Publicly-funded UK agricultural R&D and 'social' total factor productivity

Most studies concerned with measuring the rate of return to publicly‐funded agricultural R&D investment have found high returns, suggesting under‐investment, and calls for increased expenditure have been common. However, the evaluation of returns tends to measure the effect of research expenditure against growth in total factor productivity (TFP), based on market inputs and outputs. When compared against growing public unease over the environmental effects of pursuing agricultural productivity growth, TFP indices become a misleading measure of growth. This paper integrates some non‐market components into the TFP index. The costs of two specific externalities of agricultural production, namely fertiliser and pesticide pollution, are integrated in a TFP index constructed for the period 1948–1995. This adjusted, or ‘social’, TFP index is measured against UK public R&D expenditures. The rates of return to agricultural R&D are reduced by using the ‘social’ as opposed to the traditional TFP index. Whilst both remain at justifiable levels, previous studies appear to have over‐estimated the effect of agricultural R&D expenditures. Furthermore, with changes in policy towards more socially acceptable but non‐productivity enhancing outcomes, such as animal welfare, rural diversification and organic farming, the future framework for analysing returns to agricultural R&D should not be so dependent on productivity growth as an indicator of research effectiveness.     

Licensing a new product with non-linear contracts

Abstract .  This paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good. The licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good. We show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good. The equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee.     

Investor Reaction to Inter-corporate Business Contracting: Evidence and Explanation

We examine the stock market reaction to 1227 inter-corporate ordinary business contract announcements reported by Dow Jones between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2001. Around contract announcement dates, we find statistically significant positive average abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume for contractors, but insignificant positive abnormal returns and negative abnormal volume for contractees. Cross-sectionally, contract announcement period returns are higher for contractors who are small relative to the contract size, have higher return volatility, larger market-to-book ratios and higher profitability. The announcement period returns of contract-awarding firms are not significant and are only marginally related to cross-sectional explanatory factors. The results are consistent with two explanatory stories: contractor quasi-rents induced by the winner's curse and information signalling about contractor production costs. The results are not consistent with perfect competition, with contracts having positive net present values for both parties, and with a version of incomplete contracting theory.     

Employment with connections: Negative network effects

In less developed countries, it is widely observed that employers hire workers through employee referrals. In this paper, we show an extension of this kind of networks that may decrease applicants' payoffs while a diversification of the networks can raise referred applicants' payoffs. We also discuss the effect of the extension of interlinked contracts on farmers' wages.     

Spot water markets and risk in water supply

Water availability patterns in semiarid regions are typically extremely variable. Even in basins with a highly developed infrastructure, users are subject to unreliable water supplies, incurring substantial economic losses during periods of scarcity. More flexible instruments, such as voluntary exchanges of water among users, can help users to reduce risk exposure. This article looks at the effects of spot water markets on the economic risk caused by water availability variations. Our theoretical and empirical risk analyses are based on the random profits of water users. Profit probability density functions are formally and graphically characterized for both water sellers and buyers under several possible market outcomes. We conclude from this analysis that, where water supply is stochastic, water markets unambiguously reduce both parties' risk exposure. The empirical study is conducted on an irrigation district in the Guadalquivir Valley (Southern Spain), where there is a high probability of periods of extreme water scarcity. Water demand functions for the district representative irrigators and a spatial equilibrium model are used to simulate market exchanges and equilibrium. This programming model is combined with statistical simulation techniques. We show that the profit probability distribution of a representative irrigator is modified if water exchanges are authorized, leading to risk reductions. Results also indicate that if the market were extended to several districts and users that are subject to varying hydrological risk exposure, extremely low‐profit events would be less likely to occur. In sum, we show that exchanging water in annual spot markets can reduce farmers' economic vulnerability caused by water supply variability across irrigation seasons. These results support the water policy reform carried out in Spain in 1999 to allow for voluntary water exchanges among right holders.     

Morale hazard

We interpret workers’ confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers’ morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low.     

Food, nutrition, and substitution in the late nineteenth century

Economic historians hypothesize that households in the nineteenth century substituted away from carbohydrates and fiber and towards protein and fat as their incomes rose. Anthropometric historians assert that there was increased nutrient intake without any nutritional substitution. I test these hypotheses using the 1888 Cost of Living Survey. I fail to reject the hypothesis that the income elasticity of fiber is greater than or equal to the income elasticities of protein, fat, or sugar—contrary to the nutritional substitution posited by economic historians. A food modified Engel curve reveals that the shares of carbohydrates, fat, and sugar in the diet vary with household income, but the shares of protein and fiber do not. I do find, however, that the share of protein from animal sources increases with household income. I also find that the diets of late nineteenth century industrial workers were surprisingly balanced by modern standards.     

The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.     

Identification and estimation in sequential,asymmetric, English auctions

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. When the identity of the winner and the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and propose a semi-nonparametric estimation strategy based on orthogonal polynomials. We apply our estimator to daily data from fish auctions in Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.