Inflation and inflation uncertainty in China

The study examines the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in China using Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity model. Particularly, this link is investigated in China’s urban and rural sectors, motivated by the substantial urban–rural divide. The results provide strong statistical supportive evidence that higher inflation raises inflation uncertainty. On the other hand, evidence on the effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation is mixed depending on the sample periods and areas examined. The understanding of inflation-uncertainty nexus in China could provide implications to policymakers in the adoption of monetary policies.     

WHICH FISCAL MULTIPLIERS ARE REGIME‐DEPENDENT? A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS

We analyse whether estimated multiplier effects are systematically higher if the economy suffers a downturn. For that purpose, we conduct a meta‐regression analysis on a unique data set of 98 empirical studies with more than 1800 observations on multiplier effects and control for regime‐dependence of the multiplier. We find that spending multipliers are much higher (by about 0.7–0.9 units) during a downturn. Tax multipliers are not sensitive to the economic regime, and generally lower than spending multipliers. Finally, for all spending categories other than government consumption, the multiplier significantly exceeds one during downturns.     

The impact of macroeconomic factors on income inequality: Evidence from the BRICS

In this paper we investigate how the evolution of income growth, real interest rates, and inflation have driven income inequality across a variety of countries with particular focus on the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) during the period 2001 to 2015. Our work suggests that, when central banks of the BRICS economies use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization, they need to consider the impact monetary policy changes have on the distribution of income in their nations. Our estimates reveal that the unintended consequence of policies that induce economic growth and higher prices is higher income inequality. We find that the positive relationship between the three macroeconomic variables and income inequality for the BRICS economies is stronger during the post-2008 period.     

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on business expectations

We document and evaluate how businesses are reacting to the COVID-19 crisis through August 2020. First, on net, firms see the shock (thus far) largely as a demand rather than supply shock. A greater share of firms report significant or severe disruptions to sales activity than to supply chains. We compare these measures of disruption to their expected changes in selling prices and find that, even for firms that report supply chain disruptions, they expect to lower near-term selling prices on average. We also show that firms are engaging in wage cuts and expect to trim wages further before the end of 2020. These cuts stem from firms that have been disproportionally negatively impacted by the pandemic. Second, firms (like professional forecasters) have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by lowering their one-year-ahead inflation expectations. These responses stand in stark contrast to that of household inflation expectations (as measured by the University of Michigan or the New York Fed). Indeed, firms’ one-year-ahead inflation expectations fell precipitously (to a series low) following the onset of the pandemic, while household measures of inflation expectations jumped markedly. Third, despite the dramatic decline in firms’ near-term inflation expectations, their longer-run inflation expectations have remained relatively stable.     

Do currency undervaluations affect the impact of inflation on growth?

In this paper, we investigate how the level of currency undervaluations affects the effect of inflation on growth in a sample of 62 countries over the 1980–2015 period. While previous studies find a positive effect of an undervalued currency, we show that higher currency undervaluations reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth. As an undervalued currency is associated with supplementary inflation pressures arising from a cost-push inflation phenomenon and economy overheating, growth is thus penalized. This result is shown to be robust to the exclusion of currency crises episodes from our sample, and dependent of the development level of countries. Specifically, it holds in the case of emerging countries, but not for developing economies. Consequently, policies based on undervaluations should not be encouraged for emerging economies as they tend to reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth.     

The long-run Phillips curve: A structural VAR investigation

Both cointegration methods, and non-cointegrated structural VARs identified based on either long-run restrictions, or a combination of long-run and sign restrictions, are used in order to explore the long-run trade-off between inflation and the unemployment rate in the post-WWII U.S., U.K., Euro area, Canada, and Australia. Overall, neither approach produces clear evidence of a non-vertical trade-off. The extent of uncertainty surrounding the estimates is however substantial, thus implying that a researcher holding alternative priors about what a reasonable slope of the long-run trade-off might be will likely not see her views falsified.     

