商业银行内部控制低效的成因及模式重构

我国商业银行金融风险的产生多是由内部控制低效造成,而内部控制低效又源于控制模式的不规范.因此,研究这一课题具有重要的理论价值和现实意义.为探索提高内部控制效果的有效途径,本文在分析我国商业银行内部控制低效成因的基础上,根据COSO报告和ERM的要求,构建了要素式动态控制的立体模式,并对这一模式的构成及其运行方式等进行了深入研究,为商业银行规范内部控制行为和降低金融风险提供了一种行之有效的管理手段.     

企业家行为、企业迁移、产业集群与农村城镇化政策

文章按照系统自组织理论,采取问卷调查、访谈和分组对比方法,以村镇企业迁移为考察切入点,对我国企业家行为、企业迁移与产业集群之间的联系展开研究。调查研究表明:企业迁移收敛于向区位条件优越、社会化服务和市场体系健全、私有产权保护良好、企业家受人尊重、自然及社会人文环境和谐、地方政府服务好的城镇集聚;企业家控制权与企业迁移呈正相关关系;企业家对产业集群的收益预期和对迁移成本的预期的高低是企业迁移的主要动因。乡镇产业集群政策体系和城镇化政策的要点是:以乡村企业家理性决策和理性迁移为政策立足点,通过公共财政政策的系统配置,以增加公共产品和政府服务、健全市场体系、保护私有产权、尊重企业家人格精神、促进社会人文环境和谐等措施来优化区位和环境,提高乡村企业家产业集群价值的预期,引导中小企业向工业园区或产业集群集聚。     

积极财政政策与私人投资关系的区域差异——基于中国东、中、西部面板数据的检验与分析

本文利用面板数据模型分别考察了积极财政政策对我国东、中、西部私人投资增长和差异的影响.分析表明,积极财政政策对东、中、西部的私人投资具有一定的正向影响,从而证实了积极财政政策的有效性.本文通过地方财政各项支出对私人投资产生的影响分析,表明东、中、西部要根据自身的经济发展水平来安排财政支出的结构.     

Managerial,organizational, and external drivers of sales effectiveness in export market ventures

The authors extend sales management theory by considering the role of export sales management in small- and medium-sized firms, and they develop an integrated model of export sales organization effectiveness. Specifically, the authors test 16 hypotheses that examine the relationships among export sales management control, export territory, psychic distance, export sales performance, and export sales organization effectiveness. Using a mail-survey approach, data were collected from U.K.-based export sales managers in 146 direct exporters of industrial products. Though certain anomalies are observed, the research findings support many of the hypothesized associations, confirming the robustness of existing sales management concepts and theories in an export-marketing context.

企业集团适时财务控制体系的研究与设计

为加强企业集团财务控制力度,提高企业集团整体竞争力,企业集团应充分利用网络资源,以网络技术为依托,构建以全面预算管理为框架、资金管理为核心、财务信息控制为保障的适时财务控制体系。     

充分发挥外汇政策作用支持阜新民营企业发展

国家外汇管理局阜新市中心支局适应新形势的需要,不断提高外汇管理和服务的水平,加大了对招商引资工作的支持力度,特别是大力支持民营企业的发展,千方百计支持出口创汇.一系列支持民营企业发展政策措施的实行,取得了较好的效果,促进了全市外向型经济的发展.     

加强高校内部控制制度的探讨

高校内部控制制度由控制环境、会计系统和控制程序所组成。加强高校内部控制制度,对于严肃财经纪律,保障学校权益和国有资产完整,有着十分重要的意义。     

Keeping Public Institutions Invested in Tobacco

Increasingly through the 1990s, tobacco control advocates questioned the practice of public institutions investing in tobacco company stocks. The questioning was framed in at least three ways. First, is it ethical to fund public expenditures with profits from a product that causes addiction and disease? Second, is it sound social policy to derive public income from a product that increases healthcare costs and reduces worker productivity? Finally, is it sound fiscal policy to invest in an historically profitable industry facing multiplying legal and regulatory challenges? While the tobacco industry preferred to restrict discussion to the fiscal question, and offered an affirmative answer, its position was weakened by depressed stock prices brought on by actions of the industry as much as by tobacco control activism. As part of a campaign to restore its credibility as an investment vehicle with public fund managers, Philip Morris (PM) commissioned a report from the influential investment managers/advisors Wilshire Associates. However, Wilshire had only recently conducted such a study for the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB), assuring the board that the value tobacco stocks added to an investment portfolio – if any – was too small to be measured. Nonetheless, within a year, Wilshire produced a report for PM which appeared to laud the investment value of tobacco and to dismiss tobacco-excluded investment alternatives. This paper examines how Wilshire produced apparently diametrically opposed reports for clients with different interests. It reveals a pattern of potential conflicts of interest among tobacco companies, financial analysis firms, investment authorities, and institutional fund managers. It demonstrates substantial violations of two generally accepted ethical principles of business consulting: veracity and transparency.     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Exchange Rate Pegs, Fiscal Policy and Credibility

In a fixed exchange rate regime, an exchange rate change can be a swift way to change the real exchange rate in the short run. Fiscal policy also affects relative prices, and fiscal policy response to various types of shocks can therefore be crucial for the credibility of an exchange rate peg. We develop a model within which fiscal policy plays a crucial role for ensuring the viability and thus credibility of an exchange rate peg. We use the insights of this model to take a closer look at Denmark, which has successfully pursued a fixed exchange rate policy since 1982.