享年次高的诺贝尔奖得主——新制度经济学大师罗纳德·科斯

1991年诺贝尔经济学奖得主、英国和美国(双重国籍)经济学家和法学家罗纳德·科斯是交易成本理论、科斯定理和科斯猜想的首创者,法律经济学和新制度经济学的开山鼻祖,产权理论和产权经济学的奠基人,他开启了产权理论、法律经济学和新制度经济学三个领域的研究方向。科斯是国际经济学界的泰斗级大师和巨匠,他在阐述经济组织产生的原理、交易成本分析以及推动法学、经济史和组织理论的发展方面作出重要贡献,发展了新古典经济学,开创了现代企业理论。科斯一生都关切和热爱中国,一直密切关注着中国的经济改革,其经济理论和深邃思想对中国的经济改革影响巨大而深远。     

COPENHAGEN,CANCÚN AND THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

The rise of a global welfare economics directed at the environmental challenges facing our planet represents a new policy phenomenon. This paper examines the most ambitious attempt so far to put such economics into practice via the Kyoto Protocol and more specifically the Clean Development Mechanism of the Protocol. The Copenhagen and Cancún climate change conferences have put an end to hopes of the Protocol serving as an effective tool in the mitigation of global warming. This failure of the new global welfare economics is the result of flawed principles, not just defective implementation.     

Why do farmers have so little interest in futures markets?

A farm financial model with leverage and investment in two farm enterprises is specified. The model is extended to incorporate futures hedging and the Separation Theorem is used to show that optimal hedging is zero. The assumption of a risk‐free asset is relaxed and, while this leads to a violation of the Separation Theorem, the result that optimal hedging is zero is maintained providing that futures markets are efficient. It is concluded that if capital markets are efficient then farmers will have little interest in futures markets except to speculate.     

证明函数零点问题的研究

证明函数有且只有一个零点,通过构造方程,转化成方程有且仅有一个实根的问题,然后利用闭区间上连续函数的性质以及微分中值定理或函数单调性即可证明。     

经济转型国家与资本外逃

中央集权的计划经济国家在经济体制转向市场经济的过程中普遍存在着资本外逃的问题,作为经济转型的成本之一,资本外逃加剧了转型国家宏观经济的不稳定,延长了经济转型过程中的阵痛期。回顾有关资本外逃和经济转型文献,从体制转型的角度剖析转型国家资本外逃的深层次原因,就如何防范、减少资本外逃提出相应的对策建议。     

庇古与科斯的规制理论比较

庇古和科斯的规制理论在观点上有着明显的冲突.庇古认为,由于外部性等原因,部分产品的边际私人纯产值与边际社会纯产值并不相等,因此政府必须界入进行管制,对外部性产品收取庇古税;科斯则认为,产权不清才是外部性成本的原因,由此提出了只要明确产权市场就能良好运行的科斯定理.科斯在庇古的基础上拓展了外部性规制理论,但"科斯定理"并不能超越和替代"庇古税".     

村级财务治理新机制:村务(财务)监督委员会及其制度的学理解析——基于浙江武义县后陈村的调查

本文从浙江武义县后陈村财务监督个案出发,以财务学、制度经济学与法学为主要分析工具,对后陈村村务（财务）监督委员会组织及其制度进行学理解析,最终提出一般性结论与建议.     

Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma

This paper explores how property-right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both “public good” and “public bad” components. We show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay, the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure. Thus, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group. To illustrate the result, we develop social-cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary-storage facilities to a permanent central repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, USA. For a representative city with a population of 226,195, the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is $1.42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear-waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to “health and safety.” That number swells to $5.95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right. Thus, property-right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear-waste, and thus nuclear energy, produced.     

Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Summary. Arrows original proof of his impossibility theorem proceeded in two steps: showing the existence of a decisive voter, and then showing that a decisive voter is a dictator. Barbera replaced the decisive voter with the weaker notion of a pivotal voter, thereby shortening the first step, but complicating the second step. I give three brief proofs, all of which turn on replacing the decisive/pivotal voter with an extremely pivotal voter (a voter who by unilaterally changing his vote can move some alternative from the bottom of the social ranking to the top), thereby simplifying both steps in Arrows proof. My first proof is the most straightforward, and the second uses Condorcet preferences (which are transformed into each other by moving the bottom alternative to the top). The third proof proceeds by reinterpreting Step 1 of the first proof as saying that all social decisions are made the same way (neutrality).Received: 9 July 2001, Revised: 2 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D7, D70, D71.John Geanakoplos: I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Chris Avery, Don Brown, Ben Polak, Herb Scarf, Chris Shannon, Lin Zhou, and especially Eric Maskin for very helpful comments and advice. I was motivated to think of reproving Arrows theorem when I undertook to teach it to George Zettler, a mathematician friend. After I presented this paper at MIT, a graduate student there named Luis Ubeda-Rives told me he had worked out the same neutrality argument as I give in my third proof while he was in Spain nine years ago. He said he was anxious to publish on his own and not jointly, so I encourage the reader to consult his forthcoming working paper. The proofs appearing here appeared in my 1996 CFDP working paper. Proofs 2 and 3 originally used Mays notation, which I have dropped on the advice of Chris Avery.