Total factor productivity, the east Asian miracle, and the world production frontier

Total Factor Productivity, the East Asian Miracle, and the World Production Frontier. — The post WWII growth of the East Asian Tiger states has stimulated the discussion about its determinants. Young and Krugman hold that high capital accumulation rather than gains in efficiency or technological progress has spurred growth. Nelson and Pack, however, have recently criticized the methods of measuring technological progress. Applying the nonparametric approach to frontier production function determination and the Malmquist index of total factor productivity change, the authors take up this criticism. They calculate productivity indicators for a sample of 18 American, Asian, and European countries. For the Tiger states, their results confirm that capital accumulation was the main source of growth in 1960-1973, whereas they find evidence for an increasing importance of efficiency improvements for the growth in 1973-1990.     

A generalization of Panjer’s recursion and numerically stable risk aggregation

Portfolio credit risk models as well as models for operational risk can often be treated analogously to the collective risk model coming from insurance. Applying the classical Panjer recursion in the collective risk model can lead to numerical instabilities, for instance if the claim number distribution is extended negative binomial or extended logarithmic. We present a generalization of Panjer’s recursion that leads to numerically stable algorithms. The algorithm can be applied to the collective risk model, where the claim number follows, for example, a Poisson distribution mixed over a generalized tempered stable distribution with exponent in (0,1). De Pril’s recursion can be generalized in the same vein. We also present an analogue of our method for the collective model with a severity distribution having mixed support.     

Die Anforderungen an die interne Unternehmenskommunikation in neuen Organisationskonzepten

This article mainly concentrates on two questions: 1. What functions does an internal corporate communication perform in a learning organization, and in relation to knowledge management? 2. Under which conditions or circumstances can internal corporate communication fulfill these functions? In the concepts of organizational learning and knowledge management, internal communication gains an important productive function in generating, processing and saving knowledge. Instruments and tools such as face-to-face communication, internal magazines, information boards and the use of an intranet are discussed. As far as the generation, production and saving of knowledge are concerned, the instrument of face-to-face communication and the intranet are gaining special importance. In order to cope with these functional challenges, the internal corporate communication has to institutionalize selective incentives and motivating factors. For generating and saving knowledge, the actors’ reception of these media of communication seems of great importance also: Only a unified «community of practice» is able to transform information into knowledge.     

Forecasting the Adoption of GM Oilseed Rape: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany

This paper explores farmers’ willingness to adopt genetically modified (GM) oilseed rape prior to its commercial release and estimates the ‘demand’ for the new technology. The analysis is based upon choice experiments with 202 German arable farmers. A multinomial probit estimation reveals that GM attributes such as gross margin, expected liability from cross pollination, or flexibility in returning to conventional oilseed rape significantly affect the likelihood of adoption. Neighbouring farmers’ attitudes towards GM cropping and a number of farmer and farm characteristics were also found to be significant determinants of prospective adoption. Demand simulations suggest that adoption rates are very sensitive to the profit difference between GM and non‐GM rape varieties. A monopolistic seed price would substantially reduce demand for the new technology. A monopolistic seed supplier would reap between 45% and 80% of the GM rent, and the deadweight loss of the monopoly would range between 15% and 30% of that rent. The remaining rent for farmers may be too small to outweigh possible producer price discounts resulting from the costs of segregating GM and non‐GM oilseed rape along the supply chain.