Sales force technology usage—reasons, barriers, and support: An exploratory investigation

Increasingly, salespeople are being asked to adopt and use a variety of technologies to increase their selling productivity and efficiency, including sales force automation and customer relationship management technologies. However, little research has investigated what happens once sales force automation (SFA) technology is adopted. This paper explores the reasons why salespeople use SFA technologies, the perceived barriers to SFA usage and how management can increase the usage of SFA technology. First, a qualitative study was performed to gain insight about salespeople's automation technology usage and the reasons why some salespeople fully use or do not utilize technology. After the initial study, 130 salespeople were surveyed. More productivity/efficiency was the main reason why salespeople use technology, the lack of management and technical support proved to be the main barrier to usage, and training proved most effective in increasing usage of SFA technology. Sales managers are provided with implications of the findings.     

R. J. Chambers on Securities and Obscurities: Making a Case for the Reform of the Law of Company Accounts in the 1970s

This study examines the contribution of Raymond J. Chambers to the British inflation accounting debate in the early‐to‐mid 1970s, from the perspective of the reception of his book, Securities and Obscurities: A Case for Reform of the Law of Company Accounts, published in 1973. To structure the empirical narrative, drawing on previously unpublished documents from the R. J. Chambers Archives, we employ Czarniawska and Joerges’ ( 1996 ) notion of the ‘travel of ideas’, and Mumford’s ( 1979 ) observation of the existence of ‘inflation accounting debate cycles’. The result is a narrative that traces the environmental and material circumstances that led to Chambers’ book having a lesser impact on the British inflation debate than one would expect based on the international exposure of his ideas, his influence at the time, and the empirical rigour of his proposal. The purpose of this exercise is to assess how contextual factors, such as the choice of publisher, use of promotional material, and distribution methods, can be as (or more) important than the substance of the proposed ideas, arguments, and solutions.     

The Future of Financial Reporting: Insights from Research

Research offers insights that, if heeded and built upon, could improve financial reporting, thereby contributing to a more prosperous society. In particular, research suggests improvement could stem from greater use of fair value; a performance statement designed to reveal the information embedded in changes in fair value; better information to help investors assess the value of intangible assets; more specific information about risk and uncertainty; information that is unbiased, rather than conservative; acceptance of a degree of earnings management together with a determination of how much earnings management is acceptable; and a financial reporting package designed to convey information users need, which presumably is broader than today's financial statements.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Short term real earnings management prior to stock repurchases

This study examines whether firms engage in income-decreasing real earnings management before open market stock repurchases to reduce the cost of stock buybacks. In the short run, managers have the ability to underproduce inventory and increase discretionary expenditures, thus decreasing current period earnings. We find that managers engage in both of these activities before repurchasing their firms’ shares, especially the latter. Also, companies increase their discretionary spending before making repurchases to a greater extent following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as when they are financially healthy and have high marginal tax rates. Finally, we document that firms with the most income-decreasing real earnings management experience the largest positive abnormal returns during the subsequent period. Our findings highlight the importance of considering firms’ use of real operating decisions, as opposed to just opportunistic disclosure practices, around significant corporate events, such as the repurchase of their own stock.     

Stock price informativeness on the sensitivity of strategic M&A investment to Q

Using a strategic merger sample that covers the period from 1985 to 2011, we find that the acquirer’s stock price firm-specific information, the new information created by investors about the value of firm fundamentals, increases the positive sensitivity of strategic merger investment to the acquirer’s Q; the target’s stock price firm-specific information increases the negative sensitivity of merger investment to the target’s Q. These results suggest that managers learn from financial markets in identifying strategic merger investment opportunities by transferring assets from poorly managed firms to well managed firms. In addition, the target’s stock price firm-specific information itself increases the acquisition size, indicating that informed acquirer managers are more likely to take out large merger investment. Last but not the least, stock price informativeness increases merger synergies and post-merger performance, suggesting that informed managers make better merger investment that increases shareholder value. Our study contributes to the recent increasing stream of studies on managerial learning from the market.     

On the Earnings and Price Momentum Strategies: Evidence from European Real Estate Firms

We test the performance and interaction between earnings and price momentum for European real estate companies by first making use of decile portfolios sorted on the previous 3- to 12-month returns, standardized unexpected earnings and a combination of both. Then, the relation is tested on a risk-adjusted basis employing a 3-factor asset pricing model and Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression analyses. Our analyses reveal several critical findings: (1) both price and earnings momentum are effective for European firms, the effect being stronger for the UK than EU firms; (2) unlike U.S. REITs, price momentum seems to dominate drift for European firms; (3) there is weak evidence for positive interaction between drift and price momentum, contrary to the U.S. evidence; (4) the performance of momentum strategies depends on the state of the economy, while controlling for systematic factors; (5) idiosyncratic risk of real estate property firms may influence the returns on drift and momentum factors.