Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?

This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state and this has repercussions for financial development. The adaptability channel holds that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial development more effectively. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 653–675.     

The optimal portfolio for the two-pillar mandatory pension system: the case of Poland

In the recent decade, there has been observed across the Central and Eastern European states the regulatory trend towards the increase of the non-financial (first) pension pillar size at the expense of the financial (second) pillar. It tends to question the consequences of this shift for the future retirement benefits. Applying the portfolio approach we address this issue by running a series of simulations to find out how to allocate pension contributions between both pillars in an optimal way. Our study contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, we do not perform the assessment of the predetermined regulatory solutions, but we look for an optimal one. Moreover, we allow our optimal rule to be time-varying, if necessary, which would be a true novelty in this research area. Second, we do not base our estimates on historical trends; rather, we apply the long-term economy’s projection to account for the society’s ageing impact, which is a crucially important factor for the solvency of the pension system. Adapting some of the simulation assumptions to fit the Polish case, our results confirm that current regulations underestimate the role of the capital pillar and the optimal allocation between both pillars should be time-varying.     

Pure joint production and international trade: a note

This paper applies the principles of the neo-Ricardian (or Sraffian)theory of international trade to certain joint production systems.It is shown that, in contrast with single-product systems, (i)there is not always a pattern of international specialisation,which would entail the increase of the real wage rate in botheconomies, and (ii) the ‘law of comparative advantage’has no general validity. Furthermore, not only the existenceof such a pattern of specialisation but also the validity ofthis law depend on the values of the variables of distributionof income. The analysis is wholly based on two of the numericalexamples formulated by Bidard in 1997, and further generalisedin an elementary way only when this is considered necessary.     

A note on the projection properties of Hadamard matrices obtained by the first Payley construction

We show that the projections on four factors of an arbitrary orthogonal array of strength 2 allow the estimation of main effects and two-factor interactions when all other effects are assumed to be zero, if those projections satisfy the bounds given by Weils theorem. The only exceptions are the Hadamard matrices of orders 16 and 24. A consequence is again the estimability of main effects and two-factor interactions for the projections on four factors of the first Payley construction for arbitrary run size.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

我国传统典权制度的存废之辨

典权制度是我国特有的一项古老制度,与其它类似制度相比,其融资安全性更高,能够对社会资源进行更有效的利用,满足融资者保留不动产所有权的愿望,并在保护弱者、平衡各方利益上具有得天独厚的优势。在充分认识典权制度内涵及价值的基础上,可以发现典权是一种具有独特作用的特殊他物权,应在立法中作出使其独立于用益物权和担保物权的规定,并在我国民事立法中科学地确立典权制度。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

论国际经济法的形成发展与知识产权国际保护

国际经济法是国际公法的一个重要组成部分，它经过了三个阶段的形成与发展。特别是自上世纪70年代以来，国际知识产权组织成立，国际知识产权的法律地位日益突出，知识产权的法律保护也就成为各国关注的焦点。如何推动更公平、平等的国际经济新秩序和知识产权法律的完善与发展，是值得研究的新课题。     

On transaction efficiency and China’s Urban-Rural disparity

It is recommended for economists to examine China’s Urban-Rural disparity from the perspective of transaction efficiency, in that it can provide us with a systematic explanation to both the cases of different countries and development stages. China’s Urban-Rural disparity is special and virtually a demonstration of its special transaction efficiency structure. Exploration of China’s Urban-Rural disparity from such perspective indicates that, different from those in countries with a market economy, China’s case involves many exogenous and contrived factors. Therefore, the solutions are to improve the whole transaction efficiency in the economy, which includes eliminating its regionally unfavorable policies and institutions, and enforcing more favorable and regionally balanced institutional reforms. __________ Translated from Fudan Journal (复旦学报, Social Science Edition), 2006, (1) (in Chinese)     

控制权性质影响税收敏感性吗?——基于企业劳动力需求的检验

西方学者研究表明企业所得税是劳动力需求的重要影响因素,这一理论在中国是否适用?中国大部分上市公司为国有控股企业,这一特殊的制度背景是否会影响企业所得税与劳动力需求的关系?本文基于2007年企业所得税改革这一外生政策变化,在检验西方企业所得税与劳动力需求关系的理论在中国是否适用的基础上,就不同控制权的性质是否会影响企业劳动力需求的税收敏感性进行了检验。研究发现企业所得税税率降低和"就业税盾"增加提高了企业劳动力需求,但这种税率和"就业税盾"的变化对国有控股企业劳动力需求变化的影响要显著小于非国有控股企业。这表明税收是影响企业劳动力需求的重要因素,但国有控制权使得这种税收敏感性变弱。本文的研究结果不仅丰富了相关领域的国际学术文献,而且对我国就业政策的制定具有政策含义。