Integrating parametric and non-parametric multivariate analysis of urban growth and commuting patterns in a European metropolitan area

Quality & Quantity - Mono-centric regions have experienced a progressive transformation towards polycentric structures. Transition to discontinuous and dispersed spatial configurations was...     

Co‐integration Rank Determination in Partial Systems Using Information Criteria

We investigate the asymptotic and finite sample properties of the most widely used information criteria for co‐integration rank determination in ‘partial’ systems, i.e. in co‐integrated vector autoregressive (VAR) models where a sub‐set of variables of interest is modelled conditional on another sub‐set of variables. The asymptotic properties of the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC) are established, and consistency of BIC and HQC is proved. Notably, the consistency of BIC and HQC is robust to violations of weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables with respect to the co‐integration parameters. More precisely, BIC and HQC recover the true co‐integration rank from the partial system analysis also when the conditional model does not convey all information about the co‐integration parameters. This result opens up interesting possibilities for practitioners who can now determine the co‐integration rank in partial systems without being concerned about the weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables. A Monte Carlo experiment based on a large dimensional data generating process shows that BIC and HQC applied in partial systems perform reasonably well in small samples and comparatively better than ‘traditional’ methods for co‐integration rank determination. We further show the usefulness of our approach and the benefits of the conditional system analysis in two empirical illustrations, both based on the estimation of VAR systems on US quarterly data. Overall, our analysis shows the gains of combining information criteria with partial system analysis.     

Endogenous codetermination

This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.     

Managing liquidity with portfolio staleness

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Liquidity is a risk factor of primary relevance that can significantly affect the asset allocation decisions of investors. In this paper, we introduce the...     

Earnouts: The real value of disagreement in mergers and acquisitions

Earnout agreements link part of the payment for an acquired company to its future performance. Despite their option-like features, they cannot be valued using vanilla option-pricing methods. Two peculiar sources of risk affect these contracts: Bidder default before the earnout expiration (default risk) and potential litigation associated with earnouts (litigation risk). We developed an option-pricing model that encompasses these sources of risk, showing that counterparty and litigation risk can have a remarkable impact on earnout values. Our model's relevance is further enhanced by recent accounting standards that require contingent payments to be valued at fair value.     

Antony Lewis: The basics of bitcoins and blockchains

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management -     

Ethnic discrimination in hiring,labour market tightness and the business cycle - evidence from field experiments

Several studies using observational data suggest that ethnic discrimination increases in downturns of the economy. We investigate whether ethnic discrimination depends on labour market tightness using data from correspondence studies. We utilize three correspondence studies of the Swedish labour market and two different measures of labour market tightness. These two measures produce qualitatively similar results, and, opposite to the observational studies, suggest that ethnic discrimination in hiring decreases in downturns of the economy.     

The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

High exchange-rate volatility and low pass-through

Two specifications of an open-economy model are shown to generate high exchange-rate volatility and low exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT). In the model, price discrimination causes ERPT to be incomplete in both the short and the long run. In the short run, a small amount of nominal rigidities is enough to reduce ERPT sharply; still, exchange-rate depreciation worsens the terms of trade, consistent with the evidence. Possible biases from omitted variables and measurement error in the ERPT empirical literature (due to data limitations) are investigated using model-generated time series. Estimates of ERPT coefficients can be quite different from true parameters, and are sensitive to the shocks driving the economies. Estimates can nonetheless detect key structural features of the models.