The economic determinants of depreciation accounting in late nineteenth-century Britain

This paper examines the economic incentives for unregulated companies, in late nineteenth-century Britain, to disclose in their published accounts the fact that they had charged depreciation. We argue that the disclosure will be positively associated with whether a company has outside shareholders and long-term debtholders, profitability, extent of depreciable assets, appointment of a professional auditor, and size. These hypotheses are tested using 150 British companies from the years 1880/81, 1889/90 and 1899/01. Our results indicate that whether depreciation was charged is related to profitability and, to a lesser extent, to the presence of outside shareholders, long-term debt holders and the appointment of a professional auditor. However, the amount of depreciation charged is related only to profitability and appears to be opportunistically determined.     

中国证券市场反应偏差的研究——基于股票股利的实证研究

采用1998年-2004年的A股上市公司作为样本，试图从行为金融的角度出发，立足于反应偏差的研究，对股票股利的股价效应厦反应偏差演变进行研究，包含即对股票股利公告后股价在二级市场的反应以厦从纵向的角度来看，分析反应偏差程度的演变规律。研究发现：对于股票股利公告在公告的当天对股票价格产生显著的正超额收益率，并且对于股票股利公告普遍存在反应偏差，反应偏差度也随着时间的推移逐步明显减小。     

The Quasi-split Effect, Active Insiders and the Italian Market Reaction to Equity Rights Issues

The positive market reaction at the announcement of most European rights issues can be explained by two major factors which distinguish them from a US public offering: active insiders, and a quasi-split effect which signals a large increase in the dividend yield. An analysis of 428 Italian rights offerings and an event study involving 82 observations in the 1980–94 period show that Italian insiders are completely 'active', and almost 85 % of the equity rights issues result in a dividend yield increase, which corresponds to the quasi-split effect in approximately 40 % of the issues. The dividend yield rises, on average, by a significant +61 % after a combined rights offering and by a significantly lower +20 % following a fully-paid rights issue. The market reaction to the announcement is significantly positive for combined rights offerings (+ 2.77 %) and positive, but not significant, for the whole sample (+ 0.79 %). The dividend increase signalled by the quasi-split effect explains almost 30 % of the abnormal returns' cross-sectional variation and it is the only significant explanatory variable.     

高送转股利政策真的是套现“工具”吗？——来自A股市场的经验证据

2017年金融监管的全面升级使得高送转分红一时间从市场的“香饽饽”沦为备受质疑的“烫手山芋”。文章基于2007-2015年A股上市公司数据,综合运用PSM、IV-Probit模型等计量方法对高送转是否促进股票套进行实证分析。研究发现：（1）企业实施高送转相比于其反事实的非高送转方案存在明显的超额收益,从而为股票套现创造了有利条件,并且在有过减持行为的子样本中收益更高。（2）在有效控制了因果倒置反向因果的内生性问题后,大股东和高管的股票减持套现行为使得高送转的可能性出现了显著的正向提升,表明高送转背后隐藏着企业内部人有意识地利用了投资者的非理性偏好来实现自身理性的套现自利动机,即高送转具有“工具”性质,继而印证了“股票解禁-高送转-减持套现”的利益实现路径。（3）进一步分析表明二者间的关系还存在市场特征异质性,在牛市行情阶段及创业板为代表的中小创板块中,高送转配合套现的“工具”性质更为明显。本文从利益驱动视角为我国监管部门遏制高送转乱象提供了有力的经验证据,并据此提出一系列的政策建议。     

高管过度自信、过度悲观与股利羊群行为研究

以股改后的2007-2011年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察高管过度自信、过度悲观的非理性行为与股利羊群行为之间的关系。结果发现：存在过度自信和过度悲观心理行为高管的上市公司发生股利羊群行为的可能性较小,而存在适度理性高管的上市公司发生股利羊群行为的可能性较大。进一步对不同产权性质下二者的关系进行分析发现,与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司中高管过度自信与过度悲观对公司股利羊群行为的影响更为显著,而适度理性的高管却总是倾向于股利羊群行为。股利羊群行为是上市公司高管的理性选择。     

产品市场竞争的公司治理效应：基于股利政策的证据

以2004年至2007年深沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,探讨了产品市场竞争程度在上市公司股利政策中治理效应。对全样本进行回归,研究发现,产品市场竞争程度和每股现金股利呈正相关关系。通过分样本研究发现：在非国有控制样本中每股现金股利和产品市场竞争程度相关系数为正,与全样本相关性一致,但在国有控制样本中每股现金股利和产品市场竞争程度参数不显著,说明产品市场竞争在国有上市公司中并不对现金股利发放产生影响,同时反映了我国产品市场竞争程度还不够高。产品市场竞争程度较高样本组中每股现金股利和产品市场竞争程度在5%水平下显著为正,说明在集中度较高行业中的公司,趋向于支付更多的现金股利。     

Asymmetric information,dividends, and external financing

We analyze a signaling game where firms' dividend announcements convey private information but the possible need to externally finance the dividend creates an incentive conflict between inside and outside investors. Consequently, the attempt to address an adverse selection problem creates (or exacerbates) moral hazard. The interaction of these two imperfect information problems results in equilibria that may be separating or pooling. Additionally, the equilibrium may be only partially separating, i.e., firms are incompletely identified.     

Dividend Policies and Price-Volume Reactions to Cash Dividends on the Stock Market: Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

This study examines the effects of cash dividend payments on stock returns and trading volumes in the stock market. It also investigates whether there is any difference in the investment behavior of investors with respect to the dividend pay out ratio and size in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)from 1995 to 2003. Prices start to rise a few sessions before cash dividend payments, and on the ex-dividend day, they fall less than do dividend payments, finally decreasing in the sessions following the payment. Trading volume shows a considerable upward shift before the payment date and, interestingly, is stable after Thus, cash dividends influence prices and trading volumes in different ways before, at, and after payment, providing some profitable active trading strategy opportunities around the ex-dividend day. The findings support price-volume reaction discussions on the divident payment date and the significant effect of cash dividends on the stock market.     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

Dividends and Market Signalling: an Analysis of Corporate Insider Trading

This study tests the multiple‐signal theory of dividends of John and Lang (1991) in the context of a European market. Our evidence shows that investors are more sensitive to insider trading signals than to signalled changes in existing dividends. In effect, the insider sales signal is universally understood as bad news. After controlling for the quality of a firm's investment opportunities, investors are found to penalise dividend outflows by mature firms that exhibit more informed insider sales activity. Finally, we offer an innovative exploration of the role of earnings announcements in market reaction to the dividend signal.