Consumer durables and the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income shocks

This paper derives and estimates a model in which the utility of durable and non-durable consumption is allowed to be non-separable and individuals face a convex adjustment cost for the purchase of a new durable good. Panel data on subjective expectations allow us to identify income shocks and estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income shocks.     

Host country competition,labor skills,and technology transfer by multinationals

Host Country Competition, Labor Skills, and Technology Transfer by Multinationals. — This paper examines the impact of local competition and the availability of skilled labor on the technology imports of foreign MNC affiliates in Mexican manufacturing industries. The authors find that proxies for local competition and labor skills are positively related to the recorded technology imports of foreign owned affiliates. The effects of competition appear to be particularly strong in intermediate and consumer goods industries, while the availability of skilled labor seems to be particularly important in durable and capital goods industries. Thus, government policies aiming to create a competitive climate and improve labor quality may also promote inflows of modern technology.     

Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.     

Technical change and irreversible investment under risk

A stochastic dynamic model was constructed to analyze investment decisions of an individual farme under risk in the presence of legibilities, embedded technical change and indivisible capital. An analytical solution was obtained and its local behavior studied by numerical methods. Optimal investment is obtained by regulating the difference between the desired and actual capital stocks between two barriers that define an inaction interval. While the desired capital drifts between the barriers, no action is taken. If the desired capital touches the upper barrier, the farmer invests pushing the average efficiency of the actual capital stock up. This in turn raises the desired capital even higher and contracts the inaction interval. If these effects are strong enough, the farmer will invest again until the potential gains of the technological package are exhausted. If the desired capital falls enough, the farmer disinvests, pushing down the average productivity and expanding the inaction interval. Disinvestment continues until it slops either because the inaction interval becomes so wide that it is no longer optimal to disinvest or because the actual capital stock is so small that it is no longer profitable to produce.     

Consumer Welfare and the Loss Induced by Withholding Information: The Case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding information about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.     

What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, the capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for entry level lawyers. The empirical results support capture theory.     

The general dynamic factor model: One-sided representation results

Recent dynamic factor models have been almost exclusively developed under the assumption that the common components span a finite-dimensional vector space. However, this finite-dimension assumption rules out very simple factor-loading patterns and is therefore severely restrictive. The general case has been studied, using a frequency domain approach, in Forni et al. (2000). That paper produces an estimator of the common components that is consistent but is based on filters that are two-sided and therefore unsuitable for prediction. The present paper, assuming a rational spectral density for the common components, obtains a one-sided estimator without the finite-dimension assumption.