GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION1

Abstract. This survey is organized as follows. I. Introduction. II. The main issues. III. Negishi's model. IV. Objective demand in the Cournot-Nash framework. V. Objective demand in the Bertrand-Nash framework. VI. The assumption of quasi-concavity of the profit functions. VII. Compromises between the conjectural and the objective approach. VIII. Insights into the notion of perfect competition. IX. Conclusion.     

An empirical framework to study food labelling fraud: an application to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market

The mislabelling of agricultural and food products is one of the most common types of food fraud. Despite the frequency with which labelling fraud occurs, there is no empirical framework to study its welfare implications, the probability that it may occur, and the measures that can limit its occurrence. We present an empirical framework to study the economic consequences of food labelling fraud in a differentiated products food market. Such framework requires the availability of sales data and the use of an ‘attribute‐space' demand model. The model is applied to the Italian extra‐virgin olive oil market to simulate the occurrence of fraudulent ‘100 per cent Italian' claims. Our results indicate that potential consumer losses due to overpayments for a false claim are higher than manufacturer gains, suggesting that labelling fraud results in welfare losses and not just in welfare transfers. Simulation results indicate that the level of the current administrative fines is not likely to be effective to discourage ‘100 per cent Italian' labelling fraud. Imposing larger fines or other measures negatively affecting a firm's image could be more effective in deterring labelling fraud.     

The Politics of Co-optation

Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 591–607. Universita' di Modena e Reggio Emilia, I-41100 Modena, Italy; and Centre for Economic Policy Research; and Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, United Kingdom; and Centre for Economic Policy Research. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D74, P26, D3.     

ON THE SOURCES OF HETEROGENEITY IN BANKING EFFICIENCY LITERATURE

This study reviews the empirical literature on banking efficiency by conducting a meta‐regression analysis. The meta‐dataset consists of 1661 observations retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000–2014. While the role of study design and method‐specific characteristics of primary studies is evaluated, the focus concerns regulation in banking. The results are fourfold. First, parametric methods always yield lower levels of banking efficiency than non‐parametric studies. Second, banking efficiency is higher in studies using the value‐added approach rather than the intermediation method. Third, efficiency scores also depend on the journal's ranking and on the number of observations and variables used in the primary papers. Finally, regulation matters: primary papers focusing on countries with a liberalized banking industry provide higher values for efficiency scores.     

A numerical method to price exotic path-dependent options on an underlying described by the Heston stochastic volatility model

We consider the problem of pricing European exotic path-dependent derivatives on an underlying described by the Heston stochastic volatility model. Lipton has found a closed form integral representation of the joint transition probability density function of underlying price and variance in the Heston model. We give a convenient numerical approximation of this formula and we use the obtained approximated transition probability density function to price discrete path-dependent options as discounted expectations. The expected value of the payoff is calculated evaluating an integral with the Monte Carlo method using a variance reduction technique based on a suitable approximation of the transition probability density function of the Heston model. As a test case, we evaluate the price of a discrete arithmetic average Asian option, when the average over n = 12 prices is considered, that is when the integral to evaluate is a 2n = 24 dimensional integral. We show that the method proposed is computationally efficient and gives accurate results.     

The ‘wrong skewness’ problem: a re-specification of stochastic frontiers

In this paper, we study the ‘wrong skewness phenomenon’ in stochastic frontiers (SF), which consists in the observed difference between the expected and estimated sign of the asymmetry of the composite error, and causes the ‘wrong skewness problem’, for which the estimated inefficiency in the whole industry is zero. We propose a more general and flexible specification of the SF model, introducing dependences between the two error components and asymmetry (positive or negative) of the random error. This re-specification allows us to decompose the third moment of the composite error into three components, namely: (i) the asymmetry of the inefficiency term; (ii) the asymmetry of the random error; and (iii) the structure of dependence between the error components. This decomposition suggests that the wrong skewness anomaly is an ill-posed problem, because we cannot establish ex ante the expected sign of the asymmetry of the composite error. We report a relevant special case that allows us to estimate the three components of the asymmetry of the composite error and, consequently, to interpret the estimated sign. We present two empirical applications. In the first dataset, where the classic SF has the wrong skewness, an estimation of our model rejects the dependence hypothesis, but accepts the asymmetry of the random error, thus justifying the sign of the skewness of the composite error. More importantly, we estimate a non-zero inefficiency, thus solving the wrong skewness problem. In the second dataset, where the classic SF does not yield any anomaly, an estimation of our model provides evidence for the presence of dependence. In such situations, we show that there is a remarkable difference in the efficiency distribution between the classic SF and our class of models.     

New Geography of M&As: A Framing Device of Firms' Strategies

The emergence of new economic centers is changing the competitive scenario. The diffusion of power across an increasingly broad range of countries has opened a window of opportunity for firms from China that want to compete globally. These firms understand their options in exploiting economic geography, and they frequently use cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to penetrate developed countries. The United States and Europe are becoming natural destinations for such investments because of their huge markets and leading‐edge technologies. This article provides a “framing device” for firms’ strategies in a multipolar world. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Looking at the determinants of efficiency in banking: evidence from Italian mutual-cooperatives

Italy has experienced a restructuring and consolidation process in the banking industry since the 1990s that is expected to foster efficiency and competition. Despite the reforms, a peculiarity of the industry is the persistence of small mutual-cooperative banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo, BCCs) active in narrow markets. The scope of this paper is to analyze the determinants of BCCs’ efficiency in the 2006–2011 period. In the first step of the study, a stochastic cost frontier is used to yield bank efficiency. Then the cost efficiency becomes the dependent variable of fixed and random effect models. The reference market of BCCs is the province (NUTS3). We find that BCC cost efficiency is positively affected by market concentration and demand density and inversely related to branching. Importantly, these results are robust to any sample restriction anchored to the distribution of efficiency. While the evidence regarding the credit quality is inconclusive for all BCCs, the sensitivity analysis shows that the risk in local markets is a source of BCC cost inefficiency.