Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency

The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the downstream industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the downstream industry and examines the effects of permitting third‐degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare. We identify situations where permitting price discrimination leads to either higher or lower wholesale prices for all downstream firms. These findings are driven by upstream profits being discontinuous due to costly entry. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe inefficiency in production.     

Bemerkungen zur theorie der statistischen funktion

Abstract

In einer früheren Arbeit habe ich u. a. verschiedene kritische Anmerkungen über die Ansichten der Korrelationisten veröffentlicht. Um leicht entstehende Missverständnisse gleich von Anfang an zu vermeiden, möchte ich einige Ergänzungen zur angeführten Arbeit geben. Ich schicke folgende Erklärungen voraus.     

新春贺辞

金虎辞旧岁,玉兔迎新春。在这辞旧迎新之际,我谨代表中共济南市委宣传部,向长期以来关心、支持济南经济社会发展的海内外读者朋友和网民朋友表示衷心的感谢!向辛勤工作在外宣战线上的同志们表示亲切的慰问!     

The failure of integrated transport policy in Germany: a historical perspective

In order to reach a sustainable traffic development, the European Union follows the central idea of an integrated transport policy. In contrast to the widely accepted concept, the EU recently had to admit that in fact transport development goes in the opposite direction. This contradiction has to be explained. The article describes the long lasting succession of efforts to implement a far-reaching cooperation in the transport sector as is aspired to by an integrated transport policy. In each case, though, the political idea of cooperation was superseded by the economic one of competition. Therefore, the author argues in favour of a detailed scientific analysis of the necessary political conditions for an integrated transport policy, instead of continuing an untested concept.     

Sharing the burden for climate change mitigation in the Canadian federation

Dividing the burden for greenhouse gas abatement among the provinces has proven challenging in Canada and contributes to Canada's failure to limit emissions. This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model to compare a number of rules for sharing the burden of emission reductions among Canadian provinces. Because of the substantial heterogeneity among Canadian provinces, these different rules imply significantly different relative abatement effort among provinces, and also significantly different welfare implications. We compare these archetypal burden sharing rules to existing provincial emission reduction commitments and find that none of the standard burden sharing rules comes close to existing commitments.     

Should Welfare Administration be Centralized or Decentralized? Evidence from a Policy Experiment

The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational models for welfare administration. In most districts, a centralized organization was established where local welfare agencies are bound to central directives. At the same time, 69 districts were allowed to opt for a decentralized organization. We evaluate the relative success of both types in terms of integrating welfare recipients into employment. Compared to centralized organization, decentralized organization has a negative effect on employment chances of males. For women, no significant effect is found. These findings are robust to the inclusion of aspects of internal organization common to both types of agencies.     

Patterns and determinants of entry and exit in industrial sectors in Sweden

This paper uses a unique dataset which gives a complete picture of the pattern of entry and exit in industrial sectors in Sweden during the period 1997–2001. The importance of profitability, industrial market growth, tangible capital intensity, intangible capital intensity and economies of scale for entry and exit are investigated. A fixed effects panel data model is used, and it is shown that the inclusion of unobserved industry-specific effects explains many of the inter-industrial differences in entry and exit rates. For policymakers, this implies that it is difficult to formulate an entrepreneurship policy that can be expected to be equally successful across all industries. It is also shown that investments in intangible assets is one way to compete, while economies of scale tend to deter entry rates.