深化国有资产管理体制改革的取向分析

根据现代产权理论分析，无论产权的最终归属是谁，只要产权界定清晰，就是有效率的产权制度安排。而我国国有产权制度安排缺乏效率的主要症结正好在于国有产权界定不明晰，这说明国有资产管理体制存在弊端。为此，须加快国有产权制度创新，深化国有资产管理体制改革。     

城乡关系的自然顺序及其演变——亚当·斯密的城乡关系理论解析

经济地理学的理论渊源之一亚当.斯密关于城乡关系的系统理论阐释及其意义,却被经济地理学者忽视了。自然顺序揭示了城乡关系的本质和初始状态,认为城乡之间是一种基于产业分工而形成的互为市场的互利关系,并强调城镇的增设应该与农村和农业发展成比例。发展经济学家忽视了这种初始状态的意义,经济地理学家侧重于空间分布的解释。城乡关系主要受政策—文化和地理—贸易两组变量的制约与影响。特定的产业保护政策形成的风俗习惯以及地理条件(主要是临海的区位)的先天差异改变了自然顺序,导致反自然的演变结果和趋势。亚当.斯密历史和逻辑相结合的分析方法,贯穿于他对影响城乡关系的地理、经济、文化等诸要素的综合集成研究中,非常值得当代经济地理学家借鉴。     

On the dimensionality of bounds generated by the Shapley–Folkman theorem

The Shapley–Folkman theorem places a scalar upper bound on the distance between a sum of non-convex sets and its convex hull. We observe that some information is lost when a vector is converted to a scalar to generate this bound and propose a simple normalization of the underlying space which mitigates this loss of information. As an example, we apply this result to the Anderson (1978) core convergence theorem, and demonstrate how our normalization leads to an intuitive, unitless upper bound on the discrepancy between an arbitrary core allocation and the corresponding competitive equilibrium allocation.     

有限维线性空间直和分解问题的新探索

线性空间直和分解问题在数学、力学及许多应用领域有着广泛的应用。本文利用哈密尔顿-凯莱定理得到了n维向量空间的一个适用范围更为广泛的直和分解定理和一些重要推论,拓展了向量空间直和分解使用范围,通过范例说明直和分解的具体方法和实际过程。     

Does mother nature punish rotten kids?

The theory of parent-offspring conflict predicts that mothers and their offspring may not agree about how resources should be allocated among family members. An offspring, for example, may favor a later weaning date than does its mother. Despite a parent's physical superiority, it may be that offspring are able to manipulate their parents' behavior. In this paper, we investigate a two-locus population genetic model of weaning conflict in which offspring can attempt to extort resources from their parents by reducing their own chances of survival if their demands are not met. We find that the frequency of recombination between the genes controlling maternal behavior and those controlling juvenile behavior determines the evolutionary outcome of this genetic conflict. When these genes are tightly linked, the mother will be able to get her way. When they are not, offspring can successfully 'blackmail' their parents into providing additional resources.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

An existence theorem of intertemporal recursive utility in the presence of Lévy jumps

This paper presents an existence theorem for a class of backward stochastic integral equations. The main contribution is a generalization of Duffie and Epstein's [Duffie, D., Epstein, L., 1992. Stochastic differential utility, (Appendix C with Skiadas C.), Econometrica 60, 353–394.] existence theorem of intertemporal recursive utility to allow the information structure to be driven by a Lévy jump process. The existence theorem applies also for a more general class of utility functions, such as recursive utility with habit-formation, and can be used to prove the existence of an equilibrium asset price process as a unique solution to the stochastic Euler equation derived by Ma [Ma, C., 1993b. Valuation of Derivative Securities with Mixed Poisson–Brownian Information and Recursive Utility, McGill University, mimeo.].     

Durable goods with quality differentiation

We study the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities. The key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm's commitment problem, leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable-goods models or those of models where the firm can commit.     

Decentralizing Edgeworth equilibria in economies with many commodities

Summary. This paper proves core-equivalence theorems for exchange economies without ordered preferences, defined on locally convex Riesz commodity spaces such that the price space is a lattice. Properness assumptions are borrowed from some recent equilibrium existence results. Received: January 15, 1998; revised version: August 19, 1998     

Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution

Summary. Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively.Received: 13 June 2003, Revised: 13 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D51.This article is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, a friend since 30 years.Financial support of the DFG under grant #444 USA 111/2/03 is gratefully acknowledged.