Forecasting and forecast narratives: The Bank of England Inflation Reports

We analyze the narratives that accompany the numerical forecasts in the Bank of England’s Quarterly Inflation Reports, 1997–2018. We focus on whether the narratives contain useful information about the future course of key macro variables over and above the point predictions, in terms of whether the narratives can be used to enhance the accuracy of the numerical forecasts. We also consider whether the narratives are able to predict future changes in the numerical forecasts. We find that a measure of sentiment derived from the narratives can predict the errors in the numerical forecasts of output growth, but not of inflation. We find no evidence that past changes in sentiment predict subsequent changes in the point forecasts of output growth or of inflation, but do find that the adjustments to the numerical output growth forecasts have a systematic element.     

Forecasting using heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional dependence

In this paper, we focus on forecasting methods that use heterogeneous panels in the presence of cross-sectional dependence in terms of both spatial error dependence and common factors. We propose two main approaches to estimating the factor structure: a residuals-based approach, and an approach that uses a panel of auxiliary variables to extract the factors. Small sample properties of the proposed methods are investigated through Monte Carlo simulations and applied to predict house price inflation in OECD countries.     

A test for inflation persistence in Nigeria using fractional integration & fractional cointegration techniques

This study seeks to test for inflation persistence in Nigeria using the recently developed fractional cointegration VAR model by Johansen and Nielsen (2012) and complemented with univariate fractional integration techniques. The empirical results suggest evidence of high inflation persistence in Nigeria albeit with a lower trend after the global financial crisis. Also, the major classes of inflation – headline, core and food inflation rates, share long run properties regardless of the sample used. This suggests that any policy action directed at a particular class of inflation will have a spill-over effect on the other classes given the strong association among them. The ability to also exploit the fractional cointegration in a multivariate set-up when modeling inflation is a major contribution of this study and ignoring same may lead to wrong conclusions. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of data frequency.     

Blocking,attracting, imposing,and aligning: The utility of ASEAN forest and environmental regime policies for strong member states

International institutions, including ‘global regimes’ and ‘regional regimes’, address an increasing number of environmental issues. While in the past much attention was given to global regimes, a plethora of regional institutions and organizations (regional regimes) and their environmental policies have recently gained more momentum in political practice and attention in scholarship. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one such regime, and is actively developing its own policies relating to (e.g.) forests and the environment. These policies necessarily have to be useful for the regime’s member states; however, we further argue, that within the member states the regime’s policies especially have to be useful for specific member states’ bureaucracies, because it is they who actually develop the policies on behalf of the member states. Further, this paper aims to analyse the utility of ASEAN’s forest and environmental policy for specific member states and their responsible bureaucracies. Our analytical framework builds on regional regime theory, bureaucratic politics, and concepts of actor’s utility and interests. It differentiates the utility of the regional regime policies into several functions: (i) blocking unpleasant international initiatives, (ii) attracting international political or financial support, (iii) imposing rules on other member states, and (iv) aligning the interests of member states against external political opponents. Our results indicate that ASEAN’s environmental and forest policies serve all four functions. For instance, through ASEAN structures, Indonesia is blocking strict CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) regulation of ramin wood to maintain existing ramin protections and business, and the ASEAN Biodiversity Centre is found to be instrumental in blocking ambitious claims towards biodiversity from international actors. In addition, Malaysia and Singapore have imposed an ASEAN wildfire haze pollution agreement onto other member states in order to protect their directly affected interests in air quality and air traffic. ASEAN is also attracting to its members various international environmental funds in areas including climate change, community-based forestry, and sustainable peatland management. Last, member states under ASEAN actively align their positions in international climate negotiations as well as global forest deliberations to enhance their influence. We conclude that policies developed within regional regimes such as ASEAN are aligned with the interests of stronger member states, and their bureaucracies in particular. It remains unclear, however, how powerful these actors need to be in order to make this customization of regime policies valid for them. The results suggest that not only a potential hegemon, but also second or third powers may have this option. At the same time, member states’ activities do not seem to be conducted by states as unitary actors; instead, issue-specific actions are based on the interests of issue-relevant bureaucracies, which are in charge of representing a given member state in a given field of a regime’s policy.