Realised volatility and parametric estimation of Heston SDEs

Finance and Stochastics - We present a detailed analysis of observable moment-based parameter estimators for the Heston SDEs jointly driving the rate of returns $(R_{t})$ and the squared...     

Risk arbitrage and hedging to acceptability under transaction costs

The classical discrete-time model of proportional transaction costs relies on the assumption that a feasible portfolio process has solvent increments at each step. We extend this setting in two directions, allowing convex transaction costs and assuming that increments of the portfolio process belong to the sum of a solvency set and a family of multivariate acceptable positions, e.g. with respect to a dynamic risk measure. We describe the sets of superhedging prices, formulate several no (risk) arbitrage conditions and explore connections between them. In the special case when multivariate positions are converted into a single fixed asset, our framework turns into the no-good-deals setting. However, in general, the possibilities of assessing the risk with respect to any asset or a basket of assets lead to a decrease of superhedging prices and the no-arbitrage conditions become stronger. The mathematical techniques rely on results for unbounded and possibly non-closed random sets in Euclidean space.

     

Conflicts of interest,intra‐group financing and procedural coordination of group insolvencies

Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism.     

Board representation in international joint ventures

Research summary : Relatively little attention has been paid to boards in international joint ventures (IJVs), and the composition of these boards in particular. We examine the determinants of foreign partners' representation on IJV boards in order to advance our knowledge of this facet of IJV governance. We argue that a foreign partner's representation on the IJV board is related to its equity contribution. However, we hypothesize that this relationship is moderated by IJV and host country characteristics that affect the importance of the internal and external roles IJV boards serve. These results provide insights into the conditions under which a partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Managerial summary : The functioning and composition of corporate boards have long been seen as critical to managers and shareholders alike. In contrast, the boards of IJVs have been relatively neglected. We advance our knowledge of this important facet of IJV governance. Specifically, we highlight the importance of two roles (i.e., an internal and external role) that IJV boards and directors fulfill. We find that the importance of these internal and external roles of boards determines whether a foreign partner might wish to secure greater board representation for its level of equity, or utilize less board representation than might be suggested by its equity level alone. Our results provide novel insights that can help managers structure their IJV boards. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The mystery of zero-leverage firms

We present the puzzling evidence that, from 1962 to 2009, an average 10.2% of large public nonfinancial US firms have zero debt and almost 22% have less than 5% book leverage ratio. Zero-leverage behavior is a persistent phenomenon. Dividend-paying zero-leverage firms pay substantially higher dividends, are more profitable, pay higher taxes, issue less equity, and have higher cash balances than control firms chosen by industry and size. Firms with higher Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ownership and longer CEO tenure are more likely to have zero debt, especially if boards are smaller and less independent. Family firms are also more likely to be zero-levered.     

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more. The prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case, and have little or no effect in the latter case. The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities, and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions.     

State capitalism in international context: Varieties and variations

State interventions in markets assume varieties of forms in different economic systems. To capture this variety, we consider state capitalism as a multidimensional concept, first reviewing its historical evolution from both practical and scholarly vantages. We describe several dimensions of state capitalism and demonstrate how cross-national variations can be captured through positioning countries along these dimensions. We use cross-sectional data for a large sample of countries to derive factors that represent key dimensions of state capitalism. We demonstrate how cross-national and historical variation in state capitalism is captured by this Virtual Special Issue and offer suggestions for future research.     

The communication cost of selfishness

We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be truthful (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasilinear in such transfers). For Bayesian incentive compatibility, the protocol may need to hide some information from the agents to prevent deviations contingent on the information. In both settings with selfish agents, the communication cost can be higher than in the case in which the agents are honest and can be relied upon to report truthfully. The increase is the “communication cost of selfishness.” We provide an exponential upper bound on the increase. We show that the bound is tight in the Bayesian setting, but we do not know this in the ex post setting. We describe some cases where the communication cost of selfishness proves to be very low.     

Analyzing determinants of bond yield spreads with Bayesian Model Averaging

This paper analyzes determinants of country default risk in emerging markets, reflected by sovereign yield spreads. The results reported so far in the literature are heterogeneous with respect to significant explanatory variables. This could indicate a high degree of uncertainty about the “true” regression model. We use Bayesian Model Averaging as the model selection method in order to find the variables which are most likely to determine credit risk. We document that total debt, history of recent default, currency depreciation, and growth rate of foreign currency reserves as well as market sentiments are the key drivers of yield spreads.