Pay reference arbitration and the disclosure of information

This, the first of two articles, brings together two aspects of industrial relations: the practice of arbitration and the disclosure of information in the specific context of financial information disclosed at general pay claim references, making use of two case studies in which a relatively high degree of information was made available.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VOUCHER BUY-OUTS IN RUSSIA

This paper examines the issues which may create pressures and incentives to introduce efficiency-enhancing governance structures in enterprises which are privatized through voucher schemes in Russia. These pressures emphasize the need to view buy-outs created on privatization as transitory organizational forms with a three-stage process being suggested as the most feasible for developing governance mechanisms which produce efficiency gains, The paper uses illustrative case studies of the first major enterprises to experience post-privatization ownership changes.     

a fire inspector calls

Mike Fisher, an Institute of Economic Affairs' trustee and director of Whale Tankers, explains what happened when the fire inspector called on the home of the great British whale.     

Can integrated infrastructure investment plans contribute to more effective public spending? The case of Mozambique

All countries, especially developing countries with limited financial resources, face difficult decisions in prioritising public funds for investment projects in the face of multiple demands in order to achieve strategic public goals. Effective investment often requires coordination between different institutions and the management of political pressure to divert investment in support of private interests. It also requires the identification of appropriate sources of funds for different purposes. The preparation of an integrated infrastructure investment plan (IIIP) that uses structured approaches to review investment proposals has been suggested, and adopted in some cases, as an instrument to address these challenges and bridge the gap between national planning and sectoral budgeting. This article considers the experience of Mozambique in deploying an IIIP as well as some recent events and concludes that the instrument may be helpful as part of a system of investment planning and allocation but that it has significant limitations.     

Estimating Technical Efficiency and Production Risk under Contract Farming: A Bayesian Estimation and Stochastic Dominance Methodology

We investigate production risk, technical efficiency and risk attitudes amongst contract and independent farmers. We use a Bayesian parametric approach and stochastic dominance quantile regression methods to compare technical efficiency and risk attitude of smallholders in Nepal. Using farm‐level data, we find that contract farmers appear to show lower inefficiency and lower production risk. Additionally, contract and independent farmers can increase output by reducing the scale of operation. Regardless of the commodity produced and farming arrangement (contract or independent production), we find that labour, land and other inputs are risk‐augmenting, while the role of capital is mixed. We find a second order stochastic dominance (SSD) for lentils, and first order stochastic dominance (FSD) for tomatoes, ginger and HYV paddy seed commodities. Finally, contract farmers are more risk averse than independent farmers, regardless of the commodity produced.     

One Share - One Vote: the Theory

The theoretical literature on security-voting structure canbe organized around three questions: What impact do nonvotingshares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional votingpower affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussionsof mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownershipchoices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cashflow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade offbetween disempowering blockholders and empowering managers.It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share- one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance,notably in systems that so far relied on active owners.     

Moving from Private to Public Ownership: Selling Out to Public Firms versus Initial Public Offerings

We study two alternative means to move assets from private to public ownership: through the acquisition of private companies by firms that are public (sellouts) or through initial public share offerings (IPOs). We consider firm-specific characteristics for 1,074 IPO and 735 sellout firms to identify differences in growth, capital constraints, and asymmetric information between the two types of transactions. Our results suggest that firms move to public ownership through an IPO when they have greater growth opportunities and face more capital constraints. We provide a better understanding of the firm-specific characteristics that lead firms to go public.