Reducing reporting risk: Designating foreign currency forward contracts as cash flow hedges

We present an example that compares the effects on earnings of designating a foreign currency forward contract as either a cash-flow or fair-value hedge of a foreign currency denominated receivable. Entities engaging in exchange transactions not denominated in their functional currency frequently enter into foreign currency forward contracts in order to mitigate their foreign exchange rate risk exposure. The aggregate effect on earnings of the transaction gain or loss on the foreign currency receivable and the gain or loss on the forward contract is known on the date the forward contract is initiated. The effect on each period’s earnings during the term of a forward contract designated as a cash-flow hedge is also known on the date the contract is initiated; whereas the effect on each periods’ earnings from a fair-value hedge cannot be determined until the respective balance sheet dates. Therefore, designating forward contracts as cash-flow hedges may suppress volatility in reported earnings compared to designating forward contracts as fair-value hedges. In addition, the reporting risk (the amount of uncertainty surrounding the pending measure of an item to be reported in the financial statements) is lower when a forward contract is designated as a cash-flow hedge relative to designating it as a fair-value hedge. This suggests foreign currency forward contracts designated as cash-flow hedges are more consistent with the purpose of hedge accounting: to mitigate the effects on earnings of applying different measurement criteria for the hedge and the hedged item.     

Business Groups: An Integrated Model to Focus Future Research

abstract    Business groups are the primary form of managing large business organizations outside North America. This paper provides a systematic and integrative framework for understanding business groups. We argue that existing theoretical perspectives of business groups pay attention to four critical external contexts, each of which draws from a specific theoretical perspective: market conditions (transaction cost theory), social relationships (relational perspective), political factors (political economy perspective), and external monitoring mechanisms (agency theory). Business groups adapt to these external forces by deploying various internal mechanisms along two key dimensions: one focuses on the distinctive roles of the group affiliates (horizontal connectedness) and the other focuses on coupling and order between the parent firm and its affiliates (vertical linkages). Based on these two dimensions, a typology of business group forms is developed: network (N-form), club (C-form), holding (H-form), and multidivisional (M-form). Utilizing this model we provide research questions which facilitate an improved future research agenda.     

Benchmarking Risk Management Within the International Water Utility Sector. Part I: Design of a Capability Maturity Methodology

Risk management in the water utility sector is becoming increasingly explicit. However, due to the novelty and complexity of the discipline, utilities are encountering difficulties in defining and institutionalising their risk management processes. In response, the authors have developed a sector specific capability maturity methodology for benchmarking and improving risk management. The research, conducted in consultation with water utility practitioners, has distilled risk management into a coherent, process‐based framework. We identified eleven risk management processes, and eight key attributes with characterise the extent to which these processes are defined, controlled and institutionalised. Implementation of the model should enable utilities to more effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible and defensible decision making.     

Commodity price inflation, retail pass-through and market power

When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative commodity price shocks; that is, whether commodity price volatility alters market power. We exploit recent volatility in food commodity prices over the period 2007-2010 to investigate how commodity price shocks translate into market power in two different vertically-structured food product industries: potatoes and fluid milk. For potatoes, we find both wholesale and retail market power decreases (increases) during periods of rising (falling) commodity prices. Moreover, price-cost margins widen a substantially greater degree in response to negative shocks than margins narrow in response to positive shocks, indicating that commodity price volatility increases market power. For fluid milk, we find that market power likewise declines during periods of rising commodity prices; however, market power does not significantly change during periods of falling commodity prices, suggesting that commodity price volatility decreases market power.     

PREDICTING PRIVATE COMPANY FAILURE

Private company failure is a significant problem that is not fully addressed by existing research. This study develops a discriminant model from data on 107 private companies. The model predicts success and failure, based on six ratios obtained from the two immediately prior years' publicly available accounting reports. Based on a hold-out sample of 40 companies a prediction with 85% accuracy was achieved. This prediction was made one year ahead. The model indicates that the retained earnings/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, and shareholders funds/total liabilities ratios are the three major predictors of bankruptcy. Overall the model's coefficients are, as expected, substantially different to those of public company models.     

Joint oligopsony-oligopoly in the U.S. leaf tobacco market, 1924–39

The leaf tobacco marketplace is highly organized. Prior to 1940, the few large tobacco companies controlled that organization explicitly. The question is whether this organization set oligopsonistic leaf prices or minimized production and transaction costs. A model of joint oligopsonyoligopoly shows that pricing of cigarettes and leaf tobacco was unified: oligopolistic cigarette pricing was sufficient to curtail both cigarette production and leaf purchases. The companies could just bid in the market for the leaf necessary for that cigarette production rate.Prima facie, the organization was not for oligopsony coordination. The implied econometric model of pricing fits observed behavior well.Malcolm Boyd, Dennis Carlton, John Garen, Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, An-loh Lin, Robert Miller, Stephen Spurr and the referee have given me thoughtful, perceptive and useful comments. I am pleased to acknowledge their involvement without implicating them in whatever errors remain.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

The upgrading effect of voluntary export restraints

Summary Given that a volume-defined VER is introduced on two differently priced varieties of a good,(i) the transfer of the VER-rent to the exporting country will cause imports of both varieties to fall,(ii) the relative price change in favour of the high cost variety counteracts this import fall and could in fact outweigh it,(iii) an ad valorem tariff restoring the original relative price of the two varieties would increase welfare and that welfare increase could in fact outweigh the welfare loss due to the VER-transfer to the exporting country.