The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy

We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time, as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition to equalization. “But the law of inheritance was the last step to equality.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).     

The enfranchisement of women and the welfare state

We offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico-economic model where men are richer than women, women display a higher preference for public goods, and women's disenfranchisement carries a societal cost. Men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process. We derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes: a males-only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime. The latter is associated with a higher tax rate but, as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor, women's relative wage increases, thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates. When the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement, the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women. A consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement.We empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870–1930 period. We proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism, which is associated with a more traditional view of women's role and thus a lower cost. The gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women. Consistently with the model's predictions, women's suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce, while women's suffrage increases the size of government only in non-catholic countries.     

Marriage and other risky assets: A portfolio approach

We study the joint impact of gender and marital status on financial investments by testing the hypothesis that marriage represents – in a portfolio framework – a sort of safe asset and that this attribute may change over time. We show that married individuals have a higher propensity to invest in risky assets than single ones, that this marital status gap is stronger for women and that, for women only, it evolves and declines at the end of the sample period. Next we explore a number of possible explanations of the observed gender differences by controlling for background factors that capture the evolution of family and society. We find that both the higher female marital status gap and its time variability vanish for those women who are employed. Our empirical investigation is based on a dataset drawn from the 1993–2006 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth.     

The Politics of Co-optation

Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 591–607. Universita' di Modena e Reggio Emilia, I-41100 Modena, Italy; and Centre for Economic Policy Research; and Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, United Kingdom; and Centre for Economic Policy Research. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D74, P26, D3.     

Did colonization matter for growth?: An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment

We investigate the impact of 20th-century European colonization on growth. We find that colonial heritage, as measured by the identity of the metropolitan ruler and by the degree of economic penetration, matters for the heterogeneity of growth performances in Africa. Colonial indicators are correlated with economic and sociopolitical variables that are commonly employed to explain growth and there are growth gains from decolonization. Colonial indicators also add significant explanatory power to worldwide growth regressions and are correlated with the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin America dummies.     

Imperfect information, Bayesian learning, and capital accumulation

This paper examines the consequences of informational imperfections for economic growth in an overlapping generations model in which agents learn the technological parameters in a Bayesian fashion. Under mild sufficient conditions, beliefs converge to the true value of the technological parameters. Nevertheless, even short-lived informational imperfections could have lasting effects, as they alter the long-run equilibrium levels of the capital stock. Therefore, learning dynamics may explain some of the observed differences in the performance of countries with otherwise similar economic characteristics.     

De jure and de facto determinants of power: evidence from Mississippi

We evaluate the empirical effectiveness of de facto versus de jure determinants of political power in the U.S. South between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Using previously-unexploited racially-disaggregated data on voter registration in Mississippi for the years 1896 and 1899, we show that the observed pattern of black political participation is driven by de facto disfranchisement as captured by the presence of a black political majority, which negatively affects black registration. The de jure provisions introduced with the 1890 state constitution and involving literacy tests and poll taxes exert a non-robust impact. Furthermore, a difference-in-differences approach shows that the decline in aggregate turnout pre-dates the introduction of de jure restrictions and confirms a causal effect of the presence of a black political majority. De jure restrictions intensify the influence of the latter after 1890, which suggests that the main effect of the constitutional reforms may have been an institutionalization of de facto disfranchisement.