Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts

In the face of informational asymmetry, REIT equity investors may bear the costs of agency. Hence, it is in shareholders' interests to pay incentive fees to induce managers to utilize their superior information and to take suitable actions that reduce these costs. In this paper, the relation between financial performance and fees paid, and between fees paid and contractual incentives, are examined to determine whether equityholder interests are being served by the decisions of REIT managers. The data reveal that fees paid and financial performance are positively related, indicating that financial performance is at least partially endogenous with respect to managerial action. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the industry fee structure has changed over the period in a manner that appears to have reduced the agency costs borne by equityholders, and by the end of the sample period the fees paid in general seem to reflect incentives that are consistent with the wealth maximization goal of equityholders.     

Alternative algorithms for the macRae OLCV strategy

Using dynamic programming MacRae obtained a linear feedback law for her open loop constrained variance (OLCV) strategy. To compute the control law requires solving a two point boundary value problem. The dynamic programming formulation does not admit gradient related algorithms. This paper presents an alternative augmented Lagrangian formulation which can be solved as a deterministic constrained optimization problem. The new approach is superior because it admits gradient related algorithms plus all the algorithms which could be employed using the original approach. Three examples demonstrate the superiority of the new approach.     

Are business ethics and engineering ethics members of the same family?

The thesis of the paper is that there are no important differences between problems in business ethics and problems in engineering ethics. The problems are both of the same logical type. What keeps this contention from being obvious is that many view engineers as professionals and business persons as nonprofessionals. If you accept the traditional definition of professional neither engineering nor business qualify. If you adopt the attitudinal definition of a profession which I propose, both practitioners could be professionals. This thesis is then tested by applying it to six specific issues in business and/or engineering ethics. Norman E. Bowie is Director at the Center for the Study of Values and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. Previously, he was Executive Secretary at the American Philosophical Association and received the Phi Beta Kappa Award. Important publications: Ethical Theory and Business, co-editor with Tom Beauchamp, Prentice Hall, 1979, Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, co-editor with Fred Elliston, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982, Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century, editor, Hackett Publishing, 1983, and Making Ethical Decisions, editor, McGraw-Hill (forthcoming). He has also written numerous articles in professional journals.An earlier version of this paper was read at a conference on applied ethics as part of an NEH sponsored project, National Project on Philosophy and Engineering Ethics, University of Florida, January 13–15, 1982.     

Audit report lag: the role of auditor type and increased competition in the audit market

This study investigates the effect of auditor type (private vs. state) and increased competition in an audit market on audit report lag (ARL). This is the first study to provide evidence regarding the effect of audit market competition on ARL. Utilising structure–conduct–performance theory, we predict that competition pressures private auditors to be more efficient and to have less reporting lag than state auditors. We also predict that competition among auditors after a liberalisation period forces auditors to be more efficient and to record less ARL than before. We use a unique data set in Iran, whereby the audit market liberalisation (an audit market where services were previously provided primarily by a state entity) has resulted in both state and private auditors simultaneously providing audit services. The findings are consistent with the following hypothesis, that is ARL is shorter for private auditors than it is for state auditors, and ARL decreases as competition increases in the Iranian audit market. Consistent with the structure–conduct–performance theory, the findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market results in higher efficiency, as reflected by a shorter ARL.