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901.
Nikolas Topaloglou Hercules Vladimirou Stavros A. Zenios 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2011,35(12):3188-3201
We develop a stochastic programming model to address in a unified manner a number of interrelated decisions in international portfolio management: optimal portfolio diversification and mitigation of market and currency risks. The goal is to control the portfolio’s total risk exposure and attain an effective balance between risk and expected return. By incorporating options and forward contracts in the portfolio optimization model we are able to numerically assess the performance of alternative tactics for mitigating exposure to the primary risks. We find that control of market risk with options has more significant impact on portfolio performance than currency hedging. We demonstrate through extensive empirical tests that incremental benefits, in terms of reducing risk and generating profits, are gained when both the market and currency risks are jointly controlled through appropriate means. 相似文献
902.
Behavioral biases of mutual fund investors 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine the effect of behavioral biases on the mutual fund choices of a large sample of US discount brokerage investors using new measures of attention to news, tax awareness, and fund-level familiarity bias, in addition to behavioral and demographic characteristics of earlier studies. Behaviorally biased investors typically make poor decisions about fund style and expenses, trading frequency, and timing, resulting in poor performance. Furthermore, trend chasing appears related to behavioral biases, rather than to rationally inferring managerial skill from past performance. Factor analysis suggests that biased investors often conform to stereotypes that can be characterized as Gambler, Smart, Overconfident, Narrow Framer, and Mature. 相似文献
903.
The CEO pay slice 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Lucian A. Bebchuk K.J. Martijn CremersUrs C. Peyer 《Journal of Financial Economics》2011,102(1):199-221
We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms. 相似文献
904.
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage. 相似文献
905.
Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender. 相似文献
906.
Neelam Jain 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(4):464-472
We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example, and show that cost of entry and experimentation do not have a monotonic relationship. 相似文献
907.
Greg Taylor 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(6):668-677
Sending general advertisements with inflationary claims may attract additional visitors with whom an advertiser is poorly matched. This is costly when ads are priced per-click because many visitors (clickers) will not purchase. This renders per-click advertising particularly conducive to the transmission of information via ads. The admissibility of information transmission depends not only on advertiser behaviour, but also upon consumers' interpretation of and trust in ads. In less conducive environments, consumers quickly learn to place little stock in the claims they see advertised. This mechanism undermines the ability of advertisers and consumers to communicate under per-impression or per-sale fee structures. Consumers benefit from increased informativeness, but distortions introduced by the market power given to advertisers imply that society may be better-off with no information transmission taking place. 相似文献
908.
Ana Espínola-Arredondo Esther Gal-Or Félix Muñoz-García 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(6):729-745
We examine an incumbent's trade-off between the improved efficiency that business expansion facilitates and the signaling role that business expansion plays in conveying information to potential entrants about the state of demand. We demonstrate that both separating and pooling equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion. Essentially, in contrast to models with asymmetric information about unit cost, incumbents' benefits from investing in a signal are not necessarily monotonic in the state of demand. We investigate how the extent of informativeness of the outcome depends on the enhanced efficiency that the incumbent's expansion facilitates and the priors of the entrant. 相似文献
909.
Sotiris Georganas Rosemarie Nagel 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(1):34-45
We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring. 相似文献
910.
Ana I. Saracho 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(2):187-199
A significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis. Patent holders, however, may face a dynamic problem, namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable-goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side. Licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem. There are situations, however, where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent (the case of information goods) or due to compulsory patenting laws. We study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations. Relative to the existing literature, we obtain the following main results: (i) all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation; (ii) royalty licensing may be superior to fixed-fee or auction licensing from the licensor's point of view; (iii) social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales; (iv) even for non-drastic innovations, the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation (before the innovation was discovered). 相似文献