Upward influence tactics and their effects on job performance ratings and flexible working arrangements: The mediating roles of mutual recognition respect and mutual appraisal respect

Supervisor's human resources (HR) decisions have a significant impact on the employees they manage but have been found to be subject to bias. The upward influence tactics use by subordinates can play a role in this. We investigated the effects of seven upward influence tactics on supervisor job‐performance ratings and the extent of subordinate flexible working arrangements (FWAs). Supervisors are often responsible for determining whether employees are granted FWAs. We posit an alternative theoretical mechanism by which upward influence tactics bring about their effects, mediated through two distinct types of respect, mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect. We collected data from 389 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads, and found that both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect mediated relationships between several upward influence tactics and both job‐performance ratings and FWAs. Our findings show that upward influence tactics affect the quality of the relationship between employees and their supervisors, specifically, these two forms of mutual respect. Further, both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect may explain why supervisors show favoritism to some subordinates over others, in reaching HR decisions in these areas.     

Do regional trade agreements increase trade? Empirical evidence from the Asia–Pacific region

This article examines the effects of regional trade agreements. The augmented gravity model of international trade is used to test for trade creation and diversion in the context of trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. The results of the estimated model indicate that trade has increased among the members of AFTA and APTA but not among the AANZFTA members. Differences in the levels of development appear to have a significant impact on trade flows, suggesting that there can be no general presumption about the extent of trade creation and trade diversion.