Trade and expropriation

We examine the effect of international trade on expropriation in a setting where law enforcement is costly. We show that, in general equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce expropriation activities and have a first-order effect on the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results is that unskilled-labor abundant countries facing popular militia or rebel groups will experience amplified gains from trade, as expropriation levels and cost of enforcement decline with trade liberalization. However, the model also admits the possibility that globalization causes an increase in crime, particularly for skilled-labor abundant countries.     

Does IPO Pricing Reflect Public Information? New Insights from Equity Carve‐Outs

We examine the efficiency of initial public offering (IPO) pricing using a sample of over 300 equity carve‐outs from 1985 to 2009. The partial adjustment theory posits that the initial return of IPOs is predictable based on private information, but public information is fully incorporated. Prospect theory is consistent with both private and public information not being fully incorporated in the offer price. Our analysis confirms that both price update and initial return of carve‐out IPOs can be predicted based on the parent firm's returns during the prepricing and preissuing periods. Further, postissue ownership of the parent firm is associated with significantly higher price update and initial return, while IPOs where the majority of the proceeds are paid out register lower initial return. The size of the subsidiary and relative size of the offering are also significantly related to price update and initial return. These findings are consistent with prospect theory.     

On the Determinants of REIT Capital Structure: Evidence from around the World

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Using a sample of REITs from twelve countries around the world, we examine the determinants of REIT capital structure. We investigate...     

Endogeneity in survey research

Endogeneity is a crucial problem in survey-based empirical research on marketing strategy (MS) and inter-organizational relationships (IORs); if not addressed, it can cause researchers to arrive at flawed conclusions and to offer poor advice to practitioners. Although the field is increasingly cognizant of endogeneity-related issues, many authors fail to properly address it, particularly in survey-based research. Emphasizing the role of essential heterogeneity, this article develops an overarching framework to help improve the understanding of endogeneity problems and how to tackle them when researchers use cross-sectional survey-based data. The authors provide explanations of and advice for how MS and IOR researchers can address six “painful” and sometimes hidden decisions: 1) Do you have an endogeneity problem? 2) What technique/estimator is appropriate? 3) What instrumental variables (IVs) should be chosen? 4) How should IVs be evaluated empirically? 5) How should the results be interpreted and evaluated? and 6) What results should you report? The authors provide a practical flowchart to guide researchers in their efforts to address endogeneity-related concerns.     

Corruption,market quality,and entry deterrence in emerging economies

In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.     

Durability Versus Concentration as an Explanation for Price Inflexibility

We document the extent of price rigidity across United States manufacturing industries in the 1980s and early 1990s and compare rigidity across different phases of the business cycle. We measure price rigidity in three ways – each under four different sets of assumptions. We take an approach that relies on disaggregated data; we look at price patterns for over 4000 individual manufactured commodities. Both durability and seller concentration are found to be important factors explaining differences in price rigidity across industrial product classes. Using our data, we replicate the regression results found in Carlton (1986) that were based on actual transaction prices from the 1960s.     

Does the Confucius Institute Network Impact Cultural Distance? A Panel Data Analysis of Cross‐Border Flows in and out of China

This paper examines the impact of cultural distance in general and the Confucius Institute Network in particular on cross‐border flows of tourists, goods and investment in and out of China. We estimate a panel gravity model of inbound and outbound flows between 2004 and 2012. We find that the presence of Confucius Institute(s) in the source country increases inbound tourism and equity flows and outbound export and FDI flows for China, while other measures of cultural distance have less of an impact.     

International trade and unionization: Evidence from India

We exploit exogenous variation in tariffs to examine the impact of import competition on unionization and union wages in a developing country. Using a combination of nationally representative household data (National Sample Survey Organization) and nationally representative industry‐level data (Annual Survey of Industries) from India, we find that net‐import industries that experienced larger cuts in tariffs also experienced larger declines in unionization. In addition, we find that these industries also experienced larger increases in union wages. These results are consistent with the predictions of an efficient bargaining framework that we extend to endogenize the union formation decision by allowing for a fixed cost of union formation. We also conduct a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation to show that the total wage gains to unionized workers marginally exceed the total wage losses to deunionized workers.