Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

Do Invesrtors Capture the Value Premium?

Do investors realize higher returns by investing in value stocks instead of gorwth stocks? Examination of a sample of equity indexes, mutual funds, and large‐cap stocks reveals no evidence that value firms have earned higher returns than growth firms. The value premium reported in the literarture is historically strongest for small‐capitalization firms, yea average annual rerturns for small‐cap equity funds are 14.10% for value funds compared to 14.52% for growth funds. Despite dramatic increases in mutual fund expense ratios from 1965 to 2001, fee differences across style funds cannot explain the absence of a value premium.     

A Comparison of Unexplained Racial Disparities in Bank-Level and Market-Level Models of Mortgage Lending

Statistical models of mortgage lending have been used by both academics and regulators to assess the importance of racial discrimination in lending decisions. Models estimated by bank regulators are specified at a bank level, allowing regulators to focus on possible disparate treatment discrimination against minorities. In contrast, the academic literature has tended to estimate models combining data across many banks. We argue that the market-level approach uses a mis-specified model whose estimates do not clearly measure any well-defined concept of discrimination. Using data from eight banks, we find important differences between bank-level and market-level models, with market-level models producing larger estimated racial effects than bank-level models.     

Keeping Teams Together: How Ethical Leadership Moderates the Effects of Performance on Team Efficacy and Social Integration

Journal of Business Ethics - Prior research has demonstrated a strong relationship between team performance and team members’ team efficacy beliefs and perceptions of social integration....     

Productivity and efficiency at english football clubs: a random coefficient approach

This paper analyzes productivity and efficiency of English professional football clubs from 1981–1982 to 2010–2011, using a random coefficient stochastic distance frontier (SDF) model. Our Bayes factor analysis indicates that this model is strongly favored over the commonly used fixed coefficient SDF model. Our empirical results show that clubs in our sample operate at different levels of technical efficiency and technical change. Our further analysis using ordered logistic regression suggests that technical efficiency is more important than technical change in predicting whether clubs in our sample are promoted or relegated.     

Educational upgrading,structural change and the task composition of jobs in Europe

We analyze the changes in the task content of jobs in 24 European countries between 1998 and 2015. We link the O*NET occupational data with the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU‐LFS), and use the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor ( 2011 ). We find that the intensity of non‐routine cognitive tasks grew in all countries, while the intensity of manual tasks declined. Workforce upskilling was the major factor contributing to these developments. The intensity of routine cognitive tasks grew in most Central and Eastern European countries, but it declined in Western European countries. This difference is attributed to the contrasting patterns of structural changes in these groups of countries.     

Implicit recourse and credit card securitizations: What do fraud losses reveal?

In this paper, we develop and test a model of implicit recourse in asset-backed securitizations. Fraud losses on securitized assets are generally incurred by the bank and do not affect the performance of securitization trusts, while credit losses do affect the trust’s performance and are potentially borne by the owner of the securitized assets. Thus, the classification of losses as either fraud or credit losses provides a potential avenue of implicit recourse to manipulate the performance of securitization trusts. Using annual data from 2001 to 2006, we find that the performance of the credit card securitization portfolio is negatively related to fraud losses reported by the bank. We examine these results in light of the proposed Basel II capital rules and argue that a bank’s incentive to provide implicit recourse will increase under the anticipated regime.