Information Disclosure,Cognitive Biases,and Payday Borrowing

Can psychology‐guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high‐cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding‐up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take‐up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disclosure policy to “remedy” payday borrowing, we cast the 11% reduction in borrowing in light of the relative low cost of this policy.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.     

Investing in Bankrupt Firms

We examine the investment characteristics of firms electing to enter bankruptcy, between 1973 and 1982. Comparisons are made before and after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Our results indicate that the 1978 Act had no significant impact on bankruptcy decisions or resolutions for actively traded firms. Trading in bankrupt firms' securities is becoming more common, but no abnormal returns appear to be available. Systematic risk does not change significantly with the filing of bankruptcy, but there is a significant increase in return variance. The financial markets also react to various announcements of stages in the reorganization process.     

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?

We argue that some powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures, thereby rigging incentive pay. A simple model formalizes this intuition and gives an explicit structural form on the rigged incentive portion of CEO wage function. Using U.S. data, we find support for the model's predictions: rigging accounts for at least 10% of the compensation to performance sensitivity and it increases with CEO human capital and firm volatility. Moreover, a firm with rigged incentive pay that is one standard deviation above the mean faces a subsequent decrease of 4.8% in firm value and 7.5% in operating return on assets.     

Stock Returns over the FOMC Cycle

We document that since 1994, the equity premium is earned entirely in weeks 0, 2, 4, and 6 in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cycle time, that is, even weeks starting from the last FOMC meeting. We causally tie this fact to the Fed by studying intermeeting target changes, Fed funds futures, and internal Board of Governors meetings. The Fed has affected the stock market via unexpectedly accommodating policy, leading to large reductions in the equity premium. Evidence suggests systematic informal communication of Fed officials with the media and financial sector as a channel through which news about monetary policy has reached the market.