Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

Is the quality of female auditors really better? Evidence based on the Chinese A-share market

Unlike previous studies in which a single index was used to measure audit quality, this study establishes a new comprehensive index to measure audit quality via Discretionary Accrual, as estimated by Jones’ basic model (1991) and Audit Opinions. The former is used to measure the quality of financial statements, and the latter is used to measure the auditors’ independence in the mainstream international literature. We examine whether and how an auditor’s gender affects the quality of his or her audits under the framework of empathy theory and gender role socialization theory. Using a large sample of 9861 auditor-firm-year observations from Chinese A-share–listed companies from 2011 to 2015, we find that the audit quality of signed auditors shows significant gender differences: these significant gender differences differ from the findings of previous studies that female auditors could provide a higher-quality audit than male auditors; that is, in our study the audit quality of the male auditors exceeds that of the female auditors. After distinguishing the positive and negative directions of the Discretionary Accrual, we find no significant gender differences in audit quality between male and female auditors when the earnings had been adjusted upward by the client; that is, female and male auditors had the same audit risk perception. However, when the client adjusted earnings downward, which indicates a lower audit risk for the auditor, the audit quality of female auditors was significantly lower than that of the male auditors. After controlling for the age and position of the auditors, we also find that the gender differences in the auditors’ audit quality decreased significantly or even disappeared when the auditor’s age exceeded 45?years and/or their position was manager or above. These results are consistent with the empathy theory and gender role socialization theory.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

On the effort-saving effect of audit committee–auditor interlocking

Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

An examination of the relation between market structure and the profitability of audit engagements

Due to increasing supplier concentration, there is growing concern regarding the lack of competition in the audit market. Theory based on Cournot oligopoly predicts that increasing concentration will facilitate monopolistic behaviour. Conversely, if the market for audit services has more in common with a Bertrand oligopoly, concentration may not lead to higher fees. We evaluate whether increased audit supplier concentration leads to economic rents by investigating audit profitability. Using proprietary data from a (then) Big 6 audit firm, we find that local market structure has a significant and positive association with audit profitability, but not auditor effort for large clients.     

Measuring audit quality of local governments in England and Wales

The purpose of this paper is to model and test the audit quality provided to local governments in England and Wales. A key question is: are there major differences in audit quality provided? The Audit Commission, a national public body under Parliament, regulates the audits. It sets audit standards, appoints the auditors, and (although each auditor and client local government set the specific audit fee for that client) it establishes a formula to determine standard audit fees. The Audit Commission also conducts an annual review of the audit quality provided by the selected auditors, as well as a survey of client satisfaction. The majority of audits are conducted by District Auditors (public sector employees of the Audit Commission). About a quarter of local governments are audited by one of six private sector auditors (including three of the Big 4). Actual results indicate that audit quality differences are associated with the number of governmental audit clients and local government type. Generally, there were modest quality differences by auditor category.     

The influence of judges' attitudes on liability assessments related to failed audits exhibiting significant audit team over-time or significant use of off-shore auditors

This study provides evidence on how audit firms' decisions to use offshore (outsourced) auditors or to assign on-site (local) auditors extensive overtime affect judges' evaluation of auditor legal liability I conduct a behavioral experiment in which actual judges responded to a hypothetical audit lawsuit. The results suggest auditors may be penalized during the litigation process depending on the extent of overtime or off-shoring and judges' attitude toward the public accounting profession. Judges with a positive attitude toward public accounting assessed more liability for an audit firm that used offshore (outsourced) auditors than for the use of extensive overtime for on-site auditors or a control condition. However, judges with a negative attitude toward the auditing profession assessed higher liability for auditors except when on-site auditors bore significant overtime in the final weeks of the audit.     

Public and private sector auditors and accruals quality in English NHS hospital Trusts

To promote auditor independence and audit quality in English NHS Trusts the Audit Commission regulates auditor rotation, fees and the appointment of its own and private sector auditors. NHS sanctioned departures from GAAP, some of which allow the financial breakeven target to be achieved, have been criticised by the Audit Commission as detrimental to financial discipline. In this paper, we investigate the association between abnormal accruals and the achievement of financial breakeven in NHS hospital Trusts over the period 1998–2005. We also investigate the association between abnormal accruals, audit fees and the Trusts audited by public and private sector auditors. We find evidence that abnormal accruals are used to achieve financial breakeven and they differ across different types of auditor. We also identify a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and NHS Trust star ratings. These findings raise questions about the ‘quality’ of NHS audit where compliance with NHS-specific regulations overrides the wider GAAP-based requirement for financial statements to show a true and fair view and they warrant reconsideration of the nature of audit in NHS Trusts.     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

The Market for External Audit Services in the Public Sector: An Empirical Analysis of NHS Trusts

This study investigates the market for audit services in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The market has a number of interesting features, including the presence of the Audit Commission as a regulator, appointer and provider of audit services. Following a theoretical overview of audit pricing in the NHS, evidence is provided on the behaviour of private sector auditors in an environment where audit risk characteristics differ from the private sector. The research also investigates, for the first time in the public sector, the relationship between audit fees and non–audit (consultancy) fees. Comparisons are also drawn between audit fees in the public and private sectors in an analysis of audit fees by industry. Despite some key similarities, the study shows that a number of differences exist between private and public sector audit fee models. In particular, we find no evidence of Big 6 (or mid–tier) auditor premiums, but we do find a significant negative relationship between audit and consultancy fees providing support for the 'knowledge spill–over' hypothesis. In addition, the fees charged to trusts appear significantly lower than their private sector counterparts, despite trust auditors having additional duties to perform. Possible explanations for this finding are offered in the paper.     

