation, and the size of organizations

We present an analytical model of an organization that offers operational drivers of limits on team size. The model trades off benefits from collaborative problem solving against the disadvantages of diminishing motivation when groups get large. Collaboration is represented as parallel employee activity combined with frequent sharing of partial information, with a resulting superlinear performance increase over team size. Motivation is modeled by team members periodically setting an effort level either to contribute to the best of their ability or to “cruise”; at the minimum level not recognizable as shirking. Each individual decision is limited by bounded rationality based on team rewards, the time horizon of team interaction, and individual expectations about colleagues’ behavior. The decision collapses to a simple “barrier rule”;. Work hard when a certain “barrier percentage”; of team members work hard, and otherwise shirk. The influence of team size on this barrier percentage depends on the extent of benefits from collaboration: As long as performance increases quadratically with team size, the increased benefits resulting from collaboration exactly balance the temptation to shirk, with the barrier percentage approaching a fixed limit for large team sizes. As soon as the performance increase slows to anything less than quadratic, shirking eventually sets in and limits the possible size of the team. This implies that cooperation is sustainable in large organizational units, provided the problem‐solving processes used are powerful enough to ensure sufficient performance increases. Thus, effective problem‐solving methods are of double value, improving direct productivity and mitigating the social dilemma from team production. A manager should enlarge his or her organization up to the minimum of the limit set by the cooperation barrier and the exogenous performance limit.     

Economic crises in the thirties and today

In the context of the ongoing financial and economic crisis reference is frequently made to the Great Depression of the 1930s and fears are voiced that we may have embarked on a similar path. This article looks at the conditions prevailing back then and compares them with the present economic environment. From this some conclusions are drawn as to the likelihood of a recurrence of the disaster.     

Die Liberalisierung des Wohlfahrtsstaates und ihre Herausforderungen für das Pflegemanagement der Zukunft

Heilberufe - Die Liberalisierung des Wohlfahrtsstaates, ausgelöst durch den zunehmend globali sierten Wettbewerb, wird in der Zukunft auch wesentliche Auswirkungen auf die Anforderungen an die...     

Political Risk and Export Promotion: Evidence from Germany

Political risk represents an important hidden transaction cost that reduces international trade. This paper investigates the claim that public export credit guarantees mitigate this friction to trade flows and hence promote exports. We employ an empirical trade gravity model, where we explicitly control for political risk in the importing country in order to evaluate the effect of export guarantees. Using a novel data set on guarantees, we estimate the effect of guarantees in a static and dynamic panel model. We find a statistically and economically significant positive effect of public export guarantees on exports which indicates that export promotion is indeed effective. Furthermore, political risk turns out to be an important obstacle for exports and hence should be taken into account in any empirical model of trade.     

Welfare effects of the euro cash changeover

Using merged data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper applies a parametric difference-in-differences approach to assess the real effects of the introduction of the euro on subjective well-being. A complementary nonparametric approach is also used to analyze the impact of difficulties with the new currency on well-being. The results indicate a loss in well-being associated with the introduction of the new currency, with the predicted probability that a person is contented with his/her household income diminishing by 9.7 percentage points. We calculate a compensating income variation of approximately one-third. That is, an increase in post-government household income of more than 30% is needed to compensate for the clear decline in well-being. The reasons for the negative impact are threefold. First, perceived inflation overestimates the real increase in prices resulting in suboptimal consumption decisions. Second, money illusion causes a false assessment of the budget constraint. Third, individuals have to bear the costs from the conversion and the adjustment to the new currency. Moreover, it is thought that losses are higher for persons who have difficulties with the new currency. However, the impact of difficulties in using and converting the new currency is rather small, and the initial problems were overcome within one year of the introduction of euro cash.