Accounting Frauds and Main-Bank Monitoring in Japanese Corporations

This study examines whether the delegated monitoring of main banks effectively decreases severe agency problems. For example, this includes accounting fraud in bank-dominated corporate governance. In this context, the fraud triangle specifies the three main factors of opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. Main banks may reduce the factor of opportunity through actions such as monitoring, which plays a moderating role by reducing the potential for managerial misconduct, whereas, the incentive factor may be enhanced through the subsequent pressure that influences managers to force turnover when they do not repay debts. The potential influence that the main banks have on the fraud rationalization factor may be stronger in firms that are more dependent on main-bank borrowing. This study analyzed data from publicly listed firms in Japan for the period between 2008 and 2016 to determine how main-bank relationships affected accounting fraud, thus allowing an assessment of delegated monitoring practices. Findings showed that main-bank relationships were helpful for reducing accounting fraud, suggesting its overall effectiveness in delegated monitoring. Results also showed that large audit firms did not necessarily prevent accounting fraud, which implies that main banks can employ their own monitoring as a substitute for the roles typically played by these firms. Here, the main policy implication is that main-bank relationships may strengthen business ethics in the context of bank-dominated corporate governance. In conclusion, the continued analysis of bank monitoring may benefit stakeholders while strengthening business ethics in bank-centered economies.

     

International migration,foreign direct investment,and development stage in developing economies

The existing empirical results on the relationship between FDI and migration are rather mixed. This study reevaluates, both theoretically and empirically, how inward FDI relates to emigration in developing countries. Our model illustrates that the relationship between inward FDI and emigration flows depends on the development stage of a developing country, that is, there is a positive association between inward FDI and emigration flows for relatively less‐developed countries but a negative association between these two variables for relatively developed countries. We confirm the empirical validity of our model prediction using the panel data of 21 OECD and 51 non‐OECD countries during the period from 2003 to 2012. Our results argue that as economic development proceeds in a developing country, the home effect of inward FDI associated with intensified labor demand would dominate the linkage effect that induces the brain drain problem through enhancing the socioeconomic ties with migrant networks.     

What causes business cycles? Analysis of the Japanese industrial production data

We explore what causes business cycles by analyzing the Japanese industrial production data. The methods used are spectral analysis and factor analysis. Using the random matrix theory, we show that two largest eigenvalues are significant. Taking advantage of the information revealed by disaggregated data, we identify the first dominant factor as the aggregate demand, and the second factor as inventory adjustment. They cannot be reasonably interpreted as technological shocks. We also demonstrate that in terms of two dominant factors, shipments lead production by four months. Furthermore, out-of-sample test demonstrates that the model holds up even under the 2008–2009 recession. Because a fall of output during 2008–2009 was caused by an exogenous drop in exports, it provides another justification for identifying the first dominant factor as the aggregate demand. All the findings suggest that the major cause of business cycles is real demand shocks.     

Quantitative analysis of modularization in the automobile and PC industries

Much research has been done on modularizing the PC industry and automobile industry. In the analysis of the effect of modularization in the PC and automobile industries, however, very little of this research has been quantitative. In this paper, we use the number of patent applications for PC and automobile components to analyze the modularization in the PC and automobile industry. We calculated a ratio of the number of patents applied for by PC/automobile manufacturers vis-à-vis the total number of patent applications for the components, and used it to quantitatively judge whether PC/automobile manufacturers still hold the initiative with respect to R&D. The analysis indicates that PC manufacturers no longer hold the R&D initiative but that automobile manufacturers still do for engine control systems. On the other hand, it indicates that automobile manufacturers no longer hold the R&D initiative on the safety and communication control systems. The paper finally verifies the correlation between modularization and R&D initiative by means of regression analysis.     

Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership

This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, 2010), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form of capital ownership. By generalizing the form of capital ownership, this paper shows that the simultaneous-move outcome prevails as an SPE if the capital is owned by residents in the countries, whereas the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi argument holds if the capital is owned by nonresidents.     

Monetary Policy, Credit, and Real Activity: Evidence from the Balance Sheet of Japanese Firms

We analyze the mechanism of monetary transmission in the Japanese economy by using the quarterly time series data disaggregated by firm size. In particular we examine the channels through which monetary policy influences the firm's fixed investment with special focus on the firm's land. We estimate the vector autoregressive model where we encompass two competing hypotheses on the monetary transmission: monetary and credit channels. Our evidence is in support of the credit channel. We find that land has played a vital role in the monetary transmission, especially for small firms. Moreover, we find that fall of land value in 1990s weakened the efficacy of monetary policy considerably. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2000, 14(4), pp. 385–407. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan Copyright 2000 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E22, E32, E44, E51.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power

We theoretically analyze the optimal tariff problem that arises in a large country with market power. By using a model with more than two traded goods, we derive (1) the condition for optimal import tariff rates to be ranked, and (2) the condition under which the optimum import tariff becomes uniform. These conditions are established in a three-good model and in an N-good model. The results are evaluated on the basis of compensated excess demand elasticity, and hence do not require information on income effects. I would like to thank Tatsuo Hatta, Makoto Okamura, Katsuhiko Suzuki and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Corporate restructuring in Japan: Who monitors the monitor?

Peek and Rosengren [Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2005. Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95, 1144–1166] showed that, when the bubble economy era ended, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in evergreening. This is the first comprehensive study to empirically analyze the economics of private debt restructurings of financially distressed companies in Japan, where the corporate monitoring mechanism is not market based but large-stakeholder based – typically, banks and affiliated companies. These stakeholders are expected to efficiently resolve potential bankruptcy or collapse with better information resulting from long-term relationships with the distressed firms. Our study, however, finds that private restructurings led by them failed because of delays in implementing fundamental solutions. Forbearance in addressing the needs of distressed firms demonstrates the weakness of such stakeholders in instituting discipline, hence the need for a system to “monitor the monitor”.     

Correlated performance of firms in a transaction network

The correlation of firms’ performance on a transaction network is studied by analyzing financial and transaction data. Statistically significant correlation coefficients are obtained as evidence for the firm interactions. The firm interactions are taken into account in the basic equation of firm activity. Forty percent of residuals are explained by considering the firm interactions. The overall structure of the transaction network, i.e., the connectivity of industry sectors, is analyzed.