Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed, then sincere voting in accordance with a voter's private information is always rational while participation may become strategic. We find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data. Moreover, voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible. The latter finding may serve to rationalize the co-existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature.     

New technology and old institutions: An empirical analysis of the skill-biased demand for older workers in Europe

Using panel data from nine European countries over the period 1970 to 2007, we examine the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on the demand for older workers (aged 50 and over). We find evidence of a decrease in demand for older workers in the 1970s and 1980s. It can be argued that the impact of ICT on demand for older workers is skill-biased. However, the skill-biased demand for older workers is mainly reflected in the skill-biased changes in employment shares rather than relative wages. There is some evidence of a gradual deskilling of older workers. We find that labour market institutions such as the national minimum wage, social pacts on wage issues and union density mostly benefit skilled older workers, while coordination of wage setting, extension of collective agreements, social pacts on pensions and centralisation of wage bargaining can alleviate the adverse effects of skill-biased technological change.     

Engagement partner specialization and corporate disclosure transparency

This paper explores the association of audit partners' industry specialization with corporate disclosure transparency and the latter's informativeness. The distinctive institutional designs of partner signature requirement and Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System (IDTRS) adopted in Taiwan allow us to empirically address the issue. We posit and find that the rankings from the IDTRS are higher for firms audited by industry specialist engagement partners than for firms audited by non-specialist engagement partners. Additionally, the results show that the probability of informed trade (PIN) proxy for information asymmetry is negatively associated with the rankings for clients of industry specialist engagement partners, but not for clients of industry non-specialist engagement partners. The results are robust with respect to alternative estimation method and alternative measures of industry specialization. Overall, the evidence suggests that industry specialist engagement partners enhance the credibility of corporate disclosure transparency, through which information asymmetry is further declined. The evidence provides policy implications to the partner signature requirement adopted in Taiwan and China.     

Information and its impact on consumers׳ reactions to restrictive return policies

Designing an effective return policy is a difficult task for retailers. A very restrictive return policy can keep logistic costs down and prevent fraudulent returns but it can also have a negative effect on consumer behavior. Two experiments explore the role of assortment-related information in moderating consumers׳ negative reactions to more restrictive product return policies. The results demonstrate that consumers will view an assortment characterized by a more restrictive return policy as attractive to the extent that the assortment supports the information processing strategy triggered by the return policy.     

How do “gatekeepers” affect credit risk?

This study investigates the relationship between auditor tenure and credit default swap (CDS) spreads of U.S. firms based on quantile regression. After allowing for common determinants of CDS spreads, auditor tenure exerts both statistically and economically significant additional impacts on the CDS market. Furthermore, there are differential effects of common CDS spread determinants and auditor tenure. While common determinants of CDS spreads (e.g., leverage, volatility, risk free rate, credit ratings, and earnings) have monotonically increasing impacts when CDS spreads (and their changes) are increasingly higher, auditor tenure primarily has the impact when CDS spreads are of low or median levels for less risky firms.     

Information transmission between large shareholders and stock volatility

Does information transmission between large shareholders exacerbate stock volatility or reduce stock volatility? In this study, based on the common shareholding data in the Chinese stock market from 2007 to 2017, we establish the shareholder’s coshareholding network, and use the weighted network clustering coefficient to measure the information transmission speed. Moreover, we investigate the impact of information transmission speed on stock volatility. The empirical results show that a nonlinear U-shaped relationship exists between information transmission speed and stock volatility. The findings are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of stock volatility identified in the literature. Finally, we verify the existence of private information interaction in the coshareholding network.     

The role of ICT in reducing information asymmetry for financial access

This study assesses the role of ICT in complementing private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) in reducing information asymmetry for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments with 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011. The following findings are established. First on financial access: (i) the marginal effects from interactions between ICT and PCR (PCB) are consistently positive (negative); (ii) net effects from interactions are negative with the higher magnitude from PCR and (iii) only thresholds corresponding to interactions between PCR and internet penetration are within range. Second, findings on financial allocation efficiency reveal positive marginal and net effects exclusively for mobile phones and PCR. Third, allocation efficiency may be constrained by increasing financial deposits. Overall, the complementarity between information offices and ICT in boosting financial access is still very limited. Policy implications are discussed with emphasis on improving the engaged complementarity and fighting surplus liquidity.     

中西部欠发达城市土地利用结构地域差异研究——以河池市为例

以河池市2014年土地利用变更数据为基础,运用计量地理模型与GIS软件等方法,分析其土地利用结构的地域差异情况。河池市各县市均具有较大区位意义的土地利用类型,其土地利用多样性与信息熵较高,但土地利用集中度都处于低水平,市内县市具有多种不同最优土地利用类型组合。河池市未有效利用优越的地理优势发展其特色优势产业,这将成为河池市今后土地利用规划研究的重中之重。     

Readability of accountants’ communications with small business—Some Australian evidence

This paper explores the readability of a new and non-corporate narrative area, accountants’ communications with small business. The distinctive motivations, agendas and interests of small business managers are considered. The findings are informed by rationales from Shearer's (2002) thesis on the influence of neoclassical economics on accounting discourse. The study finds low readability accentuated by potentially low reader interest with accounting documents composed according to conventional accounting's rules and statutory requirements. Higher readability and document content which informs small business managers’ interests is evident when accountants are not compelled to author documents with reference to these professional rules and legislation.     

Information,market power,and price volatility

We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes.