Ukrainian gas transit game

This paper investigates the origins and reasons for the termination of the Russian natural gas flow from Russia to Europe through Ukraine in January 2009. It discusses the strategic interaction of the three players (Russia, Ukraine and the European Union) based on the dynamics of losses from confrontation. The objective is to interpret the situation in a stylized way and to derive outcomes using calibrated parameters for costs and benefits of the players. We show that the stakes are high for both Russia and Ukraine in choosing to follow their preferred strategies, as both countries would sustain moderate losses during the initial period of conflict. Meanwhile, Europe’s lack of reserves makes it less prepared for the energy deficit than Ukraine and Russia, causing wider and earlier suffering for European countries dependent on Russian gas. Therefore, the European Union has a strong incentive to intervene in the conflict. Its actions during the January confrontation between Ukraine and Russia included extortion and bribery, all of which affected the outcome of the conflict.     

At the Edge of Longitudinal Analysis. Welfare Institutions and Social Assistance Dynamics

The main aim of this contribution is to present and discuss critically some of the results from the longitudinal analysis carried out in eight cities in five European countries within the general framework of the ESOPO project. In particular I will use these results in order to understand what longitudinal analysis can tell us as soon as we compare different citizenship systems using process-produced data from social assistance schemes as a relevant indicator. The contribution is divided into three sections. The first section will address some methodological issues and illustrate the driving hypothesis. The second section will present some main results from the longitudinal analysis carried out in the ESOPO project. The third section will highlight the institutional dimension and its role in shaping clients' recipiency dynamics, paying particular attention to the development of an interpretative framework.     

Mean square error for the Leland–Lott hedging strategy: convex pay-offs

Leland’s approach to the hedging of derivatives under proportional transaction costs is based on an approximate replication of the European-type contingent claim V _T using the classical Black–Scholes formula with a suitably enlarged volatility. The formal mathematical framework is a scheme of series, i.e., a sequence of models with transaction cost coefficients k _n =k ₀ n ^−α , where α∈[0,1/2] and n is the number of portfolio revision dates. The enlarged volatility [^(s)]_n\widehat{\sigma}_{n} in general depends on n except for the case which was investigated in detail by Lott, to whom belongs the first rigorous result on convergence of the approximating portfolio value Vⁿ_TV^{n}_{T} to the pay-off V _T . In this paper, we consider only the Lott case α=1/2. We prove first, for an arbitrary pay-off V _T =G(S _T ) where G is a convex piecewise smooth function, that the mean square approximation error converges to zero with rate n ^−1/2 in L ² and find the first order term of the asymptotics. We are working in a setting with non-uniform revision intervals and establish the asymptotic expansion when the revision dates are t_iⁿ=g(i/n)t_{i}^{n}=g(i/n), where the strictly increasing scale function g:[0,1]→[0,1] and its inverse f are continuous with their first and second derivatives on the whole interval, or g(t)=1−(1−t) ^β , β≥1. We show that the sequence n^1/2(V_Tⁿ-V_T)n^{1/2}(V_{T}^{n}-V_{T}) converges in law to a random variable which is the terminal value of a component of a two-dimensional Markov diffusion process and calculate the limit. Our central result is a functional limit theorem for the discrepancy process.     

Preemptive Bidding in Takeover Auctions: An Experimental Study

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on jump bidding in takeover auctions with entry costs. It provides support for signaling hypothesis behind jump bidding and analyzes how the size of the entry costs affects the bidders' behavior and their expected profits. It also shows that jump bidding allows the reallocation of the surplus from the seller to the first bidder but has little effect on the social surplus and the profits of the second bidder. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with affiliated values

This paper extends Fishman's (1988) model of preemptive bidding in takeover auctions to auctions with affiliated values. It shows that preemptive bidding transfers wealth from the seller to the first bidder without affecting the profit of the second bidder and social welfare. It also shows that higher correlation between bidders’ values leads to higher preemption rates but has an ambiguous effect on the size of the opening bid. Finally, it shows that in auctions with affiliated values, even infinitesimal entry costs may lead to a preemptive jump bidding that allows the reallocation of the entire surplus from the seller to the first bidder.     

Integrating Real Options with Managerial Cash Flow Estimates

This article presents a real options model that fits managerial cash flow estimates (optimistic, likely, and pessimistic projections) to a continuous geometric Brownian motion (GBM) cash flow process with changing growth and volatility parameters. The cash flows and the value of a project are correlated to a traded asset, so the real option is priced under the risk-neutral measure with a closed-form solution. The analysis is extended to a sequential compound call option for investments over multiple periods. If the project is correlated to the market, then some of the risk may be mitigated by a delta-hedging strategy. A numerical example shows that the effect of the correlated asset on the real option value is significant, and the relationship between the volatility of the project and the real option value is not analogous to the typical relationship found in financial option pricing. Integrating the expertise and industry knowledge of management, this approach makes possible a more rigorous estimation of model inputs for real option pricing.     

PERFECT AND PARTIAL HEDGING FOR SWING GAME OPTIONS IN DISCRETE TIME

The paper introduces and studies hedging for game (Israeli) style extension of swing options considered as multiple exercise derivatives. Assuming that the underlying security can be traded without restrictions, we derive a formula for valuation of multiple exercise options via classical hedging arguments. Introducing the notion of the shortfall risk for such options we study also partial hedging which leads to minimization of this risk.