Barriers to employee rights: Gender,selection, and the labor process

This article applies a labor process analysis to the issue of employment rights in the particular context of gender inequality and unlawful discrimination in the recruitment process. It criticizes conventional perspectives on employee rights for their failure to examine critically managerial power and prerogative and its implications for gender inequality. The article outlines two particular labor process theories of gender divisions and inequality. In exploring the strengths and weaknesses of these more critical perspectives, the article highlights the analytical significance that they ascribe to power asymmetries in the labor process and labor market. Building on this perspective, the analysis then presents empirical data on gender discrimination in the selection practices of contemporary UK organizations. The research material reveals how gender discrimination can be reproduced, rationalized, and resisted. These empirical findings are theorized through a combined labor process analysis of power, knowledge, and identity in recruitment practices. We conclude that labor process analysis facilitates our understanding of the deep-seated barriers that continue to impede the protection of employee rights in workplace practices.     

A note on the projection properties of Hadamard matrices obtained by the first Payley construction

We show that the projections on four factors of an arbitrary orthogonal array of strength 2 allow the estimation of main effects and two-factor interactions when all other effects are assumed to be zero, if those projections satisfy the bounds given by Weils theorem. The only exceptions are the Hadamard matrices of orders 16 and 24. A consequence is again the estimability of main effects and two-factor interactions for the projections on four factors of the first Payley construction for arbitrary run size.     

完善我国公司治理和财务治理模式的思考

随着国有企业改革的深化,人们越来越认识到公司治理和财务治理模式不完善是国有企业存在的深层次矛盾,是阻碍国有企业改革的关键所在,因此必须尽快完善我国国有企业公司治理和财务治理模式,才能使其适应市场的变化和竞争的要求。     

汽车行业供应链系统激励机制研究

针对整车企业、供应商、销售商、股东、管理层、员工对供应链的重要程度，设计不同的激励机制，最大限度地调动供应链系统各方面的积极性、主动性和能动性，构建具有竞争力的汽车行业供应链。     

Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights: A Note on Helpman's Model

This note analyses the effect of the policy of tightening Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on the rate of innovation in the North and on the welfare in both North and South in a model which is otherwise identical to Helpman (1993) except in the concept of knowledge capital. We assume that the South based imitated products do not contribute to the knowledge capital in the North. It is shown that the tightening of IPR raises the rate of innovation in the North and may improve the welfare of both North and South. These results are significantly different from those in Helpman (1993).     

Property rights protection and access to bank loans

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property – on the access to bank loans.     

控股股东、实际控制权与小股东权益保护

股权集中型公司是现代公司的主流组织形态之一,其代理成本主要产生于控股股东与小股东之间存在的利益冲突.通过发行多种类股票、交叉持股和金字塔式控股等方式,控股股东能够获取比与其股权份额相对应的名义控制权更大的实际控制权,因而更容易发生以侵害小股东权益作代价追求控制权私下收益的道德风险行为,致使代理成本高昂.声誉机制和法律手段能够迫使控股股东收敛侵占行为,且法律手段较声誉机制更为有效.在中国,声誉机制对控股股东基本不起作用,保护小股东权益的最为有效的措施是完善相关立法并加大执法力度.     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

战略环境评价中的公众参与及实施条件分析

本文简要介绍了战略环境评价中公众参与的含义，着重分析了我国公众参与战略环境评价的重要意义和作用，并立足我国国情对实施有效的公众参与所必需的制度框架和技术方法进行了深入探讨。