Legalistic organizational responses to catastrophic illness: The effect of stigmatization on reactions to HIV/AIDS

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has focused increased attention on catastrophic illnesses in the workplace, and because of the stigmas associated with HIV/AIDS, it raises three primary concerns for organizations: (1) organizational avoidance of legal sanctions and litigation; (2) the maintenance of organizational legitimacy; and (3) organizational protection of employee rights. Although many organizations adopt legalistic responses to cope with these concerns, the analysis presented in this article suggests that while legalistic approaches function well to protect organizational interests in terms of both legal liability and legitimacy, the are only partially able to protect employee rights. Drawing upon the limited literature on HIV/AIDS in the workplace, this article presents an agenda for future research on organizational responses to HIV/AIDS.     

What Do Bettors Want? Determinants of Pari‐Mutuel Betting Preference

A bstract .   This paper is an analysis of the demand for thoroughbred racetrack wagers, examining evidence that would support the existence of two types of bettors: the risk-averse informed bettor versus the uninformed bettor. Looking at 12 major racetracks over the fall of 2002, we undertake an empirical examination of the determinants of bettors' preferences for particular wagers on specific races. The goal is to try to determine what individual aspects of a race (conditions, surface, participants, etc.) will encourage increased wagering dollars. With the advent of simulcasting, the competition for the wagering dollar is fierce, as the bettor can choose from more than 100 races daily, each race offering numerous betting options. We find for most wagers that higher quality participants, larger and more competitive fields, and turf races increase betting volume while higher pari-mutuel takeout, poor track conditions, and other races run concurrently reduce volume. However, more competitive fields reduce betting volume in the show and trifecta pools. Optimal field size is determined to be between 10 and 12 betting interests. Overall, we find support for the existence of a significant share of risk-averse informed bettors.     

Poverty in Palanpur

The meaning and identification of poverty are examined usingthree indicators of standard of living in the North Indian villageof Palanpur. The first is intended as a measure of "apparentprosperity" based on the personal assessments of investigatorsafter intensive field work in the village over the full agriculturalyear 1983–84. The other two are income in 1983–84,and a measure of permanent income obtained by averaging incomesfrom four surveys conducted over a twenty-six-year interval.A comparison of these three indicators shows that income measuredin any one year may give a misleading impression of the incidenceof poverty. The risk of poverty for households is calculated.Vulnerability is high among low-caste households and those whichare involved in agricultural labor. Categories, however, arenot homogeneous; for example, whereas the landless and widowsare more likely to be poor, some of such households are quitewell off. It is argued that poverty in a good agricultural yearis a better indicator of sustained poverty than poverty in abad year. Occupational mobility out of agricultural labor islow, and changes in the distribution of land are largely accountedfor by demographic processes such as household splits.     

New market creation through transformation

Is new market creation a search and selectionprocess within the theoretical space of all possible markets? Or is it the outcome of a process of transformation of extant realities into new possibilities? In this article we consider new market creation as a process involving a new network of stakeholders. The network is initiated through an effectual commitment that sets in motion two concurrent cycles of expanding resources and convergingconstraints that result in the new market. The dynamic model was induced from two empirical investigations, a cognitive science-based investigation of entrepreneurial expertise, and a real time history of the RFID industry. JEL Classification: M13, M31, D4, D52, D71, D72, L1, L2, P42 We would like to thank the Batten Institute at the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia, for supporting this research. We would also like to thank the following on specific contributions to our thesis: Anil Menon for his relentless insistence on more precise formulations of effectual reasoning; Jim March for his conversation and for inspiring us to dig into Type I and Type II errors; Rob Wiltbank for firming up the section on opportunity costs; and Stuart Read for helping us clarify our writing. Correspondence to: S.D. Sarasvathy     

Law without justice: The dilemmas of formalization and fairness in the legalistic organization

There is growing evidence of a litigation mentality rampant in organizations, which has created a legalistic mindset in many managers. Increasingly, managerial decisions are becoming dominated by a concern for what is legally defensible at the expense of broader social considerations such as justice and fairness. The papers in this special issue explore how this legalistic mindset has created new organizational and social dilemmas, and situations of law whithout justice.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Upward influence tactics and their effects on job performance ratings and flexible working arrangements: The mediating roles of mutual recognition respect and mutual appraisal respect

Supervisor's human resources (HR) decisions have a significant impact on the employees they manage but have been found to be subject to bias. The upward influence tactics use by subordinates can play a role in this. We investigated the effects of seven upward influence tactics on supervisor job‐performance ratings and the extent of subordinate flexible working arrangements (FWAs). Supervisors are often responsible for determining whether employees are granted FWAs. We posit an alternative theoretical mechanism by which upward influence tactics bring about their effects, mediated through two distinct types of respect, mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect. We collected data from 389 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads, and found that both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect mediated relationships between several upward influence tactics and both job‐performance ratings and FWAs. Our findings show that upward influence tactics affect the quality of the relationship between employees and their supervisors, specifically, these two forms of mutual respect. Further, both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect may explain why supervisors show favoritism to some subordinates over others, in reaching HR decisions in these areas.     

Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems

Summary LetT denote a continuous time horizon and {G ^t :tT} be a net (generalized sequence) of Bayesian games. We show that: (i) if {x ^t : tT} is a net of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategies for G^t we can extract a subsequence which converges to a limit full information BNE strategy for a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, (ii) If {x ^t : tT} is a net of approximate or _t-BNE strategies for the game G^t we can still extract a subsequence which converges to the one shot limit full information equilibrium BNE strategy, (iii) Given a limit full information BNE strategy of a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, we can find a net of _t-BNE strategies {x ^t : tT} in {G ^t :tT} which converges to the limit full information BNE strategy of the one shot game.We wish to thank Larry Blume, Mark Feldman, Jim Jordan, Charlie Kahn, Stefan Krasa, Gregory Michalopoulos, Wayne Shafer, Bart Taub, and Anne Villamil for several useful discussions. The financial support of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Campus Research Board is gratefully acknowledged.