Characterization of generalized weak orders and revealed preference

Summary This short paper provides an alternative framework to axiomatize various binary preference relations such as semiorder, weak semiorder etc. A set of simple axioms is presented in terms of revealed-preferred and revealed-inferior alternatives which makes the connection between various binary preference relations transparent; and every single axiom is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a binary preference relation of a specified type.We thank Bhasker Dutta, Peter Fishburn, Prasanta Pattanaik, Robert Russell and Thomas Schwartz for helpful suggestions     

Employee share ownership,training, and early promotion policy as a bundle in enhancing labor productivity: A test of the three‐way interaction effect

The three‐way interaction effect of (broad‐based) employee share ownership (ESO), training, and early promotion policy on labor productivity was examined in a longitudinal sample of 614 organizations (1,605 organization‐year data points) in Korea. The ESO–productivity relationship was positive only when the investment in training was high and the opportunity for early promotion was present. However, we found no evidence for the two‐way interaction effects of ESO and training and ESO and early promotion policy on labor productivity. The results are in alignment with the emergent view that the productivity benefits of ESO can be better realized when ESO coexists with a bundle of complementary human resource management (HRM) practices. Thus, this study meaningfully extends the contingency perspective and related studies in the ESO literature, which tend to examine the productivity effect of ESO in isolation or in conjunction with a single HRM practice.     

Alternate instruments to manage the capital flow conundrum: A study of selected Asian economies

Capital inflows to and outflows from emerging market economies (EME) have increased significantly since 2000. This rapid increase, accompanied by a sharp rise in volatility, has amplified the complexity of macroeconomic management in EME. While foreign capital provides additional financing for productive investment and offers avenues for risk diversification, unbridled flows exacerbate financial and macroeconomic instability. In this paper, we focus on the experience of six emerging Asian economies (EAE) in dealing with capital flows. Using quarterly data, we identify the waves of capital flows experienced by these EAE and the efficacy of the various policy measures taken. The policy choices include negotiating the trilemma (i.e. balancing the need for monetary policy autonomy, exchange rate flexibility and capital account openness), as per the demands of the macroeconomic situation. The paper also analyses the extent to which intervention in the foreign exchange market and imposition of short‐term capital flow management measures have aided countries to negotiate the trilemma. The efficacy of these responses have been varied across countries, implying that a judicious mix of these measures, along with improvement in financial and institutional development, is required to effectively counter the vagaries of capital flows.     

中国服务外包:敢问路在何方

经济全球化的纵深发展和新一轮国际产业转移的持续推进,为我国承接服务外包、加快经济增长方式的转变带来了历史性契机。随着我国商务部服务外包"千百十"工程的逐步实施和新近20个"中国服务外包示范城市"的确立,我国外包产业晨曦初现,朝气蓬勃。作为新兴的外包目的地,中国外包产业的发展既有作为一个高速发展的最大发展中国家的内在优势,如巨大的国内市场、丰富的人力资源、良好的基础设施,又有作为一个外包产业新兴国所具有的后发优势,如更好地借鉴印度和菲律宾等国的经验教训,还有作为东亚文明发源地所具有的地缘优势,如拥有日本和韩国两个区域内外包客户国。同时,我国外包产业也有一些不足之处,如服务交付模式有欠成熟,"中国外包"品牌尚未形成。因而,如何整合自身优势,"有所为有所不为",走出一条中国特色外包发展道路,是当前必须面对和解决的重大课题。他山之石,可以攻玉。本文是全球外包领域权威咨询机构Tholons的最新研究成果,希望这一来自班加罗尔的声音能为我国外包领域决策要员、专家学者及业界同仁更好地谋划和发展中国外包提供一个新的视角。     

A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.