全文获取类型
收费全文 | 80篇 |
免费 | 9篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 52篇 |
工业经济 | 7篇 |
计划管理 | 7篇 |
经济学 | 11篇 |
农业经济 | 3篇 |
经济概况 | 9篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 1篇 |
2020年 | 2篇 |
2019年 | 1篇 |
2018年 | 1篇 |
2017年 | 5篇 |
2016年 | 1篇 |
2015年 | 2篇 |
2014年 | 4篇 |
2013年 | 4篇 |
2012年 | 5篇 |
2011年 | 2篇 |
2010年 | 4篇 |
2009年 | 3篇 |
2008年 | 8篇 |
2007年 | 5篇 |
2006年 | 5篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 2篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1979年 | 3篇 |
1978年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 2篇 |
1974年 | 1篇 |
1971年 | 1篇 |
1954年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有89条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
31.
32.
This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor welfare crucially depend on whether such disclosures convey information about the firm's future capital stock (i.e., balance sheet) or about its future operating cash flows (i.e., earnings). Specifically, investment efficiency and investor welfare unambiguously increase in the precision of disclosures that convey information about the future capital stock, since such disclosures mitigate the current owners' incentives to underinvest. In contrast, when accounting reports provide information about future cash flows, the firm can have incentives to either under‐ or overinvest depending on the precision of accounting reports and the expected growth in demand. For such disclosures, investment efficiency and investor welfare are maximized by an intermediate level of precision. The two types of accounting disclosures act as substitutes in that the precision of capital stock disclosures that maximizes investment efficiency (and investor welfare) decreases as cash flow disclosures become more informative and vice versa. 相似文献
33.
Waking Up from the American Dream: On the Experience of Young Americans during the Housing Boom of the 2000s 下载免费PDF全文
We exploit regional variations in house price fluctuations in the United States during the early to mid‐2000s to study the impact of the housing boom on young Americans' choices related to home ownership, household formation, and fertility. We also introduce a novel instrument for changes in house prices based on the predetermined industrial structure of the local economy. We find that in regions that experienced large increases in house prices between 2001 and 2006, the youngest households were substantially less likely to purchase residential property, to be married, and to have a child, both in 2006 and in 2011. 相似文献
34.
We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements. 相似文献
35.
To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing. 相似文献
36.
37.
While there has been an abundance of empirical research on the subject of mergers and acquisitions, little research exists on a closely related topic—voluntary corporate selloffs. This study examines the effect on shareholder wealth of the announcement by management of an investment decision to voluntarily sell part of its operations to another firm. Positive abnormal returns are found to occur on the announcement date. However, it is found that such selloffs generally occur after a period of abnormally negative returns, suggesting the announcement is preceded by the release of negative information about the firm. 相似文献
38.
ANNALISA FERRANDO ALEXANDER POPOV GREGORY F. UDELL 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2019,51(4):895-928
We study the impact of the announcement of the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Outright Monetary Transactions Program on small firms’ access to finance using a matched firm‐bank data set from eight Eurozone countries. We find that following the announcement, credit access improved relatively more for firms borrowing from banks with high balance sheet exposures to impaired sovereign debt, with such firms less likely to be refused a loan or to be price rationed. Loan terms also improved as manifested by lengthening of loan maturities. Unconventional monetary policy has a positive impact on firms’ investment and profitability, while its effect on firm innovation is weaker. 相似文献
39.
40.
Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST FELICIA MARSTON WILLIAM J. WILHELM JR. 《The Journal of Finance》2006,61(1):301-340
We investigate whether analyst behavior influenced banks' likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings in 1993–2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment banking relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending relationships, and the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the bank's decision to provide analyst coverage. Although analyst behavior was influenced by economic incentives, we find no evidence that aggressive analyst behavior increased their bank's probability of winning an underwriting mandate. The main determinant of the lead‐bank choice is the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships. 相似文献