Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Analyzing a panel of seasonal time series: Does seasonality in industrial production converge across Europe?

In this paper we consider deterministic seasonal variation in quarterly industrial production for several European countries, and we address the question whether this variation has become more similar across countries over time. Due to economic and institutional factors, one may expect convergence across business cycles. When these have similar characteristics as seasonal cycles, one may perhaps also find convergence in seasonality. To this aim, we propose a method that is based on treating the set of production series as a panel. By testing for the relevant parameter restrictions for moving window samples, we examine the hypothesis of convergence in deterministic seasonality while allowing for seasonal unit roots. Our main empirical finding is that there is no evidence for convergence in seasonality.     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.     

Sequencing and the Adding-up Property in Contingent Valuation of Endangered Species: Are Contingent Non-Use Values Economic Values?

This paper presents tests of the theoretical validity of the contingent valuation (CV) method. The validity of CV is especially a concern when involving environmental goods with a predominant non-use value. One test of theoretical validity is the adding-up property that implies that a specific good should be equally valued irrespectively of it is being valued directly or built-up sequentially. In this CV study four independent sub-samples stated willingness to pay for the same composite good, or package, using different sequences. One sub-sample valued the composite good directly, while two sub-samples faced built-up sequences valuing first subsets of this composite good. A fourth sub-sample valued the composite good from a dividing-out approach, facing first the valuation of a larger multi-package. Theoretically expected sequencing effects were observed; the subset goods obtained higher values earlier in a sequence, and the dividing-out approach decreased the stated value for the composite good. Most importantly, these CV data did pass the tests of the adding-up property.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Environmental quality indicators: Background,principles and examples from Norway

The need for a simple and general overview of the development in the state of the environment has led to work on environmental indicators in several countries and international organizations. Except for the basic common requirement of providing an overview, the works vary a great deal with regard to final aim, target groups, classification and, hence, choice of indicators. This paper gives an overview of the work carried out in the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway within this field, with emphasis on the basic principles behind the choice of indicators. A hierarchical system of indicator sets is proposed, and examples of indicators are presented. Also, a brief overview of work carried out elsewhere is included.