Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

A video game to supplement a hybrid principles of microeconomics course

In this article, the author describes the structure and content of a video game that she developed for a hybrid principles of microeconomics course that consists of two 50-minute lectures and a 50-minute online portion per week. The game comprises seven modules, each of which was assigned to be played during the course of the semester for the online portion of the class. The concepts covered in the game include the circular flow model, demand and supply, externalities, comparative advantage, types of market structure, sunk costs, and game theory, and the article explains in detail how the gameplay was related to these concepts. The game can be downloaded for either Windows or Mac computers, or played online at https://sites.google.com/site/gamesforecon/.     

基于层次聚类推理的在线品牌诊断研究及其服装系统实现

本文从服装品牌在线评估与诊断的实际需要出发,研究了面向服装品牌的在线诊断评价体系,给出了在线品牌诊断模型,提出案例推理与规则推理相结合的一种层次聚类推理方法,并根据品牌诊断流程和映射算法设计了品牌诊断推理机制,给出了一个服装在线品牌诊断系统的实现。     

国内外果品农残监测的分析

本文分析了我国及欧、美、日、澳、巴西等国家果品农药残留的监管措施，并就我国果品等农产品的农残监测提出建议。     

浅谈环境监测站仪器设备的管理

环境监测仪器设备历来被看作环境保护的眼睛和尺子,也是环境监测站重要的物质基础,充分发挥环境监测的技术监督、技术支持和服务的作用,加强监测仪器设备的管理势在必行。文章阐述了仪器设备管理中存在的问题,提出了加强仪器设备管理的措施,探讨了提高仪器设备价值的途径。     

关于重大工程编制移民安置规划并建立监测制度的思考

在移民安置量较大的建设工程准备阶段和实施阶段,可以考虑参照工程建设审批程序和实施过程中的质量监理制度,建立规范的移民安置规划审批制度和移民安置监测制度.移民安置规划制度从程序和内容对移民安置准备工作提出具体要求.对移民安置的实施要引入独立的外部监测机构,对安置工作进行监测评估.     

浅析网上书店的客户关系管理

本文以Amazon、BolChina及当当网上书店为例,从营销管理、销售管理和服务与技术支持三个方面进行CRM技术分析。相关的比较分析表明:CRM系统是网上书店提升客户满意度和忠诚度,增加企业利润和竞争力的关键所在。其CRM系统的理念、功能,对类似的网络零售业有极强的借鉴和启发作用。     

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.     

网络口碑信息对消费者购买决策的影响：一个实验研究

本文通过实验法考察了网络口碑信息对消费者购买决策的影响，就网络口碑的影响力在口碑信息类型、传播方向和产品涉入度不同的情况下会表现出哪些差异等问题作了分析。实验结果支持了所提出的6项假设，网络口碑信息对于消费者购买决策的影响力可能会随着口碑传播方向、信息类型以及产品卷入度的不同而呈现出显著差异的预测得到了证实；信息类型、传播方向和产品卷入度之间所存在的交互效应也会明显地作用到网络口碑对消费者购买决策的影响效果。     

网络商务声誉博弈新论

当前网络商务欺诈现象日益增多,使得刚刚兴起的网络经济出现发展性障碍.一般的研究中,较为注重信用制度在网络环境下的变革和建立.本文则以一个全新的视角,借助博弈方法,从网络市场销售商行为和动机入手进行研究,试图为我国网络经济的健康发展提供制度设计的理论依据.