Differential Migration Prospects,Skill Formation,and Welfare

This paper develops a one sector, two‐input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free‐market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.     

Evolution and the growth process: Natural selection of entrepreneurial traits

This research suggests that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a significant role in the process of economic development and the dynamics of inequality within and across societies. The study argues that entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically in the course of human history. In early stages of development, risk-tolerant, growth promoting traits generated an evolutionary advantage and their increased representation accelerated the pace of technological progress and the process of economic development. In mature stages of development, however, risk-averse traits gained an evolutionary advantage, diminishing the growth potential of advanced economies and contributing to convergence in economic growth across countries.     

On the optimal choice of capital intensity in LDCs with migration

"Sen's classic work on the choice of capital intensity of investment is generalized in the light of new theoretical developments and empirical findings concerning rural-to-urban migration in LDCs. This is done by explicitly incorporating a migration function into the basic choice model. Revised conditions for maximization of surplus are derived and compared with Sen's original condition. Some justification for the particular migration function used in the presence of risk-aversion is suggested."     

The brain drain, ‘educated unemployment’, human capital formation,and economic betterment1

Extending both the ‘harmful brain drain’ literature and the ‘beneficial brain gain’ literature, this paper analyzes both the negative and the positive impact of migration by skilled individuals in a unified framework. The paper extends the received literature on the ‘harmful brain drain’ by showing that in the short run, international migration can result in ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation in developing countries, as well as a brain drain from these countries. A simulation suggests that the costs of ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation can amount to significant losses for the individuals concerned, who may constitute a substantial proportion of the educated individuals. Adopting a dynamic framework, it is then shown that due to the positive externality effect of the prevailing, economy‐wide endowment of human capital on the formation of human capital, a relaxation in migration policy in both the current period and the preceding period can facilitate ‘take‐off’ of a developing country in the current period. Thus, it is suggested that while the migration of some educated individuals may reduce the social welfare of those who stay behind in the short run, it improves it in the long run.     

From political praise to stock options: Reforming compensation systems in the people's republic of China

The recent reforms in the People's Republic of China have brought into focus the system of compensation in Chinese enterprises. This paper examines the evolution of compensation schemes in China, with a special emphasis on the reforms of recent years, the obstacles they face, and the prospects for the future.     

Strategic Responses to Competitive Pressure: The Case of Township and Village Enterprises in China

This study assesses the configuration between strategic orientation and industrial environment for Chinese township and village enterprises (TVEs), the organizational form which has played an increasingly important role in Chinese economic development and structural reform. We argue that the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of the industrial environment influence TVE managers' perception of competitive pressure, which in turn affects the firm's strategic orientations such as innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, and analysis. Our analysis, based on a survey of TVE managers in Tinjin and Jiangsu, demonstrates that complexity and dynamism of industrial competition have a systematically positive impact on TVE's innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, or analysis. Environmental hostility is not significantly associated with any strategic orientations adopted by Chinese TVEs. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

Regional GDP in the UK, 1861–1911: new estimates

This article compares the Geary–Stark method for distributing known GDP totals across regions with a variation suggested by Crafts. Tests of the Geary–Stark method confirm that it generates accurate estimates of regional GDP. There are practical and conceptual problems with Crafts' extension, and it is not tested nor is it testable. New estimates of regional GDP for the period 1861 to 1911 contradict Crafts's suggestion of rising regional inequality. Purchasing power parity adjustments do not alter this trend. The new estimates confirm Ireland's post‐Famine catch‐up. The great bulk of Irish labour productivity growth can be accounted for by an upward shifting production function, though it can be argued that that portion of growth that represents catch‐up may be attributable to labour force decline.     

Real Options, (Dis)Investment Decision-Making and Accounting Measures of Performance

This paper suggests that a residual income-type measure of performance can be designed which supports optimal investment and disinvestment decision-making in a real options framework involving the options to wait before investing and to abandon. The measure has a number of advantages and disadvantages. Nonetheless, the balance of advantage versus disadvantage for the proposed measure must be set against the inadequacies of other competing measures of performance and associated organisational designs. Even if the measure of performance suggested is not regarded as practically useful, it has another general advantage – it can be used as a benchmark against which to evaluate other performance measures with regard to their support of optimal investment and disinvestment decision-making in a real options framework.     

LOOKING AT THE “POPULATION PROBLEM” THROUGH THE PRISM OF HETEROGENEITY: WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSES*

Upon introducing heterogeneity and dynamics into a model of the demand for children, a problem of optimal population is defined and analyzed. It is shown that from the perspective of social welfare, better‐educated individuals produce too few children while less‐educated individuals produce too many children and all individuals invest too little in the education of their children. The impact of several policy tools geared at addressing the “population problem” is investigated, in particular how child allowances and other tax‐subsidy policies can be harnessed to enhance welfare, and how and why early childhood education programs can mitigate the “population problem.”     

On a Variation in the Economic Performance of Migrants by their Home Country’s Wage

Although the economic performance of migrants in the receiving country undoubtedly depends on qualifications, it is also affected by inclinations. Given the probability of return migration, a behavioural link is established between the incentive of migrants to save in their country of destination and the prevailing wage rate in their home country. It is shown that migrants coming from a low‐wage country optimally save more than migrants from a high‐wage country. Policy and research implications suggested by this savings behaviour are alluded to.