Overnight borrowing, interest rates and extreme value theory

We examine the dynamics of extreme values of overnight borrowing rates in an inter-bank money market before a financial crisis during which overnight borrowing rates rocketed up to (simple annual) 4000 percent. It is shown that the generalized Pareto distribution fits well to the extreme values of the interest rate distribution. We also provide predictions of extreme overnight borrowing rates using pre-crisis data. The examination of tails (extreme values) provides answers to such issues as to what are the extreme movements to be expected in financial markets; is there a possibility for even larger movements and, are there theoretical processes that can model the type of fat-tails in the observed data? The answers to such questions are essential for proper management of financial exposures and laying ground for regulations.     

Complex solutions of nonconcave dynamic optimization models

Summary In this paper we consider a class of time discrete intertemporal optimization models in one dimension. We present a technique to construct intertemporal optimization models with nonconcave objective functions, such that the optimal policy function coincides with any pre-specifiedC ² function. Our result is a variant of the approach presented in a seminal paper by Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986). Whereas they solved the inverse problem for the reduced form models, we address the different question of how to construct both reduced and primitive form models. Using our technique one can guarantee required qualitative properties not only in reduced, but also in primitive form. The fact that our constructed model has a single valued and continuous optimal policy is very important as, in general, nonconcave problems yield set valued optimal policy correspondences which are typically hard to analyze. To illustrate our constructive approach we apply it to a simple nonconcave model.We are grateful for the helpful comments of L. Montrucchio, K. Nishimura, T. Mitra and an anonymous referee. Financial support of the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P7783-PHY and No. J01003-SOZ is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was written while M. Kopel was visiting the Department of Economics, Cornell University.     

银行信用证议付及其追索权的法学解读

在法学视角下，信用证议付实质上是议付银行向信用证受益人（出口商）给付价值后买入信用证项下的汇票和整套单据的法律行为。议付不同于出口押汇。议付是一种买卖汇票和单据的行为，而出口押汇是一种以单据为质押的融资行为。议付单据遭到开证银行拒付，议付银行有权对信用证受益人（出口商）行使追索权。议付银行的这种追索权既可以来自于合同条款的约定，也可以来自于票据法所赋予的请求权。     

Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems

We search forstrategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists aPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are unlimited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that isPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof.     

Endogeneity in quantile regression models: A control function approach

This paper considers a linear triangular simultaneous equations model with conditional quantile restrictions. The paper adjusts for endogeneity by adopting a control function approach and presents a simple two-step estimator that exploits the partially linear structure of the model. The first step consists of estimation of the residuals of the reduced-form equation for the endogenous explanatory variable. The second step is series estimation of the primary equation with the reduced-form residual included nonparametrically as an additional explanatory variable. This paper imposes no functional form restrictions on the stochastic relationship between the reduced-form residual and the disturbance term in the primary equation conditional on observable explanatory variables. The paper presents regularity conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality of the two-step estimator. In addition, the paper provides some discussions on related estimation methods in the literature.     

B2C电子商务模式下的物流配送研究

物流配送是电子商务运作的一个重要环节,在整个商务活动中起着举足轻重的作用.目前,在线交易中的信息流已通过互联网基本实现,资金流的安全也在一定程度上得到了解决,但物流仍是电子商务开展的一大瓶颈.B2C作为电子商务的运作模式之一,存在着配送不及时、配送成本高、无法送货等问题.不解决物流配送的问题,B2C模式就难以快速发展.本文针对B2C模式的特点和对物流配送的要求,提出了B2C电子商务模式下建立物流配送系统的解决思路。     

An instrumental variable approach for panel unit root tests under cross-sectional dependence

For dynamic panel models with cross-sectional dependence, several unit root tests are constructed using a Huber-type instrument, whose null asymptotics are standard Gaussian and do not depend on nuisance parameters. A Monte-Carlo simulation shows that the proposed tests have better sizes and comparable powers relative to other two existing tests developed for cross-sectionally dependent dynamic panel models.     

Econometric analysis of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models

In this paper I propose an alternative to calibration of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Given an a-theoretical econometric model as a representative of the data generating process, I will construct an information measure which compares the conditional distribution of the econometric model variables with the corresponding singular conditional distribution of the theoretical model variables. The singularity problem will be solved by using convolutions of both distributions with a non-singular distribution. This information measure will then be maximized to the deep parameters of the theoretical model, which links these parameters to the parameters of the econometric model and provides an alternative to calibration. This approach will be illustrated by an application to a linearized version of the stochastic growth model of King, Plosser and Rebelo.     

Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment

In the economic literature, reciprocity is typically studied in situations of repeated interaction between two individuals. It refers to one individual rewarding kind acts of the other or punishing hostile acts. In contrast, this paper studies indirect reciprocity, where a cooperative action is rewarded by a third actor, not involved in the original exchange. We provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity. The experiment is based on the ‘repeated helping game’ developed by Nowak and Sigmund (J. Theoret. Biol. 194 (1998) 561; Nature 393 (1998) 573), involving random pairing in large groups. Pairs consist of a donor and a recipient. Donors decide whether or not to provide costly ‘help’ to the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipient's behavior in encounters with third parties. We observe clear evidence of indirect reciprocity. Many decision-makers respond to the information about previous decisions (whether or not to help others) of the recipients. In our experiments, this indirect reciprocity is largely based on norms about how often the recipient should have helped others in the past. We show that these norms develop similarly within groups of interacting subjects, but distinctly across groups. This leads to the emergence of group norms.     

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.