我国上市公司管理法规研究

《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行）、《上市公司证券发行管理办法》和《上市公司收购管理办法》三大市场法规，构造完成我国上市公司管理的整体法律框架。研究我国上市公司管理的法规，有助于上市公司、管理层、发行人、收购方和投资者等利益相关主体把握新的市场特征和立法精神，实现自身利益的维护和财富增值。     

股票回购中内幕交易与股价操纵行为规制——由新《公司法》第一百四十三条引发的思考

新<公司法>增加了股票回购事由的条款,放宽了对股票回购的限制.但在股票回购的立法方面,总体上仍较为简单、粗略,缺乏具体的操作规则,没有形成完整、严密的规制体系.由于立法模式的差异,各国对股票回购过程中内幕交易及股价操纵行为的管制形式也有所不同.对欧美等国对股票回购过程中的内幕交易和股价操纵行为的监管进行比较分析,可以为我国股票回购实施过程中如何抑制股价操纵行为提供启示.     

论宏观调控——对我国2003年来宏观调控的几点认识

界定了宏观调控的内涵,论证了宏观调控的必要性,讨论了宏观调控的类型,对宏观调控成效与政策实施时长进行了模型分析,并对学术界就我国2003年开始的宏观调控成效的争论进行了简要的述评。     

配股融资股价效应的实证研究

随着我国股市的发展，上市公司的融资方式也不断创新，配股融资作为股权融资的一种方式逐渐成为上市公司再融资的首选。配股融资虽然具有许多优点，但是我国上市公司没有充分发挥配股融资的长处，为了“圈钱”而“圈钱”，并且资金配置效率低下，对股市的负面影响日渐突出。通过2000年实施配股的43家样本公司配股公告日股价的变动，对配股融资的股价效应进行实证分析，并提出相应的政策建议。     

资本约束对信贷扩张及经济增长的影响:分析框架和典型案例

监管当局的最低资本要求改变了传统货币政策传导机制。本文从银行信贷渠道和银行资本渠道两方面并借助简化的商业银行行为决策模型考察资本约束的信贷扩张效应,利用CC-LM模型讨论资本约束对经济增长的影响。本文认为,在资本短缺情况下,严格资本监管将导致贷款供给下降,进而对经济增长产生影响;1990年代美国、日本出现的信贷紧缩部分应归因于1988年资本协议的实施,监管当局和货币当局必须重视资本充足率监管的宏观经济效应。     

资本市场开放与公司内部控制质量——基于“沪港通”的证据

以中国“沪港通”交易制度的实施为政策背景,采用多时点双重差分模型,考察资本市场开放对标的公司内部控制质量的影响,研究发现,“沪港通”交易制度的实施显著提升了公司的内部控制质量,在控制其他因素并经过安慰剂检验、去除A+H股影响、改变周期范围等稳健性检验后,结论依然成立。机制检验表明,“沪港通”主要通过内部和外部两种机制对公司内部控制质量产生影响,其中,内部机制是对股价波动性风险控制,外部机制是审计师声誉风险与政府部门监管。     

Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions.      

Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.