The location of cross-border and national mergers and acquisitions within the United States

Research on the location choice of foreign direct investment (FDI) focuses on the choice between countries. The within-country location choice is either not analyzed at all or restricted to greenfield investments only. The majority of FDI, however, takes the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We develop and test a pair of hypotheses regarding location-target selection for both cross-border and national M&As across the United States, expecting differences in line with the liability of foreignness argument. Using a detailed firm-level data set for M&As in the period 1985–2012, we compare location choices of cross-border versus national M&As. We find that cross-border M&As are more spatially concentrated, and tend to sort into larger agglomerations than national M&As. This finding holds both for urban agglomerations in isolation, as well as for agglomerations that take the economic geography of the United States into account.     

Government ideology and international migration*

We provide the first empirical evidence that government ideology affects the choice of migration destinations. As ruling political parties differ in their discourse, policies, and positions on migration, the ideology differential between the host and home country governments can shape the relative generosity of the welfare system, the degree of tolerance towards out-groups, and the restrictiveness of migration policies, all acting as important drivers of international migration. Using data on bilateral migration and government ideology for OECD countries between 1990 and 2016, we show that migration flows increase when the government at the destination becomes more left-wing relative to the government at the origin, particularly when both countries are members of the European Economic Area.     

The attack on share buybacks

Corporate share buybacks are under attack, mainly from the political left, but also to some degree from the right. Critics advocate increasing the tax on buybacks in the hope of inducing firms to invest more and in ways that benefit workers. This attack on buybacks reflects a misunderstanding of basic (textbook-level) finance principles. The approach advocated by critics will backfire at growth-stage firms, which will invest less, not more, because a payout-tax increase will reduce the supply of equity infusions. At mature firms that are generating ample free cash flow, managers can easily evade the (unattractive-for-shareholders) real investments that critics desire by investing retained cash in financial assets. Buyback critics should recognise that punishing cash payouts per se would be counterproductive, and should focus instead on making a case for legislation that creates incentives that directly promote the specific behaviours they desire.     

Speculative trading,prospect theory and transaction costs

A speculative agent with prospect theory preference chooses the optimal time to purchase and then to sell an indivisible risky asset to maximise the expected utility of the round-trip profit net of transaction costs. The optimisation problem is formulated as a sequential optimal stopping problem, and we provide a complete characterisation of the solution. Depending on the preference and market parameters, the optimal strategy can be “buy and hold”, “buy low, sell high”, “buy high, sell higher” or “no trading”. Behavioural preference and market friction interact in a subtle way which yields surprising implications on the agent’s trading patterns. For example, increasing the market entry fee does not necessarily curb speculative trading, but instead may induce a higher reference point under which the agent becomes more risk-seeking and in turn is more likely to trade.