How individual auditor characteristics impact the likelihood of audit failure: Evidence from China

Audit failure imposes a severe loss on investors and damages market participants' confidence in financial reporting quality. This study investigates the impacts of individual auditor characteristics on the likelihood of audit failure. Chinese regulators mandate listed firms to disclose the engagement auditors' identity. Furthermore, the information regarding individual auditor characteristics in China is also publicly available. Utilizing this unique setting, we examine the relationship between individual auditor characteristics and the likelihood of audit failure in China during the period from 2000 to 2009. We document that individual auditors with more auditing experience are less likely associated with audit failure. We also find a weaker negative relationship between auditor education level and audit failure. Our study has important implications for both auditors and regulators by shedding lights on the determinants of audit failure and by providing guidance to the human resource management in audit firms.     

Pricing and supplier concentration in the private client segment of the audit market: Market power or competition?

This study differs from prior audit-pricing studies as (1) it focuses on the issue of price competition in the (small) private client segment of the audit market and (2) addresses the questions of whether and how the audit-pricing model changed in that market between 1989 and 1997. Given the significant increases in market concentration and two big audit firm mergers in that period, we try to assess whether price competition (market power) has increased (decreased) or decreased (increased). We use Belgian data on privately owned companies from 1989 and 1997 for our analyses. We find that audit fees are significantly associated with the incumbent auditor's market share both in 1989 and 1997. Our results are in line with prior studies on public client samples and hence do not support prior assumptions that there are no price premia charged by large auditors in the small client segment of the audit market. As to the evolution of audit pricing in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market between 1989 and 1997, we find that the impact of various audit fee determinants changed significantly and report evidence supportive of increased price competition.     

Do goodwill impairments affect audit opinions? Evidence from China

There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting. The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance. We examine whether auditors, as a crucial external monitor, identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions. Using a sample of firms listed on China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2017, we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period. Our findings are as follows. First, the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments. Second, the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks. Third, this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch. Fourth, auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence. Overall, we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.     

Government and managerial influence on auditor switching under partial privatization

We investigate how auditor switching is affected by government influence, misalignment between type of auditor (government vs. private) and type of controlling shareholder (government vs. private), and misalignment between an incumbent auditor and imputed preferences of managers in a market characterized by continued substantial government ownership in listed entities. We exploit a natural policy and regulatory experiment in Iran that allows us to investigate what happens when previously government-owned entities are partially privatized as listed entities where, in many cases, the government retains significant ownership interests. At the same time, there were significant changes in the audit market, resulting in large increases in the number of private sector auditors competing for previously state-administered audits. We find the likelihood of auditor switches is strongly associated with measures of misalignment between type of auditor and type of controlling shareholder and auditor–managerial misalignment, but these associations are constrained by significant government influence. Exposing the constraining effect of significant government influence on auditor switching is an important contribution to our understanding of privatizations, government shareholder influence and auditor choice. These results have implications for policy development in other emerging and transition economies where privatization remains largely partial, and competition among private sector auditors is still emergent.     

制度环境、审计供求与审计治理——基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题的实证分析

本文基于我国证券市场中审计师变更问题这一动态视角考察了制度环境对外部审计治理的影响。通过研究,我们发现:首先,在制度环境发展相对落后的地区,上市公司频繁更换审计师的现象更严重;其次,在制度环境发展相对较好的地区,上市公司更可能发生审计师升级变更,表明其对高质量审计服务的需求;第三,在制度环境发展较差的地区,由于诉讼风险和诉讼成本较低,继任审计师为了获得审计客户更容易发生变通审计意见的行为,说明审计师难以发挥其外部治理的功能进而弥补制度环境的缺陷。本文的研究发现说明制度环境同时影响审计需求和审计供给两方面的行为表现,并支持了制度环境与外部审计治理是相互促进的关系。     

The Impact of Consulting Services on Audit Quality: An Experimental Approach

We use experimental markets to examine whether providing consulting services to a non‐audit client impacts audit quality. Our paper directly addresses concerns raised by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that the largest public accounting firms’ growth in their consulting practices threatens audit quality. We conduct an experiment proposed using a registration‐based editorial process. We compare a baseline where the auditor does not provide consulting services to conditions where auditors provide consulting to audit clients or where auditors only provide consulting services to non‐audit clients. Our unique design provides evidence on whether providing consulting to non‐audit clients strengthens the salience of a client‐cooperative social norm that reduces audit quality. We do not find differences in audit quality by condition in our planned analysis, however we find greater variation in audit quality in the conditions where auditors provide consulting services compared to the baseline. In unplanned analyses, our results suggest providing consulting services increases auditor cooperation with managers, increasing audit quality when managers prefer high audit quality and decreasing audit quality when managers prefer low audit quality.     

Understanding the determinants of the magnitude of entity-level risk and account-level risk key audit matters: The case of the United Kingdom

This study was conducted to analyse the influence of auditor and client characteristics on the magnitude and type of key audit matters (KAM) disclosed in the audit reports of the FTSE 100 companies in the UK during the period 2013–2016. A recently introduced standard requires auditors to reveal the main risks faced by the client and to describe how these are addressed in the audit. Our results show that Deloitte, EY and KPMG tend to report fewer entity-level-risk KAM (ELRKAM) than PwC, while KPMG and BDO report fewer account-level-risk KAM (ALRKAM) than PwC. In general, auditors of companies that pay higher audit services fees present more ELRKAM and fewer ALRKAM. Our findings also show that client characteristics are relevant to the number and type of KAM included in the audit report. Our results show that auditor and client characteristics are determinants of the number of KAM disclosed and, moreover, determine the type of KAM disclosed in the audit reports.