国有资本经营预算能够提高地方国有企业投资效率吗？

以A股地方国有上市公司为研究对象，从投资效率的角度考察国有资本经营预算制度的实施效果，并进一步检验其对企业价值的影响。研究发现，国有资本经营预算能够显著抑制地方国有企业的非效率投资，尤其是抑制过度投资行为,并且这种影响对处于市场化程度较低地区的地方国有企业更加显著。进一步研究发现，国有资本经营预算能够通过抑制非效率投资来促进地方国有企业价值的提升。     

Incentives to move up: Effects of pay gaps between levels on employee performance

Employees of a certain rank are motivated by the pay gap between them and the levels above (upward comparison), and the pay gap between them and the levels below (downward comparison). In some cases, employees face multiple upward comparisons such as immediate and subsequent upward comparisons. We hypothesise that upward comparison matters more than downward comparison, and in the case of multiple upward comparisons, the immediate one matters more than the subsequent ones. We also hypothesise that the pay gap effect resulting from the upward/downward comparison ought to be non‐linear in that performance increases with pay gap size at a decreasing rate. The results from two empirical studies, namely, a longitudinal field study and a laboratory experiment, largely support our hypotheses.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

社会资本视角下我国环保市场的激励机制研究

社会资本是一种无形资本。本文通过分析我国环境保护市场的发展现状，明确社会资本视角下促进环境保护市场的意义，最终提出以内部社会资本为导向的环境产权激励措施，以外部社会资本为导向的财税激励措施，有利于我国环境保护市场的进一步完善。     

组织视角下的企业员工情绪管理

员工情绪管理是现代企业管理中新的课题。文章从组织的角度出发,将员工情绪分为个体情绪、组织情绪、企业情绪三个层次,对相关概念进行了界定。研究了激励理论与员工情绪管理的关系。将相关理论应用到实践当中,论述进行员工情绪管理应当遵循匹配和疏导的原则,并从引导员工树立正确的情绪管理、采取多种激励手段与员工积极进行沟通、丰富企业文化内涵等方面提出了具体对策。     

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

We extend the classical results on the Walras–core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible.     

Optimal insurance under rank‐dependent utility and incentive compatibility

Bernard, He, Yan, and Zhou (Mathematical Finance, 25(1), 154–186) studied an optimal insurance design problem where an individual's preference is of the rank‐dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal contract covers both large and small losses. However, their results suffer from the unrealistic assumption that the random loss has no atom, as well as a problem of moral hazard that provides incentives for the insured to falsely report the actual loss. This paper addresses these setbacks by removing the nonatomic assumption, and by exogenously imposing the “incentive compatibility” constraint that both indemnity function and insured's retention function are increasing with respect to the loss. We characterize the optimal solutions via calculus of variations, and then apply the result to obtain explicitly expressed contracts for problems with Yaari's dual criterion and general RDU. Finally, we use numerical examples to compare the results between ours and Bernard et al.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

基于声誉效应的工程监理激励机制模型研究

为了提高工程监理工作积极性,基于Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,引入声誉效应,建立声誉效应和显性激励机制相结合的动态委托代理激励模型。分析声誉效应发挥激励机制作用条件,并与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较。结果表明:声誉效应在满足一定的条件下,引入声誉激励机制能够增加业主的期望收益,并且能提高监理的努力水平。最后,通过数值仿真模拟验证引入声誉效应的合理性。     

国企多任务努力成本相关下的高管激励问题

本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom多任务委托代理模型的分析框架下,建立国有企业的三任务模型,探讨国企多任务努力成本相关下高管激励问题。研究发现,当多任务为互补时,实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务产生互补促进性作用,有利于经济性任务目标的实现,增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的提高。当多任务为替代时,实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务目标的实现产生阻碍作用,不利于经济性任务目标的实现,增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的减少。当多任务为不相关时,任务间努力成本互相独立,实现企业的政策性任务与其他任务努力成本不相关,应剥离政策性任务。该结论对于国有企业的任务选择与指派,以及存在多任务时的激励机制设计具有重要参考价值。