Reviews

“URBAN ECONOMIC CHANGE” Victor A. Hausner and members of the ESRC Inner Cities Research Programme, 1987: Urban Economic Change: Five City Studies. Clarendon Press, Oxford, £25.00.

“ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY” Robinson, F., Wren, C. and Goddard, J., 1987: Economic Development Policies-An Evaluative Study of the Newcastle Metropolitan Region. Oxford: Clarendon Press, £8.95 paper.

'URBAN REGENERATION ISSUES” London Strategic Policy Unit, 1987: Land for Industry: The need for industrial land in London until 1990. London: LSPU, no price stated.

Department of the Environment, 1987: Re-using Redundant Buildings: Case Studies of Good Practice in Urban Regeneration. HMSO £11.95.

Department of the Environment, 1987: Managing Workspaces: Case Studies of Good Practice in Urban Regeneration. HMSO £11.95.

Department of the Environment, 1987: Greening Crty Sites: Case Studies in Good Practice in Urban Re-generation. HMSO £11.95.

“VIEWS FROM THE DISTRICTS” Association of District Councils, 1987: A Blueprint for Urban Areas, Volumes 1 and 2. London: £12.00.

Association of District Councils, 1987: Economic Development Initiatives and Innovations: Best Practice Paper No. 6 (Revised). London: £4.00.     

Risk Shifts Following Sarbanes‐Oxley: Influences of Disclosure and Governance

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) aimed to improve financial reporting by enhancing corporate disclosure and governance. We find statistically significant increases, from before to after the passage of SOX, in total return variance, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. The risk increases are consistent with predictions that the legislation would cause firms to disclose more negative information, resulting in increased investment risk. However, in cross‐sectional tests, post‐SOX improvements in information certainty, board independence and monitoring are associated with smaller increases or greater decreases in risk. If SOX is responsible for these improvements, its effects are consistent with its purpose.     

The buyer-supplier interface under just-in-time relationships

In any contractural relationship, legally and ethically, all parties much benefit. Minor concessions to one party can be significant gains for the other. To establish the win/win environment, it is sometimes necessary to make reasonable concessions that preserve the overall objective of the JIT concept. It is good business sense to make those concessions that are inexpensive and guarantee greater control. The concessions discussed strengthen the buyer-seller relationship and aid in reaching the objectives of JIT.     

The HRM Process Approach: The Influence of Employees’ Attribution to Explain the HRM‐Performance Relationship

In an experimental study and a field study, we studied whether high‐commitment human resource management (HC‐HRM) is more effective when employees can make sense of HRM (attribute HRM to management). In the experimental study (n = 354), employees’ HC‐HRM perceptions were evoked by a management case, and their attributions were manipulated with an information pattern based on the three dimensions of the covariation principle of the attribution theory: distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus. As expected, the results showed that the effect of HC‐HRM on affective organizational commitment was stronger when employees understood HRM as was intended by management. This experimental finding was confirmed in a cross‐level field study (n = 639 employees within 42 organizations): the relationship between HC‐HRM, on one hand, and affective organizational commitment and innovative behavior, on the other hand, was stronger under the condition that employees could make sense of HRM. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.