Oligopoly, Financial Structure, and Resolution of Uncertainty

We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.     

Local Leadership and Public Good: Evidence from The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

Journal of Quantitative Economics - The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is unique in combining self-selection of beneficiaries through demand for work and decentralization of...     

On the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium

Summary . The paper is concerned with the following question: in addition to local uniqueness, what other conditions must be imposed to ensure global uniqueness of competitive equilibrium? The answer is provided within a standard framework involving excess demand functions. Conditions are identified which have the nice property that they are true close to a regular equilibrium. Uniqueness is established by considering an adjustment process and showing that under the mentioned conditions, every equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable and moreover the process itself is globally stable; uniqueness follows from an Arrow and Hahn (1971) result. Alternatively, the paper may be seen as identifying conditions under which there is a vectorfield satisfying the requirements of an uniqueness result due to Dierker (1974). Received: July 1, 1996; revised version October 7, 1996     

Estimating Health Demand for an Aging Population: A Flexible and Robust Bayesian Joint Model

We analyse two frequently used measures of the demand for health—hospital visits and out‐of‐pocket health care expenditure—which have been analysed separately in the existing literature. Given that these two measures of health demand are highly likely to be closely correlated, we propose a framework to jointly model hospital visits and out‐of‐pocket medical expenditure, which allows for the presence of nonlinear effects of covariates using splines to capture the effects of aging on health demand. The findings from our empirical analysis of the US Health and Retirement Survey indicate that the demand for health varies with age. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Applied Econometrics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Overbidding in cross-border acquisitions: Misperceptions in assessing and valuing knowledge

Many firms competing across borders use acquisitions to gain the knowledge and capabilities that reside in target firms. Assessing and valuing knowledge in the international context is complex and frequently error-prone. The international acquisition literature has not adequately addressed the difficulties of valuing knowledge, the costs associated with acquiring knowledge, the factors behind escalating bids to acquire knowledge, and the impact of knowledge acquisitions on returns. We conceptually explore several key dimensions that influence the assessment and valuation of knowledge and develop propositions positing the effects of predictor variables and moderators on knowledge assessment and valuation in cross-border acquisitions.     

Stability of a competitive economy: A reconsideration

Negishi (1962) suggested that price adjustment was a means of attaining a particular optimum rather than an equilibrium; this provides the starting point for the present paper. Using a gradient process to arrive at an optimum, the paper shows that with proper distribution of endowments, this process may be considered to be an actual price adjustment process. The role of a proper distribution is investigated further and related to the existing published literature. It is also shown that if the distribution of endowments satisfies certain regularity features then the equilibrium will be globally stable under the classical price adjustment rule where price adjustment is proportional to excess demand.     

Activity-Based Costing for Economic Value Added®

Economic value added, which is the currently popular term for the traditional accounting concept of residual income (RI), subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. This paper provides an activity-based cost system that supports RI maximization. We construct a model of participative budgeting for a multi-activity firm in which the cost system allocates plant and equipment cost to products using a formula that includes the interest charge. The budget system we design enables decision makers to identify RI-improving opportunities for outsourcing and dropping unprofitable products. The budget system also has the open-architecture property that additional informal communication among activity managers can only serve to increase RI.     

An experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game

Summary. Recent experiments on mixed-strategy play in experimental games reject the hypothesis that subjects play a mixed strategy even when that strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium prediction. However, in a three-person matching-pennies game played with perfect monitoring and complete payoff information, we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Given this support for mixed-strategy play, we then consider two qualitatively different learning theories (sophisticated Bayesian and naive Bayesian) which predict that the amount of information given to subjects will determine whether they can learn to play the predicted mixed strategies. We reject the hypothesis that subjects play the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium when they do not have complete payoff information. This finding suggests that players did not use sophisticated Bayesian learning to reach the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Received: August 9, 1996; revised version: October 21, 1998