Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems

Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.     

A geometric property of indifference curves in the (mean-standard deviation) plane

We prove that the slope of the indifference curve through point (m σ) of the (meanstandard deviation) plane must be smaller than the ratio (1+m)/σ. We show that the indifference curves corresponding to a quadratic utility function do actually satisfy that inequality; and prove, by the way, that these curves are not quarters of circles (as it is usually asserted), but smaller parts of them.

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Riassunto Si prova che, nel piano (media-scarto quadratico medio), l'inclinazione della curva d'indifferenza per il punto (m, σ) deve essere minore del rapporto (1+m)/gs. Si mostra che le curve d'indifferenza corrispondenti ad una funzione d'utilià quadratica soddisfano di fatto tale limitazione; e si prova, a questo proposito, che tali curve non sono — come generalmente asserito — quarti di circonferenze, ma archi più piccoli delle medesime.

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The second part of this article was stimulated by an observation of E. Castagnoli. The author gratefully acknowledges this to him.     

Asymmetric expectations: Cross-national coalitions in a Japanese transplant in Italy

This article is a study of the experience of a Japanese production unit transplanted to Italy. It employs the concepts of “Fordism” and “lean production” which are well known in industrial sociology and management studies. The article shows how the interplay of the owner's nationality with the local managerial and organizational characteristics of the firm resulted in a production and market crisis, and how following a series of cross-cultural misunderstandings, a new system of trust relations evolved permitting the firm's transition to lean production. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

INFORMAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: AN ANALYSIS FOR THREE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Changes in formal and informal central bank independence (CBI) in France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the period from the mid-1970s to the 1990s are examined; the major changes occurred in the 1990s, after the disinflations of the 1980s. Broad trends in the informal independence of central banks (CBs), defined as the ability to pursue price stability regardless of the government's preferences, are identified on the basis of a monetary policy narrative and an analysis of a set of qualitative determinants of informal independence. The most important determinants are the social/political acceptance that monetary policy is the sphere of the CB, the existence of anti-inflationary commitments in the form of intermediate targets for monetary policy, the degree of social consensus on the means and ends of macroeconomic policy, and the relative technical expertise of the CB. These broad trends help to explain some of the inflation experience of the 1980s and 1990s, which cannot be understood in terms of changes to formal CBI.     

Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals

In recent years boards have become significantly more likely to implement non-binding, majority-vote (MV) shareholder proposals. Using a sample of 620 MV proposals between 1997 and 2004, we find that shareholder pressure (e.g., the voting outcome and the influence of the proponent) and the type of proposals are the main determinants of the implementation decision, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to affect the decision. We then examine the labor market consequences of the implementation decision for outside directors and find that directors implementing MV shareholder proposals experience a one-fifth reduction in the likelihood of losing their board seat as well as other directorships.     

Discussion of “Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants”

Carter, Ittner and Zechman (2009) examine the use of explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity plans in a sample of United Kingdom (U.K.) firms in 2002. They find that factors suggested by economic theories (for example, removal of common shocks, tournament theory) are more closely associated with specific features of the plan than with the firm-level decision to use an RPE equity plan. My discussion focuses on the interpretation of these findings and the opportunities and implications for future research. I also summarize the views of five U.K. directors who were involved in the design and use of performance-vested equity plans.